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Postnational scholarship describes a world of blurred boundaries, flexible memberships and 
denationalized rights. Through an examination of statelessness in the developing-world, 
democratic States of The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, however, I demonstrate that 
possession of formal citizenship in the State is still necessary to access rights, freedoms and 
protections for those who are noncitizens everywhere. By focusing on how the human right to a 
nationality is instantiated in practice, I illustrate how State practices of citizenship denial and 
deprivation, especially toward persons of Haitian descent, make and keep certain groups of 
people “Other.” Such persons, I argue, are displaced, even though they remain physically rooted 
in the country of their birth. Their displacement is both legal and psychosocial as they are either 
forced to become liminal subjects or to take on a nationality with which they do not identify 
(Haitian). By demonstrating their peculiar form of displacement, and the large gap that exists 
between the proclamation of a human right to a nationality and its fulfillment in practice, I 
expose the fragility of membership in our allegedly postnational world. Finally, in order to 
remedy this gap and to advocate for a right to belong, I conclude by proposing an alternative 
“just membership,” as opposed to legal, framework from which to address statelessness and the 
fulfillment of a human right to a nationality.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice…is at stake when belonging to the 
community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter 
of choice” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 376). 
 
As the tide ebbs and flows, Luzena Dumercy looks out across the sea and explains how many 
Bahamian-born individuals of Haitian descent feel like they exist in limbo, “The Bahamas don’t 
want to claim you and Haiti don’t either…We are on our own because we don’t really have 
anyone looking out for us or looking for our interests to protect us.”1 Some 700 hundred miles to 
the south, Dumercy’s story of exclusion is repeated like the constant crash of waves against the 
shore as hundreds of thousands of Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent are stripped of 
their Dominican nationality.2 Rejected by the countries of their birth, these descendants of 
Haitian migrants question where they belong.  
Such individuals, I argue, are displaced; but their displacement is of a different kind than 
that of forced movement across or within borders. Their displacement is both legal and 
psychosocial. Due to the exclusionary citizenship practices of their State of birth, they are either 
forcibly placed within the liminal space of statelessness or forced to take on a nationality3 that 
they do not feel belongs to them (Haitian). In both instances, they struggle to find their place in 
the world. But where do these people, denied or deprived of citizenship in the countries of their 
birth, belong? What should the instantiation of a human right to a nationality look like for them? 
                                                        
1 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 12, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Dumercy 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Marsh Harbour on the aforementioned date. With the exception 
of “Marie St. Cecile,” no pseudonyms are used in the dissertation.  
2 As I explain in Chapter 4, the Dominican Constitutional Court, the highest court in the land, issued Sentence 
TC/0168/13 in 2013, which paved the way for the denationalization of hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of 
Haitian descent. This Sentence resulted in regional and international condemnation and public outcry from political 
progressives in the Dominican Republic and among the Dominican and Haitian émigré communities.  
3 Citizenship” and “nationality” are used interchangeably in the dissertation as is common practice in the literature 
on citizenship and statelessness. See, for example, Sokoloff (2005), United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees & the Inter Parliamentary Union (2005), Batchelor (2006) and Perks and de Chickera (2009). Citizenship 
refers to the legal bond between a person and the State at the domestic level and nationality refers to this bond at the 
international level. I prefer the term “citizenship,” however, since even boats have a “nationality” under 
international law. 
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As I answer these questions in the dissertation, and expose these individuals’ peculiar form of 
displacement, I expose the fragility of membership and demonstrate the continued relevance of 
Hannah Arendt in our allegedly postnational world. I illustrate how the seemingly benign 
practice of using the law to determine who should belong where can have pernicious 
consequences upon particular groups of people, especially the racialized “Other.” I finally show 
that far from a blurring of boundaries between citizens and noncitizens in a globalizing world, 
States are increasingly demarcating the distinctions between them.   
 In order to make these arguments and to investigate how the human right to a nationality 
(UN 1948) is instantiated in practice, I divide the dissertation into three parts. The first section, 
which includes this introductory chapter and chapter 2, discusses the debate over the relevance of 
citizenship in an era of human rights, situates my work in the extant scholarship on citizenship 
and statelessness, and describes why the non-fulfillment of a human right to a nationality is an 
issue of global import. The second part, which comprises chapters 3 through 5, forms the 
empirical backbone of the study. In this section I illustrate how Bahamian- and Dominican-born 
persons of Haitian descent are rendered liminal subjects or forced to be Haitian via exclusionary 
practices of citizenship denial and/or deprivation in the countries of their birth. I show how these 
individuals’ displacement affects their sense of belonging and that citizenship, or formal 
belonging to a State, remains significant. The third section of the dissertation contains the 
concluding chapter, which outlines a just membership framework from which to address 
statelessness and the fulfillment of a human right to a nationality.  
Citizenship, the State and Human Rights 
Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II, Arendt described how millions of people 
were essentially rendered non-human through denationalization procedures and forced migratory 
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movement. These people, who had once belonged to the community of nations as citizens of 
some State, were now stateless, “the scum of the earth” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 341). They “lived 
outside the pale of the law” (ibid., 353) and were homeless, unprotected beings whom no State 
was willing to adopt. Human rights, which were supposed to apply to all persons regardless of 
national origin or other status, had ceased to exist for them because “it turned out that the 
moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum 
rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them” 
(ibid., 370).  
The stateless epitomized the hollowness of human rights discourse for Arendt. When a 
man “is nothing but a man,” she argued, he loses “the very qualities which make it possible for 
other people to treat him as a fellow-man” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 381). As a stateless person, 
Arendt knew what it was like to be without a place to call home and she consequently argued 
that the primary human right was “to belong to some kind of organized community,” where 
one’s opinion and actions mattered and where other rights could be fulfilled (ibid., 376 and 377). 
This, she contended, was the “right to the human condition itself” (ibid., 631). 
Since Arendt’s time, the “right to have rights” has been interpreted in many different 
ways.4 The first and most common usage is that of the right to formal citizenship in a State or the 
right to a nationality.5 In other cases the non-formal aspect of political belonging, such as “the 
right of political inclusion” (Michelman 1996, 205) or “the right to politics” (Schaap 2011, 33), 
is considered. Others define it as the right to personhood, whether this is “the right…to be a legal 
person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status of their political 
                                                        
4 See Kesby (2012) for a thorough analysis of the different ways in which the right to have rights has been 
interpreted and how each interpretation results in the exclusion of some group of people. 
5 See Perez v. Brownell (United States Supreme Court 1958), Gibney (2009) and Weissbrodt and Collins (2006, 
248). 
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membership” (Benhabib 2004, 3) or “the right to human personhood–recognition as a moral 
equal” (Somers 2008, 25). Yet despite the various understandings of the “right to have rights,” 
no right to belong, at least as Arendt understood it, exists.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) perhaps comes closest to a right to 
belong when it asserts that each person has a right to a nationality (UN 1948, Article 15);6 that is, 
to belong formally to a State. But the UDHR nowhere describes how this right is to be 
implemented. Even its hard law offspring7 are silent when discussing how to translate the right to 
a nationality “into a specific, actionable duty on the part of any particular state” (Goldston 2006, 
339). As Paul Weis writes, “There are no rules of international law which impose a duty on 
States to confer their nationality on certain individuals at birth” (1956, 242). The right to a 
nationality is therefore “a right without a remedy” (ibid.).8  
The American Convention on Human Rights, the human rights treaty organ of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), also asserts that each person has the right to a 
nationality, and goes further than the UDHR by declaring that it is a non-derogable right (OAS 
1969, Articles 20 and 27). The OAS is also remarkably Arendtian in that it contends that the 
right to a nationality is not only inviolable, but is “one of the most important rights of man, after 
the right to life itself, because all the prerogatives, guarantees and benefits man derives from his 
membership in a political and social community—the State—stem from or are supported by this 
                                                        
6 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) specifies that “[i]ndigenous peoples and individuals 
have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the 
community or nation concerned” (UN 2007b, Article 9). It is, however, particular to indigenous peoples’ right to 
belong and not to human beings’ right to belong to a given community generally. 
7 Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), for 
example, says that nationality is a civil right (UN 1965). Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) asserts the right of every child to acquire a nationality (UN 1966), as does Article 7 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (UN 1989). Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women affirms that a woman has the right to acquire, change and retain her 
nationality (UN1979) and Article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities states that persons 
with disabilities have the right to obtain a nationality and change this nationality regardless of their disability (UN 
2007a). 
8 See also Chan (1991, 3) and Donner (1994, 245). 
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right” (OAS 1977). The human right to a nationality, therefore, is both an intrinsic and an 
instrumental human right. As I show in chapters 2 and 5, it must be fulfilled in order for people 
to access any number of other human rights (from education, work and healthcare to social 
security, a juridical personality and freedom of movement).9 Once again, however, it is nowhere 
delineated how the right to formally belong to a State should be enacted. Only prohibitions exist. 
Alice Sironi, for instance, outlines the following propositions   
as corresponding to international customary law:…the prohibition of impinging 
on the rules on nationality of other states, the prohibition of forced conferral of 
nationality upon individuals who have another nationality, the prohibition of 
discrimination in the granting or withdrawal of nationality, the right to change 
nationality or to renounce to a nationality [sic], and the obligation to prevent 
statelessness at birth and in the context [of state] succession (2004, 55).10  
 
Donner (1994, 196), Spiro (2004, 99), Hailbronner (2006, 64), van Waas (2008, 39), and Adjami 
and Harrington (2008, 103) also argue that a norm against statelessness exists and the 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law states that loss of 
citizenship is not permitted unless a person “possesses another nationality or unless and until he 
acquires another nationality” (League of Nations 1930, Article 7). The Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness similarly claims that a person should not lose nationality from one 
State until acquiring the nationality of another State first (UN 1961, Articles 5-7). Nationality is 
therefore important in the international sphere. It is the means by which a person is linked to 
international law and confers diplomatic protection when a citizen is abroad.11 It is thus “the 
essential condition for securing to the individual the protection of his rights in the international 
sphere” (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006, 248). Moreover, it is the primary means by which the 
world’s population is ordered among the diverse States. 
                                                        
9 In “The Legal Status of Statelessness: An overview” (forthcoming, University of Pennsylvania Press) I explain 
how the violation of a right to a nationality affects the enjoyment of other human rights. 
10 Weis posits, however, that “[s]tatelessness is not inadmissible under international law” (1956, 128). 
11 Refer to Bauböck et al. (2006, 15) and Morsink (1999, 80). 
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 It bears stressing again, however, that no concomitant right to belong follows and no duty 
bearer is evident.12 Thus while most States seem to accept the international norm that people 
must not be deprived arbitrarily of their citizenship, fewer are willing to accept that they must 
provide membership to the stateless populations on their territory, or that they cannot deny or 
revoke citizenship from individuals on “reasonable” grounds, even if it renders them stateless. It 
is for these reasons, and others, that more than 12 million people are stateless globally (UNHCR 
2013b).  
Whereas Arendt firmly believed that formal belonging, or citizenship in the State, is 
necessary to access rights, freedoms and protections, recent scholarship challenges this position. 
Beginning with Yasemin Soysal’s Limits of Citizenship (1994), it has become increasingly 
common for scholars to describe citizenship as a status that is losing importance in a globalizing 
world of increased migratory movements and human rights provisions. Soysal’s work 
concretized the concept of postnationalism, wherein “the logic of personhood supersedes the 
logic of national citizenship” as the “organizing principle of membership in contemporary 
polities” (Soysal 1994, 164). Through her study of guest workers in several European countries, 
Soysal argued that citizens and noncitizens were basically treated the same way when it came to 
rights provisions. She found that the basis for this similarity in treatment was host-State respect 
for the human rights regime, which acknowledges the rights of all persons regardless of race, 
national or social origin. Soysal therefore posited that  
contemporary membership formations have superseded the dichotomy that 
opposes the national citizen and the alien, by including populations that were 
previously defined as outside the national polity. Rights that used to belong solely 
                                                        
12 See chapter 2, pp. 56-57 for an example of how ambiguity over where a stateless person belongs becomes 
particularly problematic when said individual could arguably belong to either of two States. In such cases, host 
States may “pass the buck,” contending that while they may have a duty to prevent statelessness, it is not their ‘duty’ 
to provide citizenship to said person, but the duty of some other State. 
 7
to nationals are now extended to foreign populations, thereby undermining the 
very basis of national citizenship (1994, 137). 
 
Works from diverse scholarly genres have since taken a postnational orientation and sought to 
illustrate the changing nature of the citizen-State relationship. Some authors have followed in 
Soysal’s footsteps by investigating the impact of the human rights regime on State treatment of 
noncitizens. David Jacobson (1996), for example, contends that the new international order is 
based upon human rights and has effectively devalued citizenship in the State as it erodes “the 
distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘alien’” (Jacobson 1996, 8-9 and 39). Linda Bosniak similarly 
argues that “the status of aliens in liberal democratic societies is, in many respects, hardly 
distinguishable from that of citizens” (2006, 34) due to noncitizens’ ability to press human rights 
claims and enjoy the rights of citizenship without possessing formal citizenship status. Seyla 
Benhabib also concludes in her respective works on noncitizen rights that “one does not have to 
be part of a territorially defined people to enjoy human rights” (Benhabib 2001, 36).13  
Thus, whereas Arendt deemed personhood insufficient for rights enjoyment, the premise 
of many scholars writing in the postnational vein is that personhood is enough to access human 
rights. Bosniak, for instance, directly challenges Arendt’s position by asserting that 
“[c]itizenship…is not actually ‘the right to have rights,’ despite the conventional wisdom. In 
many situations, only personhood is required” (2006, 117). Jean Cohen likewise declares that 
“many rights that used to be construed exclusively as the rights of citizens are now deemed the 
rights of persons that must be respected everywhere” (1999, 258). Yishai Blank similarly 
observes how States are granting “an impressive and ever-growing catalogue of social and 
economic rights, as well as various political rights” to noncitizens (2007, 438). He contends that 
States are even “moving in the direction of granting de facto citizenship, i.e., the substantive 
                                                        
13 See also Jacobson (1996, 2), and Basok, Ilcan and Noonan (2006). 
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content of citizenship (often devoid of the political rights)” to those who hold no citizenship 
from anywhere – the stateless (ibid.).  
 Beside examining the human rights impact upon the citizen-State relationship, other 
scholars have taken another Limits of Citizenship approach, focusing on “the emergence of 
membership that is multiple in the sense of spanning local, regional, and global identities, and 
which accommodates intersecting complexes of rights, duties, and loyalties” (Soysal 1994, 166). 
Thus while Arendt focused on formal membership in the State, these scholars study the diverse 
citizenship types or ways of belonging that exist in the contemporary era: from cultural 
(Kymlicka 1995), transnational (Bauböck 2007), deterritorialized (Ferme 2004; Teune 2009), 
denationalized (Sassen 2006), documentary (Sadiq 2009), flexible (Ong 1999; Nyamnjoh 2007), 
anational (Kostakopoulou 2008), postnational (Soysal 1994; Benhabib and Resnik 2009), post-
sovereign (Murphy and Harty 2003), global (Cabrera 2010), quasi (Gilbertson 2006) and the 
“citizenship of aliens” (Bosniak 2006). In so doing, they illustrate – contra Arendt – that formal, 
legal citizenship is no longer so important to act in and belong to a polity.  
These works tend to directly or indirectly portray formal citizenship in the State as a 
“waning,” “partially obsolete,” “anachronistic,” “possibly changed institution” or one that is 
undergoing “crisis” (Benhabib, Shapiro, and Petranovic 2007, 14; Hailbronner 2003, 75; Cohen 
1999, 247; Sassen 2006, 280; Benhabib 2004, 143; McNevin 2011, 143).14 They question 
whether “the idea of territorial state citizenship–as distinct from personhood–remain[s] 
important?” and whether “human rights [are] replacing citizenship as the most important rights-
bearing ideas and legal norms?” (Jackson 2009, 443). In response to these questions and to 
challenge the postnationalists’ assertion of the decoupling of human rights from citizenship and 
the weakening of the citizen-State relationship, I examine statelessness in the developing world 
                                                        
14 See also Falk (2000), Jacobson (1996) and Muller (2004). 
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and find that citizenship is still necessary to access rights, freedoms and protections and that it is 
not yet a “waning” institution.  
Challenging Postnational Accounts 
The majority of postnational-oriented scholarship is limited by its focus on developed world, 
democratic States and their provision of rights and protections to noncitizens. Very few works 
have examined the relationship between citizenship status and access to rights and protections in 
developing world, democratic States.15 This is somewhat surprising given that Soysal clearly 
states that her postnational arguments “are not exclusive to Europe. As the transnational norms 
and discourse of human rights permeate the boundaries of nation-states, the postnational model is 
activated and approximated world-wide” (1994, 156). More recently, Bosniak asserts that “the 
status of aliens in liberal democratic societies is, in many respects, hardly distinguishable from 
that of citizens” (2006, 34) as “a great many of the rights commonly associated with equal 
citizenship and economic citizenship are not confined to status citizens at all but are available to 
territorially present persons” in “most other liberal democratic states” (ibid., 117).16 I contend 
that this selection bias results in an overly optimistic assessment of the degree to which 
citizenship is no longer important to access rights, freedoms and protections in the contemporary 
era.  
 Additionally, despite the increased attention that has been given to noncitizens in recent 
migratory, citizenship and human rights research, as well as in political theory, scant 
consideration has been given to stateless people who represent the epitome of what it means to 
be a noncitizen. Unlike the subjects of most of the postnational-oriented literature, which 
generally consist of refugees, the undocumented, guest workers and their descendants, and other 
                                                        
15 Manby (2009) and Kraxberger (2005) are notable exceptions in the African context, although their work is not 
postnational in orientation. 
16 See also Brubaker (1989, 146 and 155). 
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types of noncitizens who are actually citizens of some State, stateless persons are “not 
considered…national[s] by any State under the operation of its law” (UN 1954). They are thus 
distinct to the aforementioned groups who may be noncitizens in their country of residence or 
employment, but who are not necessarily stateless as they have a “country of origin” and are still 
recognized as citizens under the operation of some State’s law.  
Also, unlike the former groups, who in most instances are migrants of one type or 
another, stateless people are “noncitizen insiders” (Belton 2011). They are insiders because they 
have not migrated from elsewhere. They remain, for the most part, in the States where they were 
born. But they are noncitizens because the State where they were born either rejects them as 
members or does not fully provide the means by which they can be prevented from falling into 
statelessness. They are consequently unable to enjoy many of the rights that immigrant 
noncitizens enjoy because they are not always considered legal or “lawful” residents of the States 
within which they reside. Moreover, unlike unauthorized or irregular migrants, the stateless 
cannot easily be deported because they have no country of their “own” to which to be returned. 
Indefinite detention is thus often a real possibility (Perks and de Chickera 2009, 49). 
The stateless are also distinct from refugees. Refugees are sometimes considered de facto 
stateless because they do not enjoy the protection of their State of citizenship or few (if any) of 
the rights and freedoms associated with that State’s citizenship. In contrast to stateless people, 
refugees are defined as persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution in their countries of 
citizenship because of certain political beliefs that they hold or ascriptive criteria. They 
consequently flee across an international border in order to seek safety from such persecution. 
Refugees are still typically recognized as nationals under the operation of a given State’s laws, 
however, and stateless people do not necessarily cross an international border to escape 
 11
persecution. In fact, some groups of stateless people belong to communities that have lived for 
generations as stateless people within a State’s territory.  
Finally, refugees have a particular – and developed – international framework of 
protection that the stateless lack. The stateless do not have “the assistance, benefits or attention 
of government or humanitarian communities” (Cordell 2011, n. pag.), and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the body mandated with the protection of refugees 
as well as stateless persons, notes that “statelessness is one of the most neglected areas of the 
global human rights agenda” (UNHCR 2011, 2). One of its Senior Protection Officers, Janice 
Marshall, admits that “[i]t is not that we are responsible for every stateless person worldwide, the 
way we more or less are for refugees because of the statute of the UNHCR” (Voice of America 
2009, n. pag.). Moreover, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees asks States party to 
not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees 
who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened 
in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without 
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities 
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence (UN 1951, Article 31).  
 
No similar stipulation exists in the statelessness conventions. Stateless people can thus be 
penalized for their “unlawful” presence by the very States that made them unlawful in the first 
place via their exclusionary citizenship practices. Consequently, the stateless are “perhaps even 
more vulnerable than refugees due to their near-total lack of ability to exercise their human 
rights” (Glickman 2010, n. pag.) and due to the limited lack of international attention and 
protection afforded to them.  
Not only have the stateless been largely ignored in international policy-making and 
human rights circles until recently, it is only in the past few years that academic research on 
statelessness has really taken off. Such scholarship has generally been either legal and/or 
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technical in perspective, focusing on differences in nationality laws, lack of birth registration, 
crises of State succession and gaps in protection17; or advocacy and/or human rights-based, 
describing the living conditions of stateless people, recording human rights violations against 
them, and making policy suggestions.18 While a few comparative and single-case studies exist,19 
very few works “have been prepared to tackle the practical faces of statelessness and offer a 
focused critique of the human rights regime that takes account of how it functions in 
implementation” (Sawyer and Blitz 2011, 307). I take this critique seriously in the dissertation by 
illustrating how the failure to fulfill the human right to a nationality (UN 1948, Article 15) in 
practice has repercussions on the enjoyment of other human rights for stateless people and on 
their sense of belonging.20  
Whereas the legal and technical literature is faithful to the de jure definition of 
statelessness – a stateless person is one “who is not considered as a national by any State under 
the operation of its law” (UN 1954) – recent social science scholarship has begun to advocate for 
a less legalistic and more experiential understanding of statelessness. In Statelessness in the 
European Union (2011), for example, Brad Blitz and Caroline Sawyer affirm that their “research 
suggests that it is the experiences that people who are deprived of the rights of citizens which 
better characterise situations of statelessness” and not formal lack of citizenship per se (2011b, 
282). They therefore concentrate on “effective statelessness” where access to rights is 
                                                        
17 See, for example, Batchelor (1995, 1998 and 2006), Bosniak (2000), Massey (2010) and van Waas (2008).  
18 See for instance, Belton (2013), Lynch (2005), Kingston et al. (2010), Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (2006), Perks and de Chickera (2009), Southwick and Lynch (2009) and Weissbrodt and Collins 
(2006). 
19 For example, Belton (2010a and b), Blitz (2006), Blitz and Lynch (2009), Chari et al. (2003), Ghosh (2004), 
Heffernan (2002), Khan (2001), Lynch and Ali (2006), Singh (2010), Sokoloff (2005), van Waas (2010) and Zorn 
(2004). Note that these themes also exist in the literature concerning noncitizens generally; see, for instance, Lillich 
(1984), Tiburcio (2001), Goldston (2006), Bosniak (2006) and Weissbrodt (2008). 
20 It is important to note, however, that Soysal does not examine how specific rights are implemented in practice in 
Limits of Citizenship. When she finds that noncitizens’ rights “do not differ significantly from those of citizens, and 
that the rights of noncitizens are increasingly standardized across host polities” (1994, 119-120), she admits that her 
“concern in this study is the organization and articulation of incorporation policy and membership rights, not their 
implementation and practice” (ibid., 10).  
 13
jeopardized “whether or not [a person] hold[s] another nationality” (Blitz and Sawyer 2011a, 6). 
The stateless groups in Blitz and Sawyer’s edited volume thus consist of authorized and 
unauthorized migrants, refused asylum seekers, and “immigrants whose permission to remain 
had changed or expired” (Blitz and Sawyer 2011b, 281), as well as “precarious residents” “who 
currently live within modern European states but do not or cannot claim the protection of 
membership in these states” (Gibney 2011, 45).21  
Margaret Somers puts forth a similar understanding of statelessness in Genealogies of 
Citizenship (2008). In this work, she uses the term “stateless” to refer to those who are socially 
and politically excluded. Examining the treatment African-Americans received during and post-
Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf area of the United States, Somers argues that although they were 
U.S. citizens, they were in practice “no longer in any meaningful sense citizens; they were now, 
in effect, stateless people” (ibid., 114). They had been “expelled from the rights-bearing terrain 
of the rule of law, from protection by the social state (usually called the welfare state), and from 
access to the public sphere” (ibid., 118). She adds that “[w]ith no meaningful participation and 
with only the thinnest of connections to civil and legal rights, they are, in effect, left stateless and 
rightless” (ibid., 133).22  
These more experiential understandings of statelessness fall within the sphere of de facto 
statelessness. Although UNHCR defines de facto stateless persons as those who are “outside the 
country of their nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail 
themselves of the protection of that country” (Massey 2010, 61), other perspectives exist. For 
instance, in some cases de facto statelessness is described as the condition of being unable to 
                                                        
21 The latter’s situation, Matthew Gibney argues, is “characterized by statelessness” because those individuals are 
deprived of access to the rights that citizens enjoy (2011, 52). 
22 Somers’ stateless populations are therefore like Arendt’s “half stateless” – individuals who were de jure citizens 
of a State, but who were also minorities and consequently not treated as citizens (Arendt [1948] 2004, 352). 
 14
prove one’s nationality. This may result because an individual’s birth is never registered, or 
because he or she is an undocumented migrant or a trafficked person, or because identity 
documents are purposely destroyed.23 In other cases, de facto statelessness is defined as the lack 
of “effective” citizenship, which can mean a lack of government protection24 or the inability to 
enjoy rights.25 Additionally, in the more recent climate change work on statelessness, UNHCR 
asserts that those people who lose their State of citizenship due to rising sea levels could be 
rendered de facto stateless (Park 2011, 14).26 
The present work acknowledges that a fine line separates de jure and de facto 
statelessness. People who are persecuted by their governments, who cannot count on the latter’s 
protection, or who are unable to access most of the rights of citizenship are in stateless-like 
situations. UNHCR even admits that the de facto stateless should be treated as much as possible 
as if they were de jure stateless (Massey 2010, 60), and in its Expert Meeting on The Concept of 
Stateless Persons under International Law concluded that “some categories of persons hitherto 
regarded as de facto stateless are actually de jure stateless, and therefore particular care should 
be taken before concluding that a person is de facto stateless rather than de jure stateless” 
(UNHCR 2010, 5). 
Since one of my primary aims is to demonstrate the continued significance of possessing 
citizenship in the contemporary era, my focus is upon those who are stateless in practice. I 
purposefully stress the “in practice” element because, in theory – and as I explain in chapters 3 
and 4 – individuals may fall under the operation of a given State’s law as a national, but in reality 
                                                        
23 See, for example, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2005, 89), Kanics (2011, 131), Macklin (2007, 365), 
Manly (2007, 257), Southwick and Lynch (2009, 1) and Weissbrodt and Collins (2006, 263). 
24 See, for instance, Brouwer (2003, 4), Perks and de Chickera (2009, 44) and Robinson ([1955] 1997, 7). Note, 
however, that Massey points out that lack of protection is “a key defining characteristic of a stateless person, be the 
person stateless de jure or stateless de facto” (2010, 2). 
25 Refer to Manly (2007, 257) and Weissbrodt and Collins (2006, 263). 
26 Park also notes that de jure statelessness would arise if States do not offer diplomatic recognition to a government 
that loses its physical territory (2011, 18). 
 15
they do not possess said State’s citizenship. Both The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic 
(DR), for example, deny that statelessness is an issue on their territories. They point to Article 11 
of the Haitian Constitution, which declares that any person born of a Haitian mother or father 
who has not renounced his or her Haitian citizenship is also a Haitian at birth (Government of 
Haiti 2011). These governments’ position is that the offspring of Haitian migrants born on their 
soil are Haitian citizens through their parents. It therefore does not matter whether or not they 
have Bahamian or Dominican citizenship.  
Yet, as UNHCR’s “Guidelines on Statelessness” makes clear, determining whether an 
individual is stateless “requires a careful analysis of how a State applies its nationality laws in an 
individual’s case in practice” (2012a, 5; italics added). UNHCR asserts that “[t]he reference to 
‘law’ in Article 1(1) [of the 1954 statelessness convention] should be read broadly to encompass 
not just legislation, but also ministerial decrees, regulations, orders, judicial case law (in 
countries with a tradition of precedent) and, where appropriate, customary practice” (ibid.) when 
determining whether a person is stateless. Such an approach, they contend, “may lead to a 
different conclusion than one derived from a purely objective analysis of the application of 
nationality laws of a country to an individual’s case” (ibid.).  
Using such an approach, I find – and illustrate in chapters 3 and 4 – that many individuals 
of Haitian descent, born in The Bahamas or the Dominican Republic of Haitian migrants do not 
fall under the operation of Haitian law in practice. They are consequently rendered de jure 
stateless. I thus contend that we must move away from an overly formal or legalistic 
understanding of statelessness – such as a reliance on what a national constitution says as 
opposed to what people live every day – in order to understand how the human right to a 
nationality is implemented or fulfilled in reality. 
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The present work is about more than arguing that such people are de jure stateless, 
however. Whether a State formally recognizes a person as a national under the operation of its 
law in practice is important, especially as pertains to the possibilities of rights fulfillment and 
State protection, but equally important is an examination of what State practices of citizenship 
denial and deprivation have upon people’s sense of belonging or their “place identity.”  
“[P]lace identity answers the question—Who am I?—by countering—Where am 
I? or Where do I belong? From a social psychological perspective, place identities 
are thought to arise because places, as bounded locales imbued with personal, 
social, and cultural meanings, provide a significant framework in which identity is 
constructed, maintained, and transformed. Like people, things, and activities, 
places are an integral part of the social world of everyday life; as such, they 
become important mechanisms through which identity is defined and situated 
(Cuba and Hummon 1993, 112). 
 
Thus whereas chapters 3 and 4 focus upon State practices of inclusion and exclusion, chapter 5 
concentrates on where those who have been denied or deprived of citizenship feel that they 
belong. It demonstrates how the lack of a national home or place affects their “expectations for 
the future” (Weil 1955 qtd. in Relph 1976, 38) and psychologically displaces them, even though 
they remain physically rooted. They consequently lack “a secure point from which to look out on 
the world, a firm grasp of [their] position in the order of things” (Relph 1976, 38).  
While refugees, travellers and different types of migrants have been the subjects of “an 
explosion of work which considers the role of place in the production of outsiders” or people 
“who are said to be ‘out-of-place’” (Cresswell 2004, 103), displacement has not been a typical 
lens through which to study statelessness. A recent theoretical, but empirically informed work 
that examines statelessness from the vantage of displacement, however, is Victoria Redclift’s 
Statelessness and Citizenship: Camps and the Creation of Political Space (2013). Through her 
case study of the Biharis of Bangladesh and their camp-based displacement, Redclift exposes the 
messiness of contemporary membership and how individuals are able to perform acts of 
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citizenship outside of State-defined boundaries. “[C]itizenship and ‘statelessness’ are not stable 
identities of law and fact,” she finds, “but a shifting assortments [sic] of exceptions, rejections, 
inclusions and denials” (2013, 170).  
This dissertation, as noted earlier, comes at displacement from a different perspective. 
Instead of illustrating how acts of citizenship are performed outside of Statist understandings of 
belonging from spaces of displacement,27 I argue that we need to approach statelessness as a 
form of psychosocial displacement. One need not be encamped or physically pushed across 
borders to suffer the effects of displacement from a home. One can be physically rooted, yet 
displaced. Thus, while David Hanauer describes how migrants and their host-State born children 
“are defined in essentialist terms as representatives of their heritage countries” and “are 
symbolically returned to their native lands” in the process (2011, 203), the case studies I present 
here reveal that their displacement is much more than symbolic. The Bahamian and Dominican-
born offspring of Haitian migrants are “returned” to a “native land” they have never seen (Haiti) 
via citizenship denial and deprivation in the countries of their birth.  
Such displacement – even if not always physical in the form of deportation – affects their 
sense of identity and belonging in very concrete ways. As I demonstrate in chapter 5, the realm 
of statelessness is more than one where the law ceases to operate or where rights are difficult to 
achieve. It is one, as Arendt recognized, in which one’s place in the world becomes ambiguous, 
or even outright negated. The ramifications of their displacement are portentous not only for 
them, but – as I explain in chapter 2 – for society and the international system of States. In the 
concluding chapter I therefore present a theory of just membership that addresses statelessness 
                                                        
27 Kelly Staples’ Retheorising Statelessness: A Background Theory of Membership in World Politics discusses how 
the stateless can be included in the “character of citizenship” (2012, 16) without possessing this status formally. See 
also the scholarship on political action among noncitizens in the United States and the sans papiers in France 
(Suárez-Navaz et al. 2007; Manzano et al. 2009; McNevin 2011; Monforte and Dufour 2011). 
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from a less Statist and more individualistic perspective. The next section explains how I go about 
making these arguments and challenging postnational claims on the decoupling of human rights 
from citizenship and the weakening of citizenship in the State.  
Methods 
This study engages primarily in theory-testing and, to a lesser degree, theory-building. It tests 
postnational claims about the weakening of citizenship as an institution and the decoupling of 
human rights from it, but it also pushes us to consider the fulfillment of a human right to a 
nationality from a less legalistic perspective to one of justice. For the theory-testing portion of 
the dissertation, I perform a comparative case study of statelessness in the Caribbean States of 
The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. I contend that the Caribbean stands as a valid testing 
ground for evaluating postnational claims about the decoupling of human rights from citizenship 
because “no other region” in the developing world “has had, for so long, so many liberal 
democratic polities” (Domínguez 1993, 2).  
Freedom House, which scores States according to their practices in the areas of civil 
liberties and political rights, classifies all the countries in the Caribbean – with the exception of 
Cuba and Haiti – as “free” (2013). Caribbean States thus score well in the categories of political 
participation, freedom of speech and of the press, social and economic freedoms, and the rule of 
law, among other criteria. Specifically, The Bahamas earns the highest freedom scores possible 
(1 out of 7) in both civil liberties and political rights, while the Dominican Republic scores 
slightly lower, earning a score of 2 (out of 7) in each category, respectively.  
Beside the comparative “liberal/democratic” nature of the region, “statelessness is also an 
issue of UNHCR concern in the Caribbean” (UNHCR 2012c), making the region a significant 
case study of this phenomenon from both a policy and academic vantage. Statelessness is an 
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issue in the region for several reasons. First, several countries do not grant citizenship 
automatically to children born of noncitizens on their soil.28 Individuals are thus at risk of 
statelessness if they are unable to acquire the nationality of their parents and if the State of their 
birth has no provision in place to grant citizenship to stateless children. For example, and as I 
explain in chapters 3 and 4, both The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic have stipulations in 
their laws that make it difficult to obtain citizenship at birth if one is born to noncitizen or 
“illegally” resident parents. 
Second, few Caribbean States have ratified the two statelessness conventions and 
incorporated preventative measures against statelessness into their national legislation. For 
instance, only four Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago)29 have ratified the Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons (UN 1954), which delineates the rights and duties of a stateless person in a 
State party to the treaty; and none has ratified the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
which aims to prevent and reduce statelessness globally (UN 1961; UN Treaty Collection 
2014).30 Moreover, the majority of these States lack statelessness status determination 
procedures, making it difficult to determine who is and who is not stateless in a systematic and 
transparent manner. 
The problem of statelessness is of such significance in the Caribbean that UNHCR’s 
office for the Americas stated that one of its four strategic priorities for 2012 was to: “[p]revent 
statelessness in the Caribbean by advocating for accession to international instruments, mapping 
                                                        
28 The majority of States in the Caribbean have clauses in their constitution that state a child born on their territory 
does not gain citizenship automatically if neither of his or her parents is a citizen. 
29 Belize and Costa Rica also ratified the Convention, but they are not small island developing States (SIDS) and 
also belong to the Latin American region. They are thus not included in this figure.  
30 Costa Rica ratified the Convention, but is again not included in this figure because it is not a SIDS, but classified 
as a State in the Latin American region. Note that the Dominican Republic signed the 1961 Convention in that same 
year, but never ratified it. 
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the population concerned or at risk, providing technical and legal support and helping them with 
their registration and documentation” (UNHCR 2012b, 96). For 2013, this theme continued as 
“there will be a strong focus on the prevention and reduction of statelessness and other 
nationality issues, mainly through birth registration and documentation” (UNHCR 2013a). 
Furthermore, the organization is expressly focused on “ensur[ing] access to a nationality for 
undocumented people of Haitian descent” (UNHCR 2012b, 97). This policy development is 
important because, as I explain in chapters 3 and 4, in both The Bahamas and the Dominican 
Republic, the two main destination sites for Haitian migrants (IOM 2013, 23), individuals of 
Haitian descent struggle to obtain, or retain, citizenship.  
 I chose The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic as my two Caribbean case studies not 
only because they are democracies with a large presence of Haitian migrants – and therefore an 
increased likelihood of containing populations who are at risk of statelessness – but also because 
of the notable differences that exist between them. From a demographic perspective, The 
Bahamas has a much smaller population at just over 350,000 persons (Government of the 
Bahamas 2010a), while the Dominican Republic has a population of just over 9.4 million 
(Government of the Dominican Republic 2010). The estimated tens of thousands of Haitians and 
their descendants in The Bahamas therefore make up a larger percentage of the Bahamian 
population than the estimated 380,000 in the Dominican Republic.31 Additionally, black 
Bahamians make up the majority of the population in The Bahamas (Government of The 
Bahamas 2010a) and thus share the same racial classification as most Haitian migrants. The DR, 
                                                        
31 It is estimated that 30,000-60,000 Haitian migrants reside in the Bahamas (International Organization for 
Migration 2005, 98), and around 380,000 in the Dominican Republic (Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004). 
According to the 2010 Bahamian census, 39,144 residents are Haitian nationals; and 311,969 of the residents in the 
DR were born in Haiti according to their 2010 census (Government of the Dominican Republic 2010). The number 
of stateless persons in each country is unknown. 
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on the other hand, consists of a largely mixed population. These racial differences may play a 
role in mitigating or exacerbating any tensions toward Haitian migrants and their offspring. 
Culturally, The Bahamas is a majority Protestant country (Government of the Bahamas 
2010b), while the DR is primarily Catholic.32 The former was a British colony whose residents’ 
primary language is English, while the latter was a Spanish colony whose residents’ principal 
language is Spanish. From a legal and political perspective, The Bahamas and the DR are also 
distinct. The Bahamas is a common law country, while the DR observes continental legal praxis 
(“civil law”). Although both States are classified as democracies, The Bahamas operates under 
the Westminster-style parliamentary system and the DR is a Republic headed by a Presidency. 
Significant differences thus exist between the two cases, yet both States engage in exclusionary 
membership practices that primarily affect individuals of Haitian descent. By choosing to 
undertake fieldwork in two countries that exhibit significant demographic, cultural and 
institutional differences – and that similarly generate statelessness on their territories – I 
strengthen the external validity of my findings (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, 99-100).  
 Because I am interested in how laws operate in practice when it comes to the fulfillment 
of a human right to a nationality and because I want to understand how people experience 
psychosocial displacement, I undertook fieldwork in The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic 
between 2009 and 2013 to examine how each State’s law operated in practice with regard to the 
fulfillment of a human right to a nationality and to investigate how lack of formal membership in 
a State affects a person’s sense of place identity and belonging. The 2009 fieldwork in The 
Bahamas was exploratory in nature as questions of citizenship denial and potential statelessness 
had not yet been investigated, whether by academics, policymakers, lawyers or other experts. I 
                                                        
32 The 2010 Census did not take account of individuals’ religious affiliation, but the Dominican State says that 
68.9% of the population is Catholic on its website (Government of the Dominican Republic 2014c). 
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was thus trying to establish whether statelessness existed, why it existed if it did (through which 
procedures or processes), where it existed (specific islands) and what ethnic groups were 
affected. I therefore conducted the 2009 interviews under the condition of anonymity because I 
wanted the participants to speak as freely, and provide as much information as they could, on 
questions surrounding citizenship, discrimination and national identity, given these subjects’ 
sensitive nature in the country.  
 I conducted sixteen anonymous, elite-level interviews in 2009.33 Fourteen of these 
interviews took place in the capital, Nassau, while the remaining two were conducted via 
telephone. Participants included former and current government officials, academics, community 
leaders, lawyers, a civil servant, a journalist, an amateur film documentarian and a graduate 
student who had worked in the local Haitian communities. None of those interviewed was 
stateless or at risk of statelessness, but two of them were Haitian and held prominent positions in 
the Haitian community. Due to lack of data on statelessness in The Bahamas, I purposefully 
selected the majority of the participants because they held (or had held) leadership positions in 
the foreign affairs or immigration sectors of government, the nascent human rights community, 
or were experts on Bahamian migration or nationality law and data collection.  
 I returned to The Bahamas in the fall of 2012 to carry out a second wave of interviews. I 
interviewed thirteen individuals in Nassau and seven in Marsh Harbour, Abaco. Participants 
included lawyers, activists, elected and appointed officials, educators, businesspersons, 
healthcare professionals, a police officer and a defense force officer, as well as the Haitian 
Ambassador and Bahamian-born students of Haitian descent from the College of The Bahamas. 
An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the Ministry’s perspective via email. 
                                                        
33 Interviews were carried out in conformity with IRB Protocol H09-130. Interviews lasted an average of 51 
minutes. No pseudonyms are used for the interviews conducted under this protocol. When a person is quoted, I use 
the term “anonymous” to refer to him/her. 
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Of the twenty-one persons interviewed in 2012, eight had either faced the risk of statelessness or 
were stateless at some point.34 As in the 2009 study, I performed purposeful sampling, but 
limited such sampling to government officials and lawyers. I obtained interviews with the other 
participants via snowball sampling or because I came into contact with them at a public forum on 
statelessness35 at the College of The Bahamas (COB) and requested interviews from them.  
Those who participated in the 2012 portion of the study reflected a broad set of opinions 
– from those affected by statelessness and those affected by the presence of Bahamian-born 
individuals of Haitian descent in their communities, to those who held leadership positions in 
diverse professions that come into contact with individuals of Haitian descent (such as the armed 
forces, the police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, health professionals, lawyers and teachers). In 
total, I interviewed 37 individuals for the Bahamian case study. Of these, 23 were Bahamian of 
non-Haitian descent, seven were registered or naturalized Bahamians,36 while six were foreign 
residents (either American or Haitian) and the remaining person was born in The Bahamas of 
Haitian descent who had not yet applied to register as a Bahamian. The majority of the 
interviewees were black (27) and male (24).  
 In addition to the thirty-seven interviews from The Bahamas, I travelled to the Dominican 
Republic in the summer of 2012 and the spring of 2013. I interviewed ten individuals in the 
capital, Santo Domingo, and five in the batey37 of El Caño in the province of Monte Plata. Four 
of the five participants from the batey were stateless, while one had previously been in that 
                                                        
34 Interviews were carried out in conformity with IRB Protocol H11-261, which provided me permission to 
interview “Special Populations,” of which the stateless are a part. Interviews lasted an average of 57 minutes. A few 
of these participants chose to be anonymous and I reference them as such if quoted.  
35 The conference was entitled “21st Century Slavery in The Bahamas: A Discussion on Statelessness” and took 
place on October 24, 2012 in the Harry C. Moore library at COB. 
36 An individual “registers” as a Bahamian if he or she applies during or before the 18 year mark. The application 
requirements are less stringent than if one naturalizes, which occurs if an individual applies after the age of 19. 
37 A batey is the traditional name for a settlement where sugarcane workers resided during the hey-day of the 
sugarcane industry in the DR, from the 1930s to the 1980s. Today, these settlements are primarily shanty-towns 
where many Dominicans of Haitian descent, many of whom continue to work in the sugarcane industry, live. 
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situation but now had her documents to prove Dominican citizenship. The interviewees from 
Santo Domingo consisted of two United Nations (UN) officials, nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) activists, lawyers, a diplomat from the Haitian Embassy, academics, as well as the local 
representative of the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI). Of the 15 interviewees, six were 
Dominican (one had previously been stateless), five were foreign residents and four were 
presently stateless or unable to prove Dominican nationality. The majority of the interviewees 
were black38 (10) and female (10). 
Participants for this part of the fieldwork once again reflect diverse viewpoints on the 
effects, and existence, of statelessness in the country. As in the Bahamian 2009 portion of the 
study, I once again selected the majority of the interviewees from Santo Domingo via purposeful 
sampling, although a few individuals were contacted via the snowball technique. I did not 
purposefully select the participants from El Caño, however. I was part of a group that went to 
listen to a town hall meeting on nationality deprivation in that batey and I consequently ended up 
informally interviewing five of the attendees (all women). Two additional interviews were 
conducted in New York City with two other members of OSJI earlier in 2012 on the subject of 
statelessness in the Caribbean.  
In all cases, with the exception of the email interview response from the Bahamian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I recorded and transcribed the interviews. Since I am interested in 
the participants’ experiences with, and knowledge of statelessness, migrant rights and State 
membership practices, the interviews were semi-structured. I did not constrain our conversations 
solely to the interview questions that I had, but was open to the interviewee leading the dialogue 
in other directions. This often allowed me to discover information that I had not originally 
                                                        
38 I am aware that this is a contentious assertion given the Dominican tendency not to use the term black to describe 
their ethnic/racial identity (see chapter 4). 
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thought was important and/or pointed me to new directions of inquiry. The semi-structured 
interview approach therefore allowed me to collect a series of responses to common questions, 
but also added a richness to the narratives that I perhaps would not have been able to capture 
otherwise. Such an approach, I believe, is appropriate for examining the lived realities of 
exclusionary State membership practices and their effects upon people’s sense of belonging and 
ability to access rights in practice. 
  Beside the 55 semi-structured interviews, I engaged in participant observation in a 
number of settings in the Caribbean and the United States as a means of assessing how 
individuals engage with each other on questions surrounding statelessness, migration and human 
rights. In 2009, I attended the Second Annual Youth Conclave, sponsored by the United Haitian 
Association of The Bahamas, which addressed problems of discrimination and ways to empower 
the Haitian-descended youth in the country. Many of the young people present had faced 
obstacles growing up in The Bahamas and felt ostracized. In 2012 I attended a coyuntura (or 
town hall meeting) on the effects of Dominican migration law at the Centro Bonó39 in Santo 
Domingo where members of the public, Dominican lawyers and migration experts from the 
International Organization for Migration discussed the effects of Dominican migration law upon 
persons of Haitian descent. I also witnessed an impromptu celebration at the Centro Bonó when a 
group of Dominicans of Haitian descent, deprived of their citizenship documents, came to the 
organization to thank it for the legal assistance it had provided to them. Also in 2012 I attended 
an event commemorating the life and work of Dominican activist Sonia Pierre40 at Columbia 
                                                        
39 The Centro Bonó is a Jesuit organization that focuses on social justice and solidarity for persons who face poverty 
and social exclusion. The organization legally assists many denationalized Dominicans in trying to re-acquire or 
retain their Dominican nationality documents. 
40 Sonia Pierre was a prominent Dominican activist of Haitian descent. She was the founder of the Movement for 
Dominican Women of Haitian Descent (MUDHA) and fought against the discrimination of individuals of Haitian 
descent in Dominican society. She passed away in 2011.  
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University, listening to the stories that her children, close friends and colleagues shared with the 
audience.  
In 2013, I attended a panel discussion on statelessness hosted by the Sociocultural 
Movement for Haitian Workers (MOSCTHA-USA),41 also at Columbia University, and 
participated in an invitation-only symposium hosted by the Centro Bonó, the Mesa Nacional para 
Migrantes y Refugiados (MENAMIRD), the Red de Encuentro Dominico-Haitiano Jacques 
Viau, y the Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe (OBMICA) in Santo Domingo. Both events 
focused on the right to a nationality in the Dominican context and included speakers from the 
Dominican government and civil society.42 I took part in a similar, but public, conference on 
statelessness at the College of The Bahamas in 201243 and listened via the internet to the follow-
up conference that took place in 2014.44 As a Bahamian, I have spent many hours in The 
Bahamas informally chatting with “citizens” and “noncitizens” at supermarkets, retail stores, 
religious venues and their homes about Bahamian membership practices, Haitian migrants and 
discrimination. I have thus had multiple opportunities to hear diverse viewpoints on citizenship 
denial and deprivation, the issues associated with statelessness and the efforts that have been, or 
should be, undertaken to alleviate the problem.  
 In addition to fieldwork, I use various primary and secondary sources to challenge the 
postnational claims of the decoupling of citizenship and the weakening of formal citizenship in 
the State. I examine the nationality, migration laws and Constitutions of The Bahamas, the 
                                                        
41 The Sociocultural Movement for Haitian Workers (MOSCTHA) has its origin in the fight for Haitian migrant 
labor rights, but has since expanded to address the needs of individuals of Haitian descent on the island of 
Hispaniola and is actively engaged in the “No Human Being Is Illegal” campaign. 
42 The symposium was entitled, “Jornada de Diálogo sobre el Derecho a la Nacionalidad y el Estado de Derecho en 
República Dominicana: Retos y Perspectivas” and took place on February 8, 2013 in the Hotel Dominican Fiesta, 
Santo Domingo. 
43 See footnote 33 above. 
44 “Statelessness and The Bahamas: A Discussion,” which took place on April 10, 2014 at the Harry C. Moore 
library of COB. 
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Dominican Republic and Haiti – as well as legal assessments by experts on the latter country – to 
identify how individuals ought to be covered as nationals under a given law in theory. I also 
assess the status of these countries’ treaty ratifications dealing with statelessness or the right to a 
nationality, and the reports of various NGOs and the UN on the subject to understand what treaty 
obligations they ought to have and whether they are fulfilling them in practice. I examine 
pertinent judicial cases in the Dominican context as well – such as the Case of the Girls Yean 
and Bosico v. the Dominican Republic (IACHR 2005) and Sentence TC/0168/13 (Government of 
the Dominican Republic 2013b) – to understand their impact on Dominican membership 
practices. 
 Using my interview data and these primary and secondary sources, I demonstrate that far 
from being an institution whose “limits” have become “inventively irrelevant” (Soysal 1994, 
162), citizenship in a State is increasingly important to hold to access rights, freedoms and 
protections for those who are noncitizens everywhere. Moreover, States continue to jealously 
guard their sovereign right to demarcate and defend these limits, even if under the cover of 
seemingly neutral laws. Because I find that citizenship continues to be a necessary status to hold 
in our allegedly postnational era, I move from theory-testing to theory-building in the final part 
of the dissertation and offer a just membership framework for addressing statelessness. I contend 
that interpreting statelessness through such a framework is crucial in a world where States 
engage in arbitrary and discriminatory membership practices under the cover of law and where a 
large gap exists between the operation of said law and practice.  
 Finally, in discussing citizenship and one’s place in the world, it is fitting to situate 
myself in this research project and note my particular subjectivities at the outset.45 As Ruth Arber 
                                                        
45 I thank Shayna Plaut, University of British Columbia, for encouraging me to “position” myself within the research 
and to write from the first-person perspective. 
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reminds us, “We construct ourselves through the other and yet leave that which is ourselves 
silent” (2010, 57). “We must [therefore] properly define the place from which we speak, the 
person we are, and the way we might affect, or be affected, by the interpretations inscribed 
within ethnographic texts” (ibid., 46). Thus my “place identity” is shaped by the fact that I 
consider myself a person who is always coming from elsewhere. I am the “Other” nearly 
everywhere I have lived (and I have lived in many places). 
I hold two citizenships, but neither is from the country that I was born in. I was born in a 
colony that had no citizenship of its own to grant, but I was able to acquire the citizenship of my 
father’s country, the United Kingdom. If I had not been able to do so, I could have been stateless. 
I was born to a Bahamian mother and Bahamian women do not, as I explain in chapter 3, have 
the same right to pass on their nationality to their children as their male counterparts do. Akin to 
the Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent that I interviewed for this study then, I am a 
Bahamian via “registration.”  
Although I identify as Bahamian, I am acutely aware that possessing Bahamian 
citizenship formalizes my membership, but does not actually make me belong in the eyes of 
many Bahamians. My skin color, place of birth and heritage single me out as not really 
belonging, as coming from somewhere else. I thus have a personal interest in how State 
membership practices – and society’s acceptance of the “Other” – affect one’s ability to belong 
and the ways that we can go about ameliorating exclusionary membership practices, especially 
among those who hold no citizenship from anywhere. With that said, I briefly turn to an 
overview of the dissertation’s chapters. 
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Chapters Overview  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of statelessness beginning with Arendt’s experience and ending 
with its contemporary development. It describes the many ways in which a person may become 
stateless, the problems associated with this condition from an individual, community and State 
perspective, and international efforts to address it. The chapter demonstrates that exclusion from 
an “organized political community,” as in Arendt’s time, continues to be problematic in the 21st 
century; but, in contradistinction to Arendt’s time, it shows that statelessness is not a “Europe-
only” phenomenon or one of cross-border movements. Stateless people are found globally and 
are generally physically rooted in a place, even if displaced in other ways.  
Chapters 3 and 4 bring the discussion of global statelessness to the State level with case 
studies of The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, respectively. These chapters demonstrate 
how legal, political and bureaucratic factors work together to deprive people of their right to a 
nationality and to exclude them from formal belonging in the countries of their birth. 
Specifically, chapter 3 explains how seemingly neutral citizenship laws, when situated within a 
politicized citizenship granting process and combined with bureaucratic inefficiencies, work 
together to displace Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent into liminality or into the 
category of Haitian national, often without confirming that said persons are Haitian nationals in 
practice.  
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of how the human right to a nationality is implemented 
in practice by examining the ways in which the Dominican State erects boundaries of belonging 
against the racialized “Other” within its borders. Via the retroactive application of laws and 
arbitrary bureaucratic procedures, the chapter demonstrates how people can be turned into 
foreigners in their own country. Both chapters, therefore, illustrate the precariousness of 
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belonging under State-defined conditions. 
Whereas chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that the human right to a nationality is not being 
fulfilled in practice, chapter 5 examines the effects of citizenship denial and/or deprivation in 
The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic from a less legalistic and more sociological 
perspective. Instead of demonstrating that many Bahamian- and Dominican-born persons of 
Haitian descent are not covered under Haitian nationality law in reality – or are denied/deprived 
of citizenship in the countries of their birth – chapter 5 illustrates that the consequences of not 
being a citizen of somewhere in practice has ramifications far beyond the legal realm. It affects 
an individual’s sense of belonging and his or her ability to enjoy various other human rights. 
Chapter 5 thus directly challenges the postnational claim that human rights have decoupled from 
citizenship. Chapter 6, which is the final chapter, summarizes the main points that I make in the 
dissertation and presents the contours of a just membership framework for addressing 
statelessness. It is here that I argue that noncitizen insiders should have the right to belong, via 
formal citizenship, in the State of their birth.  
In conclusion, this dissertation examines a right that is rarely studied in human rights, 
migration or citizenship studies scholarship – the human right to a nationality. It demonstrates 
that we have not moved very far from the Arendtian notion that citizenship is needed to access 
other rights and to belong to a given polity. Through an examination of exclusionary State 
membership practices in the Caribbean, the dissertation illustrates the varied ways in which 
States make, and keep, certain groups of people “Other.” It shows that belonging, as in Arendt’s 
time, continues to be a precarious status, sometimes predicated on the whims of State 






Adjami, Mirna and Julia Harrington. 2008. “The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 27.3: 93-109.  
Arber, Ruth. 2010. “Defining Positioning within Politics of Difference: Negotiating spaces ‘in  
between.’” Race Ethnicity and Education 3.1: 45-63. 
Arendt, Hannah. [1948] 2004. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books. 
Armstrong, Chris. 2011. Global Distributive Justice: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Basok, Tanya, Suzan Ilcan and Jeff Noonan. 2006. “Citizenship, Human Rights, and Social  
Justice.” Citizenship Studies 10.3: 267-273. 
Batchelor, Carol. 1995. “Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection.”  
International Journal of Refugee Law 7.2: 232-59. 
---. 1998. “Statelessness and the problem of resolving nationality status.” International  
Journal of Refugee Law 10.1: 56-83. 
Batchelor, Carol A. 2006. “Transforming International Legal Principles into National Law: The  
Right to a Nationality and the Avoidance of Statelessness.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 
25.3:: 8-25. 
Bauböck, Rainer. 2007. “Political boundaries in a multilevel democracy.” In Identities,  
Affiliations, and Allegiances, Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro and Danilo Petranovic, eds. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 85-109. 
Bauböck, Rainer, Eva ErsbØll, Kees Groenendijk and Harald Waldrauch. 2006. “Introduction.”  
In Acquisition and Loss of Nationality Vol 1: Comparative Analyses; Policies and Trends 
in 15 European Countries, eds. Bauböck, Rainer, Eva ErsbØll, Kees Groenendijk and 
Harald Waldrauch. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 15-34. 
Beardsworth, Richard. 2011. Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory. Polity Press,  
Cambridge, UK. 
Beitz, Charles. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton University Press.  
Princeton: NJ. 
Beitz, Charles R. 2005. “Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice.” The Journal of Ethics 9.1: 11-27. 
Belton, Kristy A. 2010a. “Arendt’s Children in the Bahamian Context: The Children of Migrants  
without Status.” International Journal of Bahamian Studies 16: 35-50. 
---. 2010b.“Dry Land Drowning or Rip Current Survival? Haitians Without Status in the  
Bahamas.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34.6: 948-966.  
---. 2011. “The Neglected Non-Citizen: statelessness and liberal political theory.” Journal of  
Global Ethics 7.1: 57-69. 
---. 2013. “Statelessness and Economic and Social Rights.” In The State of Economic and  
Social Human Rights: A Global Overview, ed. Lanse Minkler. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
---. (forthcoming) “The Legal Status of Statelessness: An overview.” In Slippery Citizenship,  
eds. Rhoda Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Benhabib, Seyla. 2001. Transformations of Citizenship: Dilemmas of the nationstate in the era  
of globalization. Koninklijke Van Gorcum: University of Amsterdam. 
---. 2004. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 32
Benhabib, Seyla, and Judith Resnik. 2009. Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and  
Gender. New York: New York University Press. 
Benhabib, Seyla, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranovic. 2007. “Editors’ introduction.” In Identities,  
Affiliations, and Allegiances, eds. Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro and Danilo Petranovic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-14.  
Bhabha, Jacqueline. 2011. “From Citizen to Migrant: The Scope of Child Statelessness in the  
Twenty-First Century.” In Children Without a State: A Global Human Rights Challenge,” 
ed. Jacqueline Bhabha. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 1-39. 
Blake, Michael. 2001. “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy.” Philosophy and  
Public Affairs 30.3: 257-296. 
Blank, Yishai. 2007. “Spheres of Citizenship.” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8: 411-452. 
Blitz, Brad K. 2006. “Statelessness and the Social (De)Construction of Citizenship: Political  
Restructuring and Ethnic Discrimination in Slovenia.” Journal of Human Rights 5.4: 453-
479. 
Blitz, Brad K. and Maureen Lynch, eds. 2009. Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A  
Comparative Study. http://www.udhr60.ch/report/statelessness_paper0609.pdf.  
Blitz, Brad K. and Caroline Sawyer, eds. 2011a. “Statelessness in the European Union.” In  
Statelessness in the European Union: Displaced, Undocumented, Unwanted. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
---. 2011b. “Analysis: the practical and legal realities of statelessness in the European Union.” In  
Statelessness in the European Union: Displaced, Undocumented, Unwanted, Brad K.  
Blitz and Caroline Sawyer, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 281-305. 
Bosniak, Linda. 2000. “Citizenship Denationalized.” Indiana Journal of Legal Studies. 7.2:  
447-509. 
---. 2006. The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Brouwer, Andrew. 2003. “Statelessness in Canadian Context.” United Nations High  
Commissioner for Refugees.  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESEARCH,CAN,,405f07164,0.html. 
Brubaker, William Rogers. 1989. “Membership Without Citizenship: The Economic and Social  
Rights of Noncitizens.” In Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and  
North America, William Rogers Brubaker, ed. Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America. 145-162.  
Cabrera, Luis. 2010. The Practice of Global Citizenship. New York: Cambridge University  
Press. 
Castles, Stephen. 2012. “Introduction.” In Handbook of Research Methods in Migration, ed.  
Carlos Vargas-Silva. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 7-25. 
Chan, Johannes M. M. 1991. The right to a nationality as a human right: The current trend  
towards recognition. Human Rights Law Journal 12.1/2: 1-14. 
Chari, P.R., Mallika Joseph and Suba Chandran. 2003. Missing Boundaries: Refugees,  
Migrants, Stateless and Internally Displaced Persons in South Asia. New Delhi, India: 
Manohar Publishers & Distributors. 
Cohen, Jean L. 1999. “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the  
Demos.” International Sociology 14: 245-268. 
Cordell, Kristen. 2011. “Expert Perspective: Kristen Cordell, advocate at Refugees International,  
 33
talks about long term solutions for refugees.” http://zunia.org/fr/post/expert-perspective-
kristen-cordell-advocate-at-refugees-international-talks-about-long-term-sol. 
Cordourier-Real, Carlos R. 2010. Transnational Social Justice. Palgrave MacMillan:  
Basingstoke, UK. 
Cresswell, Tim. 2004. Place: a short introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Cuba, Lee and David M. Hummon. 1993. “A Place to Call Home: Identification with Dwelling,  
Community and Region.” The Sociological Quarterly 34.1: 111-131. 
Domínguez, Jorge I. “The Caribbean Question: Why Has Liberal Democracy (Surprisingly)  
Flourished?” In Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic, and Social 
Perspectives, Jorge I. Domínguez, Robert A. Pastor and R. DeLisle Worrell, eds. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1-25. 
Donner, Ruth. 1994. The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, second ed. Irvington- 
on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 
Equal Rights Trust. 2010. Unravelling Anomaly: Detention, Discrimination and the Protection  
Needs of Stateless Persons. London. 
Falk, Richard. 2000. “The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization. Citizenship Studies  
4.1: 5-17. 
Ferme, Mariane C. 2004. “Deterritorialized Citizenship and the Resonances of the Sierra  
Leonean State.” In Anthropology in the Margins of the State, eds. Veena Das and 
Deborah Poole. Santa Fe, NM and Oxford, UK: School of American Research Press. 81-
115. 




Ghosh, Partha S. 2004. Unwanted and Uprooted: A Political Study of Migrants, Refugees,  
Stateless and Displaced of South Asia. New Delhi, India: Samskriti. 
Gibney, Matthew J. 2009. “Statelessness and the right to citizenship.” Forced Migration Review  
32: 50-51. 
---. 2011. “The rights of non-citizens in political thoughts.” In Statelessness in  
the European Union: Displaced, Undocumented, Unwanted, Caroline Sawyer and Brad 
K. Blitz, eds. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 41-68. 
Gilbertson, Greta. 2006. “Citizenship in a Globalized World.” Migration Policy Institute.  
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=369. 
Glickman, Dan. 2010. “Testimony of The Honorable Dan Glickman.” United States Senate  
Committee on the Judiciary. 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735d
a15dabae&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da15dabae-1-1.    
Goldston, James A. 2006. “Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship,  
 and the Rights of Noncitizens.” Ethics & International Affairs 20.3: 321-347.  
Government of The Bahamas. 2010a. “Total Population by Sex and Age in Years Last  
Birthday.” http://statistics.bahamas.gov.bs/download/055424000.pdf.  
---. 2010b. “Total Population by Sex, Age-Group and Religion.”  
http://statistics.bahamas.gov.bs/download/083063500.pdf.  
Hailbronner, Kay. 2003. “Nationality.” In Migration and International Legal Norms, T.  
Alexander Aleinikoff and Vincent Chetail, eds.  T.M.C. Asser Press, Netherlands. 75- 
 34
85. 
Government of the Dominican Republic. 2010. “Censo 2010.” Oficina Nacional de Estadística. 
http://censo2010.one.gob.do.  
---. 2013b. “Sentencia TC/0168/13.” Constitutional Court.  
http://tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos/Sentencia%20TC%200
168-13%20-%20C.pdf. 
---. 2014c. “Religión.” http://www.gob.do/Home/Religion. 
Government of Haiti. 2011. http://www.haiti-
reference.com/histoire/constitutions/const_1987_amendee.php.  
Hanauer, David Ian. “Non-Place Identity: Britain’s Response to Migration in the Age of  
Supermodernity.” In Identity, Belonging and Migration, eds. Gerard Delanty, Paul Jones  
and Ruth Wodak. Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press. 198-217. 
Heffernan, John W. 2002. “Being Recognized as Citizens: A Human Security Dilemma in South  
and Southeast Asia.” Commission on Human Security. 
http://www.statelesspeopleinbangladesh.net/uploaded_files/studies_and_reports/Being%2
0Recognized%20as%20Citizens-%20A%20Human%20Security%20Dilemma.pdf.  




International Organization for Migration. 2005. “Haitian Migrants in the Bahamas 2005.”  
http://iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/book
s/Haitian_Migrants_Report.pdf. 
---. 2013. “IOM-Haiti Strategic Plan, 2013-2014.” Haiti and Geneva.  
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Strategy-IOM-Haiti-Updated-Jan-
2013.pdf.  
Jackson, Vicki C. 2009. “Citizenships, Federalisms, and Gender.” In Migrations and  
 Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender, Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik, eds. 
New York: New York University Press. 439-486. 
Jacobson, David. 1996. Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship.  
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Kanics, Jyothi. 2011. “Realizing the Rights of Undocumented Children in Europe.” In  
Children Without a State: A Global Human Rights Challenge, Jacqueline Bhabha, ed.  
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 131-149. 
Kesby, Alison. 2012. The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Khan, Gerrard. 2001. “Citizenship and Statelessness in South Asia.” United Nations High  
Commissioner for Refugees. Working Paper No. 47.   
http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3bf0ff124.pdf.   
Kingston, Lindsey N., Elizabeth F. Cohen and Christopher P. Morley. 2010. “Debate:  
Limitations on universality: the ‘right to health’ and the necessity of legal nationality.” 
BMC International Health and Human Rights 10: 1-12. 
Kostakopoulou, Theodora. 2008. The Future Governance of Citizenship. Cambridge; New York:  
Cambridge University Press. 
Kraxberger, Brennan. 2005. “Strangers, Indigenes and Settlers: Contested geographies of  
citizenship in Nigeria.” Space and Polity 9.1: 9.27. 
 35
Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press.  
League of Nations. 1930. “Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of  
Nationality Law.” League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, no. 4137. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,LON,,,3ae6b3b00,0.html.  
Leedy, Paul D. and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod. 2005. Practical Research, 8th ed. Upper Saddle River,  
NJ and Columbus, OH: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Lillich, Richard B. 1984. The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law.  
Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.  
Lynch, Maureen. 2005. “Lives on Hold: The Human Cost of Statelessness.” Washington, DC:  
Refugees International. 
Lynch, Maureen and Perveen Ali. 2006. “Buried Alive: Stateless Kurds in Syria.” Washington,  
D.C.: Refugees International.  
Macklin, Audrey. 2007. “Who Is the Citizen’s Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship”  
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8.2: 333-366. 
Manby, Bronwen. 2009. Struggles for Citizenship in Africa: A comparative study. London and  
New York: Zed Books. 
Manly, Mark. 2007. “The Spirit of Geneva – Traditional and New Actors in the Field of  
Statelessness.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 26.4: 255-261. 
Manzano, Sylvia, Matt A. Barreto, Ricardo Ramirez and Kathy Rim. 2009. “Mobilization,  
Participation, Solidaridad: Latino Participation in the 2006 Immigration Protest Rallies.” 
Urban Affairs Review 44.5: 736-764. 
Massey, Hugh. 2010. “UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness.” LPPR/2010/01. Geneva: United  
Nations. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bbf387d2.pdf.  
McNevin, Anne. 2011. Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the  
Political. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Michelman, Frank I. 1996. “Parsing ‘A Right to Have Rights.’” Constellations 3.2: 200-209. 
Miller, David. 1998. “The Ethical Significance of Nationality.” Ethics 98.4: 647-662. 
Moellendorf, Darrel. 1996. “Constructing the Law of Peoples.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly  
77.2: 132-154. 
Monforte, Pierre and Pascale Dufour. 2011. “Mobilizing in Borderline Citizenship Regimes: A  
Comparative Analysis of Undocumented Migrants’ Collective Actions.” Politics &  
Society 39.2: 203-232. 
Morsink, Johannes. 1999. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and  
Intent. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Muller, Benjamin. 2004. “(Dis)qualified bodies: Securitization, citizenship and ‘identity  
Management.’” Citizenship Studies 8.3: 279-294. 
Murphy, Michael and Siobhan Harty. 2003. “Post-Sovereign Citizenship.” Citizenship Studies  
7.2: 181-197. 
Nagel, Thomas. 2005. “The Problem of Global Justice.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33.2: 113- 
147. 
Nardin, Terry. 2006. “International Political Theory and the Question of Justice.” International  
Affairs 82.3 449-465. 
Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2007. “From Bounded to Flexible Citizenship: Lessons from Africa.”  
Citizenship Studies 11.1: 73-82. 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2006. The Rights of Non-Citizens.  
 36
HR/PUB/06/11. New York and Geneva.  
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham, NC:  
Duke University Press. 
Organization of American States. 1977. “Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in  
Chile. Chapter IX. Right to Nationality.”  OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40doc. 1011. 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Chile77eng/chap.9.htm. 
Park, Susin. 2011. “Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying  
Island States.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf.  
Perks, Katherine and Amal de Chickera. 2009. “The Silent Stateless and the Unhearing World.  
can Equality Compel Us to Listen?” Equal Rights Review 3: 42-55. 
Pogge, Thomas. 1994. “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23.3:  
195-224. 
---. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms.  
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Redclift, Victoria. 2013. Statelessness and Citizenship: Camps and the Creation of Political  
Space. London and New York: Routledge. 
Relph, Edward. 1976. place and placelessness. London: Pion Limited. 
Robinson, Nehemiah. [1955] 1997. “Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Its  
History and Interpretation.” Institute of Jewish Affairs. 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d4ab67f4.pdf. 
Sadiq, Kamal. 2009. Paper Citizens: How illegal immigrants acquire citizenship in developing  
countries. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sassen, Saskia. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Sawyer, Caroline and Brad K. Blitz 2011. “Conclusions.” In Statelessness in the European  
Union: Displaced, Undocumented, Unwanted. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
306-311. 
Schaap, Andrew. 2011. “Enacting the right to have rights: Jacques Ranciere’s critique of  
Hannah Arendt.” European Journal of Political theory 10.1: 22-45.  
Singh, Deepak K. 2010. Stateless in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Sironi, Alice. 2004. “Nationality of individuals in public international law: A functional  
approach.” In People Out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights, and the Citizenship 
Gap, Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, eds. Routledge: New York. 54-75. 
Sokoloff, Constantin. 2005. “Denial of Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security.” New 
York: Advisory Board on Human Security, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs. United Nations. 
http://www.statelesspeopleinbangladesh.net/uploaded_files/studies_and_reports/DenialOf
CitizenshipAChallengToHumanSecurity.pdf.  
Somers, Margaret R. 2008. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the right to 
have rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Southwick, Katherine and Maureen Lynch. 2009. “Nationality Rights for all: A Progress Report  
and Global Survey on Statelessness.” Washington, D.C.: Refugees International.  
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership 
in Europe. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. 
 37
Staples, Kelly. 2012. Retheorising Statelessness: A Background Theory of Membership in World  
Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Suárez-Navaz, Liliana, Raquel Macià Pareja and Ángela Moreno García. 2007. Las luchas de los  
sin papeles y la extensión de la ciudadanía. Perspectivas críticas desde Europa y Estados 
Unidos. Madrid: Traficantes de sueños. 
Teune, Henry. 2009. “Citizenship Deterritorialized: Global Citizenships.” In The Future of  
Citizenship, Jose V. Ciprut, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 229-252. 
Tiburcio, Carmen. 2001. The Human Rights of Aliens under International and Comparative Law.  
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml 
---. 1951. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.  
---. 1954. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  
 http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html.  
---. 1961.Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
 http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html. 
---. 1965. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx. 
---. 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.  
---. 1979. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  
 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm.  
---. 1989. Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.  
---. 2007a. “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.”  
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=259.  
---. 2007b. “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.  
---. 2014. Treaty Collection. “Chapter V: Refugees and Stateless Persons.”  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
4&chapter=5&lang=en.  
United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 2010. “Expert Meeting: The Concept of  
Stateless Persons under International Law, Summary Conclusions.” 
http://www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.html.  
---. 2011. “UNHCR Intergovernmental meeting at  
Ministerial level Closing remarks by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees.”  http://www.unhcr.org/4ef094a89.pdf.  
---. 2012a. “Guidelines on Statelessness No. 1: The definition of ‘Stateless Person’ in Article  
1(1) of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.” HCR/GS/12/01. 
1-11. 
---. 2012b. “UNHCR Global Appeal 2012-2013: Americas.” http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDF.pdf?docid=4ec230f40.  
---. 2012c. “Who is Stateless and Where?” http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15e.html.  
---. 2013a. “2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Americas: Working environment.”  
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02da6e6.html. 
--- 2013b. “Searching for Citizenship.” http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c155.html.  
 38
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees & the Interparliamentary Union. 2005.  
Nationality and statelessness: A handbook for parliamentarians. 
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/436774c62.pdf. 
United States Supreme Court. 1958. Perez v. Brownell. 1958. 356 U.S. 44, 64. 
van Waas, Laura. 2008. Nationality Matters : Statelessness Under International Law. Antwerp,  
Belgium: Intersentia. 
---. 2010. The Situation of Stateless Persons in the Middle East and North Africa: United Nations  
High Commissioner for Refugees.  
Voice of America. 2009. “Refugee Group Highlights Plight of World’s Stateless People.”  
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2005-02-15-voa55-67378492/274567.html.  
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York:  
Basic Books. 
Weis, Paul. 1956. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law. London: Stevens & Sons. 
Weissbrodt, David. 2008. The Human Rights of Non-Citizens. New York: Oxford University  
Press.  
Weissbrodt, David S. and Clay Collins. 2006. “The Human Rights of Stateless Persons.” Human  
Rights Quarterly 28.1: 245-276.  
Wooding, Bridget and Richard Moseley-Williams. 2004. “Inmigrantes haitianos y dominicanos  
de ascendencia haitiana en la República Dominica.” Cooperación Internacional para el 
Desarollo y el Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes.  
http://espacinsular.org/IMG/_Inmigrantes_haitianos.pdf. 
Zorn, Jelka. 2004. “The Politics of Exclusion Citizenship, Human Rights and the Erased in  




Chapter 2 – Statelessness 
 
“[S]tatelessness [is] nothing less than the categorical unwillingness to share the world with others” 
(Hayden 2008, 266). 
 
Statelessness is not a new phenomenon. People have been displaced from formal belonging in 
the State in various ways since the 1800’s. In 19th and early 20th century Europe, individuals 
were rendered stateless as a form of punishment for criminal activities or because they were 
deemed threats to social order.46 Even today, many countries’ laws allow for the denaturalization 
of an individual if he or she is deemed a threat to “social order.” It was not until the 20th century, 
however, that statelessness became a group, as opposed to an individual problem. With the 
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, groups of people found themselves 
stateless when they were prevented from acquiring citizenship in the newly formed States. 
Hannah Arendt, herself a stateless person for many years, called this group the “Heimatlosen,” or 
the “oldest group of stateless people” (2004, 353).47 Jews were the primary group affected by 
these events, although other minority groups, such as Armenians and Roma, were also affected. 
 The establishment of totalitarian regimes of different persuasions added to the growing 
number of stateless persons in Europe during the early to mid-20th century. “Denationalization 
became a powerful weapon of totalitarian politics” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 343). Individuals 
fleeing Communism in the wake of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, for example, were 
summarily denationalized and many of those fleeing Fascist Italy, Japan and Germany were also 
rendered stateless (Torpey 2000, 124-126). While Jews and Armenians “showed the highest 
proportion of statelessness” from such discriminatory denationalization procedures during this 
time (Arendt [1948] 2004, 358; see also 367), “Trotskyites,” Spanish Republicans and other 
                                                        
46 See Hayden (2008, 254), Vishniak (1945, 15) and Weis (1956, 122-3). 
47 See also Rürup (2011, 119). 
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political enemies were also targeted (ibid., 343). In fact, Vishniak lists the following groups as 
affected by statelessness during this period: 
Armenians who had escaped from Kurdish and Turkish massacres; Russians who 
had fled from the Soviet Union; the inhabitants of the Saar who had voted for 
France or for the League of Nations at the time of the Saar plebiscite; the Assyro-
Chaldeans and Assyrians who had left Iraq after the massacres in that country; the 
Jews, democrats and socialists who had fled Nazi Germany; Austrian Jews, 
monarchists, democrats and socialists; Rumanians who opposed the dictatorship, 
and Rumanian Jews; anti-Fascist Italians and Italian Jews; Spanish Republicans, 
Czechoslovakian democrats, etc. After the outbreak of the war[,] Poles, 
Norwegians, Netherlanders, Belgians, Frenchmen, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Estonians, 
Lithuanians and others joined their ranks (1945, 34). 
 
During this time of economic decline, “disintegration” and “[h]atred” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 342), 
statelessness became a pervasive, and serious, problem. Arendt likened statelessness to being 
expelled “from humanity altogether” (ibid., 377). Once an individual no longer belonged 
formally to some State through citizenship, they became “the scum of the earth” (ibid., 341), 
“outlaw(s)” (ibid., 360, 363) and “barbarians” (ibid., 384) whose only way of escaping from their 
political and legal non-existence was either to commit a crime or to demonstrate some sort of 
genius (ibid., 364). In a world of sovereign States, premised as it was and continues to be on 
individuals belonging formally to some State, Arendt argued that the stateless represented a 
possible regression from civilization (ibid., 382). They were – and still are – liminal subjects; 
caught in the space of the “betwixt and between” that lies outside of States’ nationality 
classifications. 
 Although the exact numbers of stateless persons during this period is unknown and 
although the stateless were a diverse lot, Arendt’s account in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
([1948] 2004) describes certain commonalities among them. Firstly, statelessness was largely the 
result of denaturalization and denationalization campaigns. That is, individuals became stateless 
because they were stripped of citizenship (ibid., 353-4, 365, 577), not because they were born 
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into statelessness, as occurs in The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere today. 
Without citizenship, these people “lost all other qualities and specific relationships–except that 
they were still human” (ibid., 380).   
Secondly, and in contrast to today, statelessness was associated with border-crossings. 
The stateless were arrivals from elsewhere (ibid., 341, 352, 356) and therefore had a country of 
origin: “[n]onrecognition of statelessness always means repatriation, i.e., deportation to a country 
of origin” (ibid., 355). As I illustrate in chapters 3 and 4, the stateless today do not necessarily 
have a country of origin to which to be deported. Thirdly, loss of citizenship entailed the loss of 
rights: the right to a home (ibid., 372), the right to government protection and a legal status 
(ibid., 373, 577), the right to an identity (ibid., 364-5), the right to belong to a community (ibid., 
375, 377) and, in some instances, the right to life (ibid., 375). These are rights violations that 
stateless people continue to face. 
 Of all the rights violations that the stateless suffered during this time, Arendt felt that the 
loss of a community to which to belong was the gravest, as it led to the deprivation of all other 
rights. “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion…but that they no longer 
belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, 
but that no law exists for them” (ibid., 375). She consequently insisted on the “right to have 
rights,” which comprised the “right to belong to some kind of organized community” where 
one’s opinion and actions mattered (ibid., 376) and where one’s rights could be guaranteed (ibid., 
377). It was because Arendt did not believe that human rights rested on some sort of inherent 
human dignity,48 but rather on one’s belonging as an equal to a political community,49 that she 
                                                        
48 Arendt believed that human dignity “not only does not exist but is the last and possibly most arrogant myth we 
have invented in all our long history” ([1948] 2004, 631). 
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insisted that “man as man has only one right that transcends his various rights as a citizen: the 
right never to be excluded from the rights granted by his community” (ibid., 628).  
 While much has changed since Arendt wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism more than 
sixty years ago—human rights have become part and parcel of international and local discourses, 
many governments incorporate such rights into their legislation and policies, and UNCHR has 
taken on the mandate of preventing and reducing statelessness globally—statelessness persists. 
UNHCR’s Statistical Online Population Database (SOPD) has data on just over 3.47 million 
stateless people in 64 States, but the agency estimates that more than 10 million people are de 
jure stateless worldwide (2012b). It admits, however, that it has “[a] tough task determining the 
true number of stateless people” (ibid., n. pag.) and others surmise that the problem of “de jure 
statelessness is overshadowed by an even greater crisis of de facto statelessness” (Adjami and 
Harrington 2008, 107). The number of stateless persons, de jure and de facto, therefore, may be 
very high globally.  
Although regions like Western Europe and the African Great Lakes contain stateless 
populations, the majority are found in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South and South 
East Asia. The number of known stateless populations in these latter areas ranges from hundreds 
of thousands to millions and includes individuals of Russian descent in Estonia and Latvia, 
certain national minorities in the Russian Federation, Bidoon in Kuwait,50 Palestinians in Syria 
and Lebanon, highland tribes in Thailand, Rohingya51 in Myanmar and Lhotshampas in Nepal, 
among others.52 Figure 1, which does not capture the stateless populations in States for which 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
49 Arendt argues that “rights exist because we inhabit the earth together with other men” ([1948] 2004, 629). 
50 Bidoon is “an Arabic word which means ‘without nationality’” (Shiblak 2009, 37). These are nomadic and semi-
nomadic persons of the Gulf region who have been unable to acquire citizenship.  
51 Rohingya are a Muslim minority group who are denied citizenship in Myanmar, the country of their birth, due to 
their ethnicity. 
52 The Lhotshampas are ethnic Nepalis whose ancestors migrated to Bhutan for work. Although they were initially 
politically accepted in Bhutan, the merger of the Hindu polities of Sikkim and India led the Bhutanese government 
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data is unavailable (such as Australia, The Bahamas, Canada, the Dominican Republic or South 
Africa) presents the scope of UNHCR’s known stateless populations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
to fear that the Hindu Lhotshampas would wish to secede and join India. Consequently, restrictive citizenship laws 
were enacted that allegedly directly targeted the Lhotshampa (Khan 2001).  
Figure 1 – De Jure statelessness around the world
 
 
Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database 2013
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 (map produced via Batchgeo.com). 




Causes of Statelessness 
When statelessness became a prominent international concern during the World War II era, it 
was in the context of geopolitical upheaval, war and genocide. Groups of people, once 
recognized as nationals of a given State, were stripped of their citizenship, often on a 
discriminatory basis. Statelessness as a result of arbitrary denationalization policies did not 
vanish when the war ended or when the UDHR proclaimed in Article 15 that everyone has a 
right to a nationality, however. In fact, the “[d]eprivation or denial of nationality based on 
discriminatory practices, particularly against racial, ethnic or religious minorities…is perhaps the 
most important cause of statelessness worldwide” today (Manly 2007, 256). In chapters 3 and 4, 
I explain how statelessness is generated on these grounds in the specific contexts of The 
Bahamas and the Dominican Republic.  
Many of those who are denied or deprived of citizenship on discriminatory grounds are 
found in democratizing regimes or in newly formed States that are still in the process of nation 
building. For example, democratization has had the “effect of triggering an obsession with 
belonging” in Africa “in all walks of life” (Geschiere 2009, 6 and 40). Consequently, from Côte 
d’Ivoire and Cameroon to Zambia and Zimbabwe, people have been turned into “foreigners” in 
their own country because they are not deemed “autochthonous” to the State.1 The process of 
denationalizing citizens often occurs around election time. Thus, in Cameroon, “[b]elonging has 
become a choice weapon for manipulating elections” (Geschiere 2009, 52). The non-
governmental organization (NGO) Citizenship Rights in Africa (2009), a group that seeks to end 
statelessness on the continent, records how black Africans in Mauritania, Nubians in Kenya and 
various groups in Côte d’Ivoire have been denationalized around election time because they 
                                                        
1 See Geschiere (2009), Fonchingong (2005), Manby (2009) and Odinkalu (2008). 
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represent political competition.2 Similarly, the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) has found 
that “the advent of multi-party democracy in many African States in the 1990s heightened the 
political significance of distinguishing citizens from noncitizens, and led to a marked increase in 
attempts to denationalise political opponents or even entire ethnic and social groups” (cited in 
Kanengoni 2008, 4).3  
Statelessness can also be “a by-product of entrenched discrimination and social 
exclusion,” which is “often closely related to incomplete nation-building” (Manly 2007, 257). 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan observe that democratizing or transitioning regimes often suffer 
from a “stateness” problem. That is, regimes that are attempting to leave behind a previous 
authoritarian structure often face a crisis wherein “profound differences about what should 
actually constitute the polity (or political community) and which demos or demoi (population or 
populations) should be members of that political community” become problematic (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, 16). When “profound differences” exist “as to who has the right of citizenship in 
that state…a ‘stateness’ problem” occurs (ibid.).  
The creation of “strangers” and an upsurge in nationalism thus purportedly go hand in 
hand with democratization processes (Snyder 2000; Geshiere 2009). Many of the groups 
identified as “strangers” in the nation-building exercise are rendered stateless. For instance, with 
the exception of Lithuania, the Baltic States excluded ethnic Russians from their understanding 
of the demos; the Bengalis excluded the Biharis; the Myanmarese omitted the Rohingya; the 
Bhutanese targeted the Llhotshampa; the Congolese excluded the Banyamulenge, and the 
Kuwaitis rejected the Bidoon.  
                                                        
2 See also United Nations (2008b, 16). 
3 See also Open Society Justice Initiative (2007, 3). 
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This exclusion is often made formal through restrictive and/or discriminatory citizenship 
laws. Claude Cahn and Sebihana Skenderovska (2008) observe how many post-Communist 
States created laws to restrict citizenship and the concomitant privileges of voting and running 
for office, to a particular “national” group. Consequently, Serbs and Roma have been excluded 
from citizenship in Croatia and ethnic Albanians and Roma have been disenfranchised in 
Macedonia.4 Brad Blitz (2006) discusses the “erasure” of Slovenes shortly after post-Communist 
independence and Igor Stiks similarly observes how citizenship laws were manipulated in 
Slovenia “to eliminate a certain number of citizens from the political, social and economic life of 
the new state” (2006, 492).  
Outside of these cases, which clearly violate the UDHR’s Article 15 prohibition on the 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality, States retain the right to denationalize individuals on other 
grounds.5 For example, a person may be denationalized for converting to another religion, for 
failing to renew his or her passport or for not adapting to a State’s “customs.” As in the early 20th 
century, denationalization may occur for residing abroad without permission, committing a 
crime, or engaging in an act deemed “threatening” or “disloyal” to the State. A person may also 
be stripped of citizenship if he or she acquires citizenship or seeks asylum in another State. 
Formal belonging therefore is not a guaranteed status once obtained. 
Although States have come a long way in reducing gender bias in laws related to property 
and nationality rights than was the case 100 years ago, statelessness still results from outright 
gender discrimination. In some cases, mothers cannot pass on their citizenship to their children 
                                                        
4 According to Cahn and Skenderovska, “Croatia adopted a citizenship law aimed at excluding Serbs, Roma and 
others from access to belonging in the new state, and has reinforced this law with extremely restrictive practice in 
this area, including forced expulsions of Roma from Croatia,” while “Macedonia implemented an extremely 
restrictive citizenship law after independence, giving rise to a number of categories of excluded groups, most 
notably ethnic Albanians and Roma” (2008, n. pag.).  
5 These examples are found in the United States Office of Personnel Management’s “Citizenship Laws of the 
World” report (United States 2001).  
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like their male counterparts can. For example, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, North 
and South Korea, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates (UN 2010) allow restrictions on the jus sanguinis6 
transmission of nationality to children born of citizen mothers, but not of citizen fathers. Thus, in 
many of these countries, a citizen woman who gives birth to her child while overseas cannot 
automatically pass on her citizenship to her child. This is not a problem if the father is a citizen 
of a State that allows for the jus sanguinis transmission of nationality or if the child is born in a 
country that grants citizenship through jus soli. 7 If neither of these conditions holds, however, or 
if the father is stateless, the child can be rendered stateless. Many examples exist of children 
becoming stateless due to conflicts in nationality laws because there is no overarching 
framework at the international level for regulating citizenship acquisition.  
Thus, although “reliance upon the accident of birth is inscribed in the laws of all modern 
states and applied everywhere” (Shachar 2009, 4) through jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship 
transmission, States differ in how they qualify the acquisition of this status. For instance, some 
States, such as the Dominican Republic, grant citizenship via jus soli as long as one of the 
parents is a citizen or a legal resident, while other States do not have such a stipulation. In other 
cases, citizenship through jus sanguinis is limited in application through the first generation born 
overseas if the parents are no longer residents of their State of citizenship. Other States have 
different conditions depending upon whether a child is born to a mother who is married or if the 
child is born out of wedlock. Female citizens are also at risk of denationalization in some States 
because of the prevailing marriage and divorce laws of their State of origin and/or State of 
residence. That is, some States stipulate that a woman will lose her birth citizenship and acquire 
                                                        
6 Citizenship acquired through descent. 
7 Citizenship acquired through birth on a State’s territory. 
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the citizenship of her foreign husband upon marriage. If the marriage dissolves, the woman may 
be rendered stateless if the State of her former husband’s citizenship no longer recognizes her as 
a national or if her State of original citizenship does not reinstate the citizenship she held at birth. 
These and many other cases of conflicts in nationality laws result in statelessness.8 
 Even when laws are non-discriminatory in principle, they may be arbitrarily applied in 
practice. Thus, as I demonstrate in chapters 3 and 4, people may become stateless when civil 
servants, or those individuals authorized to act on behalf of the State regarding the provision and 
renewal of citizenship and identity documents, fail to provide such documents, intentionally or 
not. As Manby, discussing the case of statelessness in Africa, explains, civil servants have been 
known to deny birth certificates on discriminatory grounds or to delay the granting of a passport 
to a legitimate, but “non-native,” citizen.  
In practice, individual Africans far more often face the practical impossibility of 
obtaining official documentation than an explicit denial of nationality. Yet 
something as simple as a failure to register a birth or an indefinite delay in 
obtaining a national identification card…can have consequences just as damaging 
and permanent as if denationalization had been enacted in the law (2009, 115).  
 
Such problems are not confined to Africa. In various places around the world, minority citizens 
face obstacles in obtaining or retaining their identity documents. As Chapter 4 explains, the 
Dominican Republic has generated much attention in recent years because civil registry officers 
have denied birth certificates, and consequently proof of citizenship, to children born of Haitians 
in the country who, according to the law prevalent at the time, should have been recognized as 
Dominican nationals (Wooding 2008, 370; Goris 2011).  
While the possession of a birth certificate or other forms of State-issued identity 
documentation does not necessarily mean that a person falls under the operation of a State’s law 
                                                        
8 See Mutharika (1989), specifically pp. 106-129a, and chapter IV of van Waas (2008) for further examples of how 
conflicts in nationality laws can render a person stateless. 
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as a citizen,9 such documents are still the primary means by which a person, who is struggling to 
establish or retain citizenship, is able to make a claim to this formal status. This is one of the 
reasons why trafficked persons, as well as undocumented or irregular migrants, are susceptible to 
statelessness (van Waas 2008, 165-187). Children whose births go unregistered often find 
themselves in the same predicament. Despite the fact that the majority of States around the world 
have signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1989), which explicitly asserts in 
Article 7 that “[t]he child shall be registered immediately after birth,” the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that around 290 million children are unregistered globally 
(UNICEF 2014). Unable to prove to whom (citizenship acquisition via jus sanguinis) or where 
one was born (citizenship acquisition via jus soli) places a child at risk of not having their right 
to a nationality fulfilled. The problem is of such magnitude that UNICEF considers birth 
registration one of its key child protection issues: 
Apart from being the first legal acknowledgement of a child’s existence, birth 
registration is central to ensuring that children are counted and have access to 
basic services such as health, social security and education. Knowing the age of a 
child is central to protecting them from child labour, being arrested and treated as 
adults in the justice system, forcible conscription in armed forces, child marriage, 
trafficking and sexual exploitation…In effect, birth registration is their ‘passport 
to protection’ (UNICEF 2014, n. pag.).  
 
Lack of birth registration occurs for various reasons. Some States simply do not have the 
resources to establish civil registries in remote locations, while others have endured serious 
political and/or environmental events that destroy extant registries. In still other cases, parents 
fail to register the birth of their child in the appropriate institution or do not have the means to 
pay for the transportation or administrative costs to obtain a certificate. Most of the cases of 
unregistered births occur in South Asia and Eastern and Southern Africa, with an estimated 63 
                                                        
9 As chapter 4 illustrates, birth registration is not the same as obtaining a Dominican birth certificate that paves the 
way for Dominican citizenship acquisition. 
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per cent of children under five years old going unregistered in both regions (UNICEF 2013).10  
 Beside issues surrounding conflicts in nationality laws, inadequate application of extant 
nationality laws by State bureaucrats, outright discriminatory policies and problems obtaining 
birth registration and documentation, statelessness can also result from State dissolution. Just as 
in the early 20th century, when the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Tsarist polities disintegrated, 
the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sudan are all 
States that have either dissolved or have had a portion of their State secede and create a new 
State over the past few decades. In several of the European successor States, certain minority 
peoples were denied their right to a nationality and remain stateless today. UNHCR, for example, 
has official figures on stateless people in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine. These populations range from as few as 
35 known stateless persons in Armenia to 280,759 in Latvia (UNHCR 2013). Controversies over 
citizenship have similarly come to the fore between Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan and 
consequently placed thousands at risk of statelessness (Reynolds 2012).11   
 Statelessness, therefore, may result for many different reasons and is not a condition that 
affects a particular age group. A person can be born into statelessness or become stateless later in 
life. Despite the wide range of people affected and the diverse ways of becoming stateless, 
statelessness generates repercussions far beyond the non-enjoyment of the human right to a 
nationality. At the individual level, a stateless person may have to deal with the refusal of 
                                                        
10 Sub-Saharan Africa and West and Central Africa are close behind with an estimated 59% and 58% of the child 
population under the age of 5 unregistered, according to UNICEF. 
11 Sudan is now denying citizenship to those considered “Southerners.” “Southerners” is a label used to identify 
those who are black Sudanese of non-Arab descent.  
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identity documents and licenses,12 forced labour13 and enslavement,14 the denial of private sector 
employment,15 inadequate housing and healthcare,16 as well as the violation of other economic 
and social rights like social security and education.17 Stateless persons are also susceptible to 
family separation,18 torture,19 trafficking,20 and indefinite or unnecessary detention,21 while being 
denied adequate access to judicial procedures.22  
 Due to the obstacles that stateless people face in accessing various human rights, stateless 
populations often face higher degrees of chronic illness and unemployment, both of which can 
affect community development. For example, the poor conditions in which many stateless people 
live either generate or exacerbate health-related problems. The camps and settlements where 
stateless people live typically lack adequate sanitation facilities and running water. Lynch 
describes the situation of the Biharis of Bangladesh:  
Lack of water and co-habitation with animals, combined with poor drainage and 
sanitation systems, contribute to a variety of medical problems, including skin 
disease, water-borne illness, upper respiratory infections and gastro-intestinal 
disorders. In one camp, only two working wells supply water to 650 families. In 
Mirpur’s Millat Camp, there was only one latrine for 6,000 people. Few medical 
clinics exist, and several camps have no health care at all, leaving entire families 
susceptible to both medical and related financial hardship (2005, 15).23  
 
The stateless are also susceptible to other health problems that can run the gamut of chronic 
illness, sexually transmitted diseases and drug abuse to psychological issues such as depression, 
which sometimes results in “alcoholism, domestic violence and suicide” (Sokoloff 2005, 22). 
                                                        
12 See Korir Sing’oei (2009, 43) and van Selm (2009, 46). 
13 Refer to Ahmed (2004) and Heffernan (2002, 15). 
14 For example, Lewa (2009, 14) and Aird, Harnett, and Shah (2002, 7). 
15 See Lynch and Cook (2006) and Southwick and Lynch (2009). 
16 See Lynch (2005), Heffernan (2002) and Kingston, Cohen, and Morley (2010). 
17 Refer to Belton (2013). 
18 See Bhabha (2009). 
19 From Lynch and Ali (2006, 8-9). 
20 Refer to Aird et al. (2002, 3), Heffernan (2002, 12 and 18) and Kingston (2013, 76). 
21 See Equal Rights Trust (2010) and Weissbrodt and Collins (2006, 267-9). 
22 See Belton (2010).  
23 See Kelley (2010, 10), Sokoloff (2005, 22), Physicians for Human Rights (2010) and Hussain (2011) for similar 
accounts. 
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Stateless people are often prohibited from receiving government subsidized healthcare and 
insurance or in other instances do not receive complete coverage akin to their citizen 
counterparts,24 which results in higher percentages of stateless people suffering from treatable 
health conditions, such as tuberculosis, high blood pressure and diabetes.25 Vulnerability to 
trafficking,26 as well as lack of education and access to health care services, also results in what 
may be “epidemic” proportions of HIV/AIDS among some stateless groups (Ehna 2004, 5).27 
The problem is often compounded when the stateless are directly or indirectly denied access to 
antiretroviral drugs.28 
Children are especially susceptible to HIV exposure from their stateless mothers who 
cannot always access government-provided HIV/AIDS services or pre-natal care generally. 
Additionally, stateless children may also suffer from malnutrition and treatable illnesses. 
Maureen Lynch notes, for instance, that “[c]hildren without birth certificates cannot be legally 
vaccinated in at least twenty countries and over thirty countries require documentation to treat a 
child at a health facility” (2008, 12). Such limitations on these children’s ability to access health 
care can have far-reaching consequences: from the inability to obtain medicines for curing 
preventable and/or treatable illnesses to higher rates of malnutrition and even death.29  
Beside health-related issues, the stateless often lack access to favorable labor conditions. 
Studies illustrate that the stateless are regularly channeled into “3-D jobs” – those that are dirty, 
dangerous or degrading. Constantin Sokoloff explains, for example, how the Rohingya are 
                                                        
24 See, for example, Kingston et al. (2010, 8 and 10), Human Rights Watch (2010, 48-49 and 2011, 40), Lynch  
(2008, 12), Pérez (2011, 1038) and UNAIDS (2011, 16). 
25 See European Roma Rights Center (2005) and Feller (2009) for examples.  
26 See Aird et al. (2002), Farzana (2008), Feingold (2006, 5), Lynch (2008, 6 and 2009b), Southwick and Lynch 
(2009, 3), Pérez (2011, 1039), and Sokoloff (2005, 23) on trafficking of stateless persons. 
27 See also Lynch and Cook (2004). 
28 See Jirawattanapisal et al. (2010, 8), Modikwa (2012) and Slip (2006) for examples. 
29 See Kingston et al. (2010, 9), Physicians for Human Rights (2012), UNHCR and Plan International (2012, 15). 
Refer to Lynch (2008) and Bhabha (2011) for more on the specific effects of statelessness upon children. 
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forcefully employed by the Myanmarese army, without pay, “for construction and maintenance 
of [the army’s] facilities, as well as for a variety of other tasks required by the authorities” (2005, 
21).30 The denial of opportunities to own land or property and the inability to access credit or 
obtain business licenses also affects their ability to work.31 As Laura van Waas notes in the case 
of Syria, “stateless Kurds cannot obtain property deeds, register cars or businesses, open a bank 
account or obtain a commercial driver’s license and in Bahrain, Bidoon have been prohibited 
from buying land, starting a business or obtaining a government loan” (2010, 25). Moreover, 
many States forbid noncitizens from holding certain public sector jobs such as teachers or 
medical professionals. These are just some of the possible problems that a stateless person may 
face within their State of residence. 32  
Since international law deems citizenship the formal vehicle by which States extend 
protection to their populations when they are outside of their own State’s territorial confines (see 
p. 5), the stateless also lack such protection. Moreover, although Article 13 of the UDHR affirms 
that everyone has the right to leave any country and return to his or her own country, the stateless 
often face great hardship when trying to re-enter the State that they consider to be their “own” 
country because the latter does not recognize them as citizens under the operation of its law. 
Movement, both within a State and across borders can therefore be highly problematic, resulting 
in one of the ironies of statelessness – those who lack a formal membership bond to any State 
through citizenship are among those with the most severely restricted mobility on earth. 
When one considers the domestic and international constraints faced by those without 
citizenship, it becomes apparent why international jurists, such as Hersch Lauterpacht, would 
                                                        
30 See also United Nations (2008b, 18). 
31 Refer to Human Rights Watch (2010, 54), Lynch and Ali (2006, 6) and Sokoloff (2005, 20). 
32 See Belton (forthcoming) for an elaboration of the ways in which statelessness affects the fulfilment of each right 
in the UDHR and Lynch (2005) for a global overview of the problems that stateless people face. 
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consider citizenship to be an “instrument for securing the rights of the individual in the national 
and international spheres” (qtd. in van Panhuys 1959, 236) and why citizenship is often 
considered “not one right but a bundle of rights” (Odinkalu 2008, 14). The violation of the 
human right to a nationality does not simply have individual-level repercussions, however. Its 
effects can also be felt community-wide. For example, statelessness can affect regime stability in 
various ways. Earlier it was noted that democratization processes may sometimes have negative 
effects for certain minority populations when they are denationalized for political gain. The flip 
side to this phenomenon is the inability of a State to consolidate a democracy. As Linz and 
Stepan assert, “[t]he greater the percentage of people in a given State who were born there or 
who had not arrived perceiving themselves as foreign citizens, who are denied citizenship in the 
state and whose life changes are hurt by such denial, the more unlikely it is that this state will 
consolidate a democracy” (1996, 33). Leary likewise adds that “the exclusion of a group of 
people who reside within a given regime and who have little hope of regularizing their status and 
becoming citizens can be destabilizing domestically and challenge any regime’s ability to 
transition fully to a democratic status” (1999, 257). 
Additionally, the combination of poor living conditions, limited employment prospects 
and social stigma sometimes leads to communal tension in the States where the stateless reside. 
As UNHCR points out, the “[d]enial of basic human rights [to stateless persons] impacts not only 
the individuals concerned but also society as a whole, in particular because excluding an entire 
sector of the population may create social tension and significantly impair efforts to promote 
economic and social development” (2010, 4). During the past year, for example, significant 
violence has erupted between Buddhists and stateless Rohingya in Myanmar, with hundreds of 
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people being killed and thousands of homes destroyed.33 Banyamulenge, who have struggled for 
citizenship recognition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, continue to face “discriminatory 
treatment and ethnic tensions” (UN 2008b, 17), and “excessive force” has been used by the 
Kuwaiti authorities against Bidoon who have been peacefully protesting for citizenship 
recognition in that State (MSN Arabia 2012; Reynolds and Cordell 2012, 2).  
The problems associated with statelessness are not limited to one State’s borders either. 
States that refuse to grant citizenship to stateless persons may be providing grounds for these 
people to “seek full national legal identity elsewhere” (Batchelor 2006, 10). This is problematic 
because international law does not allow one State to “release itself from the international duty, 
owed to other states, of receiving back a person denationalized who has acquired no other 
nationality” (McDougal et. al 1974, 951). That is, States are not permitted to allow stateless 
people to become “charge[s] on other States” (ibid.). While most stateless groups do not cross 
borders, the Rohingyas are a prime example of a stateless group who has crossed borders – 
leaving Myanmar to go to Bangladesh, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Gulf States – in 
the hopes of finding a home elsewhere. As Heffernan notes, 
“the denial of citizenship has played a major role in the constant flows of people 
throughout South Asia. In a period of 15 years, over 500,000 stateless Rohingyas 
of Myanmar twice fled back and forth between Bangladesh and Myanmar. In a 
forty-year period, over 500,000 stateless Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka were 
repatriated to India and an estimated 100,000 Lhotshampas fled to Nepal from 
Bhutan” (2002, iii).  
 
The Bidoon of the Gulf region, European Roma, and Banyamulenge are also cases of stateless 
people who have crossed State borders, whether forcibly or voluntarily. Conflict between States 
may arise when they do not agree on the origin of stateless people or on which State should be 
granting citizenship to them, especially when resources are scarce. The issue of deciding who 
                                                        
33 See Amnesty International (2013) and IRIN (2013). 
 57
belongs where, and how a given minority population should be treated, can be a particularly 
politically sensitive regional issue when a State has to deal with stateless persons on its territory 
who also happen to belong to a recognized minority population in a neighboring State.  
 For instance, the stateless Lhotshampas are allegedly straining Nepal’s resources. Nepal 
has asked Bhutan, the ethnic “origin” State of the Lhotshampas, to sort out the latter’s nationality 
status (Khan 2001, 24-5). India, being the regional power, has the clout to negotiate an 
agreement between Nepal and Bhutan concerning this stateless group, but will not do so because 
of the huge number of ethnic Nepalis within its own borders. “India is no longer particularly 
anxious to be associated with Nepali minority rights movements in third countries for fear of its 
own vulnerability on the matter” (ibid., 21). Thus, the Lhotshampas end up in a protracted 
stateless situation. Relatedly, many Roma have found it difficult to obtain citizenship in the 
States that succeeded the USSR because those States tried to pass them off as residents of a 
neighboring State at the time of independence.  
Surrounding States may also act as staging grounds for stateless persons to engage in 
activities aimed at overthrowing a particular regime. As Peter Mutharika notes, “[w]here political 
enemies have been expelled and denationalized, they may continue to engage in activities aimed 
at overthrowing the ruling elite” (1989, 17). He adds that neighboring States may “even be 
drawn into attempts by some stateless persons to subvert the state of origin” (ibid., 19). 
Statelessness is thus not only a potential human rights issue, but a matter of regional security as 
well.  
International Activity around Statelessness 
Since statelessness is a pressing issue from an individual, community, State and regional 
perspective, the UNHCR and the Inter-Parliamentary Union have encouraged UN member States 
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to accede to the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions as a means of “bolster[ing] national 
solidarity and stability” and “improv[ing] international relations and stability” (UNHCR and IPU 
2005, 49). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has even asserted that the UN “should tackle 
both the causes and consequences of statelessness as a key priority within the Organization’s 
broader efforts to strengthen the rule of law” (UN 2011, 3).  
While the UN considers statelessness a rule of law issue today, when international 
concern around statelessness first surfaced in the aftermath of WWII it was primarily tied to 
refugee protection. UNHCR, the body created for the protection of refugees in 1950, did not 
acquire its second mandate over stateless persons until more than 20 years later through General 
Assembly Resolution 3274 [XXIX] (UN 1974). Since that time, UNHCR’s mandate on 
statelessness has expanded through a series of other resolutions (UNHCR 2014). Prior to the 
establishment of the agency’s second mandate, however, the UN had already produced the two 
aforementioned statelessness conventions.  
The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (UN 1954) delineates the 
rights and duties of stateless persons in their States of residence. It asks signatory States to treat 
the stateless as well as “aliens generally in the same circumstances” regarding the rights of 
property, association, gainful employment, housing and freedom of movement and to treat them 
as well as nationals regarding artistic and scientific rights, access to the courts, elementary 
education, public relief and labor legislation. The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
(UN 1961), which followed a few years later, asks signatory States to provide an expedited 
naturalization procedure to stateless people, to avoid denationalizing a person arbitrarily, and to 
ensure that an individual has access to another nationality before being denationalized, among 
other stipulations. Although more than a half-century has passed since these conventions were 
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issued, they are among the most poorly ratified of the UN system. Of the 193 UN member States, 
as of 2014, 80 (41%) are party to the 1954 convention and 55 (28%) are party to the 1961 
convention (UN 2014).  
While States continue to hesitate to become party to the statelessness conventions, 
António Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, believes that there has been “a real 
breakthrough, a quantum leap…in relation to the protection of stateless people” (UNHCR 2011) 
over the last few years. In  2010 and 2011 three international expert meetings were held on 
statelessness. They addressed de jure and de facto statelessness, statelessness status 
determination procedures, and the prevention of statelessness, respectively. From this series of 
meetings and other work, UNHCR was able to issue a series of Guidelines on statelessness: one 
on the definition of a stateless person under the 1954 convention (2012c), another on 
statelessness status determination procedures (2012d), a third on the rights and status of stateless 
persons under international law (2012e) and a fourth focusing on statelessness among children 
(2012f). These Guidelines are meant to assist a wide array of actors in addressing the needs of 
the stateless.  
Additionally, whereas UNHCR previously admitted that it was “not doing enough” to 
address statelessness  (UNHCR 2007), “[t]he number of UNHCR operations planning 
statelessness activities more than doubled between 2009 and 2011, from 28 to 60” (UNHCR 
2012a, 45). The activities carried out by UNHCR teams center upon the agency’s four areas of 
responsibility, including the identification and protection of stateless persons and the prevention 
and reduction of statelessness. As such, UNHCR has provided technical assistance to States, 
such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, so that their nationality laws can be modified to 
prevent and reduce statelessness. It has carried out campaigns, conducted workshops and 
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education programs, and provided mobile birth registration units as well (Manly and Persaud 
2009). Even the Human Rights Council, which has long been silent on the issue of statelessness, 
recently published a resolution on statelessness, encouraging ratification of the statelessness 
conventions, the amendment of national legislation with an eye to addressing statelessness, and 
cooperation among UN bodies on statelessness data collection, among other activities (UN 
2012). 
The UN’s recent upsurge of interest in statelessness is also reflected regionally. The 
Organization of American States (OAS), of which both The Bahamas and the Dominican 
Republic are members, held an International Meeting on Refugee Protection, Statelessness and 
Mixed Migratory Movements in the Americas in Brazil in 201034 and adopted the ensuing 
Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in the Americas (OAS 
2010a). This Declaration, although primarily focused on refugees, resolves:  
7. To urge countries in the Americas to consider acceding to the international 
instruments on statelessness, reviewing their national legislation to prevent and 
reduce situations of statelessness, and strengthening national mechanisms for 
comprehensive birth registration. 
8. To promote the values of solidarity, respect, tolerance and multiculturalism, 
underscoring the non-political and humanitarian nature of the protection of 
refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons, and recognizing their 
rights and obligations as well as their positive contributions to society (OAS 2010a, 
3; italics in original). 
The OAS also issued two resolutions on the “Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and 
Protection of Stateless Persons in the Americas” (OAS 2010b and 2011). In these resolutions, the 
OAS General Assembly, akin to the UN Human Rights Council, encourages member States to 
ratify the statelessness conventions and to amend domestic legislation to prevent and reduce 
statelessness. Moreover, the OAS recently held a workshop on the “Fundamental Elements for 
Identification and Protection of Stateless Persons and Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness 
                                                        
34 It is of note that the Dominican Republic sent representatives to this meeting. 
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in the Americas,” which served as “an opportunity for participants to strengthen their awareness 
on the phenomenon of statelessness, as well as to [sic] the legal tools available to identify and 
provide protection for stateless persons, and to prevent and reduce statelessness” (OAS 2012, n. 
pag.).  
Despite these promising regional and international activities around statelessness, the 
fulfillment of a human right to a nationality is still problematic in diverse areas around the world. 
Exclusionary State practices of citizenship denial and deprivation continue to make people’s 
access to rights, freedoms and protections as precarious as they were during Arendt’s time. In 
distinction to her time, however, such practices are not limited to totalitarian regimes. As I 
demonstrate in the next two chapters, even allegedly democratic States can act in arbitrary and 
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Chapter 3 – The Bahamas 
 
The world according to the postnationalists is one of blurred boundaries, flexible citizenships and 
denationalized rights. Soysal’s 1990’s proclamation that citizenship was “inventively irrelevant” 
(1994, 162) has, as I note in chapter 1, been echoed in different guises among scholars today.1  
This chapter and the next demonstrate, however, that “despite jubilant predictions by post-
nationalists of the imminent demise of citizenship, the legal distinction between member and 
stranger is, if anything, back with a vengeance” (Shachar 2009, 2).2 
 While States have created an intricate web of laws to distinguish who has membership in 
the polity, the right to belong formally to a State via citizenship is conditioned by other factors as 
well. Political practices, bureaucratic procedures and discrimination also play their part in 
determining who belongs. The fulfillment of one’s human right to a nationality is thus far more 
complex in practice than simply determining to whom (jus sanguinis citizenship acquisition) and 
where one was born (jus soli citizenship acquisition). Through the case study of The Bahamas, 
this chapter illustrates how exclusionary citizenship laws, electoral politics, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and cronyism work together to displace Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent 
into liminality or into the category of Haitian national, often without ensuring that such 
individuals have proof of the latter citizenship in reality.  
Situating the Case Study  
The Bahamas is a chain of over 700 islands and cays off the coast of Florida. Its northern tip, 
located in the Abacos, reaches as far north as West Palm Beach, FL, while its southern land mass 
extends as far as southern Cuba. Great Inagua, the most southerly island in the archipelago, lies 
less than 85 miles from Port-de-Paix, Haiti. Despite their geographical closeness, The Bahamas 
                                                        
1 See, for example Jacobson (1996), Cohen (1999), Benhabib (2001), Bosniak (2000 and 2006), Hailbronner (2003), 
Benhabib, Shapiro, and Petranovic (2007) and Blank (2007). 
2 See also Dauvergne (2007). 
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and Haiti could not be more distant in terms of their economic, political and human 
development. With a Gross National Income (GNI) of $21,280 per capita, The Bahamas is 
considered a high-income country developing country (UNCTAD 2012, xii and xvi; World Bank 
2013b). Haiti, on the other hand, is considered a “heavily indebted poor country” (UNCTAD 
2012, xv), with a GNI of only $760 and with more than 75% of its population living in poverty 
(World Bank 2013a). Although The Bahamas’ unemployment rate is high at 14% (Government 
of The Bahamas 2013b, n. pag.), it pales in comparison to the estimated 70% or higher 
unemployment rate in Haiti (Bergdahl 2012, n. pag.).  
In comparison to the peaceful transitions of power in The Bahamas, Haiti has undergone 
numerous political challenges since the 1950’s.3 From political violence and the dictatorships of 
the Duvaliers to coup d’états and environmental catastrophes – such as the 2010 earthquake that 
destabilized much of the country and left hundreds of thousands displaced – Haiti is far from the 
“Pearl of the Antilles” that it once was. Due to The Bahamas’ proximity both to Haiti and to the 
United States, its stronger economy, and the fact that it outranks Haiti in education, healthcare, 
sanitation, and other measures of the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2013),4 it is unsurprising that Haitians migrate to The Bahamas, whether temporarily or 
permanently, in search of a better life. In fact, and as I note in chapter 1, The Bahamas is one of 
the top three destinations for irregular Haitian migration (IOM 2013, 23).5  
                                                        
3 One can go even further back to the years immediately after Haitian Independence for examples of political 
instability. As Philippe Girard explains, “The first half-century of Haitian independent rule was far from peaceful. 
By the time it was over, twenty-nine of the thirty-four men who had signed the declaration of independence had met 
a violent end…Haitians could only find solace in the fact that their dictators were able to fend off most of the many 
coup attempts” (2010, 76). 
4 The Bahamas ranks 49 out of 182 States listed in the Human Development Index. It is a “high human 
development” country, less than a point away from being classified as a “very high human development” country 
(UNDP 2013, 144). Haiti, by comparison, is classified as a “low human development” country, ranking 161 out of 
182 States (ibid., 154). 
5 The Dominican Republic and the British Overseas Territory of Turks and Caicos are the other two destinations. 
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Although the precise number of irregular Haitian migrants in The Bahamas is unknown, 
hundreds, if not thousands of Haitians are speculated to migrate to the country each year through 
irregular or unauthorized channels. Many of these migrants remain in The Bahamas. According 
to the latest census numbers, 11% of the Bahamian population6 is made up of Haitian nationals7 
(Table 9.0, Government of The Bahamas 2012, 89 and 90), but this figure does not capture the 
undocumented population,8 which is notoriously difficult to enumerate. Many of these migrants 
have children in The Bahamas, some of whom – as this chapter illustrates – are at risk of not 
having their human right to a nationality fulfilled and, consequently, of becoming stateless.  
The Legal Context  
Bahamian nationality law is neutral in theory. Thus, while Dawn Marshall argued that The 
Bahamas Independence Order of 1973 “further restricted the possibilities for children born of 
Haitian parents in the Bahamas to claim Bahamian citizenship” (1979, 127), neither the 
Bahamian Constitution, nor any of the Bahamas’ Acts dealing with nationality – such as Chapter 
190/Bahamas Nationality Act and Chapter 191/Immigration Act – specifically target Haitian 
migrants or their descendants when it comes to the acquisition of Bahamian citizenship. The 
qualified nature of the jus sanguinis and jus soli provisions of the Constitution applies equally to 
all persons born of noncitizens. 
Nationality acquisition is qualified in the following ways: a child born in The Bahamas 
may only become a Bahamian citizen if one of his or her parents is a Bahamian citizen 
(Government of The Bahamas 1973a, Article 6). This Article is not specific to any particular 
                                                        
6 Specifically, 39,144 persons of the total population of 351,461 are Haitian nationals. 
7 A Haitian Embassy official says that his “estimate is 40,000” when it comes to the number of children born of 
Haitian parents in The Bahamas and “between 20 to 25,000” as regards the number of Haitians born in Haiti living 
in the country (personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 28, 2009). 
8 Freedom House (2011, n. pag.) estimates that between “30,000 and 40,000 recent Haitian immigrants reside 
illegally in the Bahamas.” 
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race or ethnicity. Those individuals born in the country, neither of whose parents is a Bahamian 
citizen, are permitted to apply for Bahamian citizenship through registration within 12 months of 
turning 18 (Article 7), but there is no guarantee that the person will obtain Bahamian citizenship. 
As a former Free National Movement (FNM) official makes clear, “it’s not an automatic 
entitlement.”9 Statelessness is therefore a possibility if the child does not possess another 
nationality.10 Those who miss the 18-19 year-old application window must go through the 
regular naturalization procedure, which is a more involved and costly process than registration. It 
is of note that being born in The Bahamas does not provide any benefit in expediting the 
naturalization process. As an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) makes clear, 
“The fact that the individual was born in The Bahamas has no bearing on the application for 
naturalization.”11  
The Bahamian Constitution states that only the Governor-General is able to deprive a 
Bahamian national of citizenship (Government of The Bahamas 1973a, Article 11), but adds that 
Parliament has powers to deprive and bestow citizenship on persons by means that are not 
addressed in the Constitution (Article 13). Chapter 190/Bahamas Nationality Act (Government 
of The Bahamas 1973b) provides more extensive details regarding the acquisition and loss of 
Bahamian citizenship and also discusses the provision of nationality to non-Bahamian adopted 
children and minors generally. It details the reasons for loss of Bahamian citizenship, which 
include acquiring Bahamian citizenship through fraudulent means, committing a crime within 5 
years of obtaining said citizenship, or demonstrating disloyalty to the country, among others, if a 
                                                        
9 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 27, 2009. The Free National Movement is one of the two major 
political parties in The Bahamas. 
10 See p. 90 below for the gender-discriminatory provision that may also result in statelessness. 
11 Personal communication (email), April 15, 2013. 
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naturalized or registered citizen (Article 11.2). Again, in none of these cases are individuals of 
Haitian descent specifically targeted.  
What is of note is that the Nationality Act provides extraordinary leeway and powers to 
the Minister in charge of naturalization and immigration, which today falls under the portfolio of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a 13-page Act, not including the final two pages that deal with 
Schedules of different types, the phrase “the Minister may at his discretion” appears ten times. 
The Minister may thus grant and revoke citizenship at his or her discretion, often without having 
to confer with any other governmental body. Even when the Minister is supposed to refer a case 
of citizenship deprivation to a “committee of inquiry,” which then recommends whether or not 
said deprivation should take place, the Minister is under no obligation “to act upon or in 
accordance with any such recommendation” (Article 11.8). Moreover, any decision of the 
Minister regarding citizenship acquisition or deprivation is not subject to judicial review: 
The Minister shall not be required to assign any reason for the grant or refusal of 
any application or the making of any order under this Act the decision upon which 
is at his discretion; and the decision of the Minister on any such application or 
order shall not be subject to appeal or review in any court (Article 16). 
 
In practice, questions regarding the grant of citizenship are typically performed by Cabinet, 
which consists of the Ministers of the Executive branch of government, and not by the Minister 
“in charge of naturalization and immigration.” As one former minister of the FNM government 
explains, a citizenship application “goes before Cabinet, and Cabinet considers it” or the 
citizenship application goes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who “prepare[s] a Cabinet brief” 
and then sends that brief to Cabinet to consider.12 The entire Cabinet then decides on the basis of 
consensus whether to grant or deny citizenship to an individual. Alfred Sears, the former 
Attorney General of The Bahamas (2002-2006) and former Minister of Education, Science & 
                                                        
12 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 27, 2009. 
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Technology under the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) administration admits that such a 
procedure often “takes up a lot of cabinet time” because each application is dealt with 
individually, making it a “cumbersome” process.13 It remains, however, that these Cabinet 
citizenship decisions are not subject to judicial review. As I illustrate, this is highly problematic 
given that the practice of granting Bahamian citizenship is highly politicized and fraught with 
bureaucratic inconsistencies. 
The Political Context  
In “Client-ship and Citizenship in Latin America” Lucy Taylor explains how clientelistic 
practices and charismatic leaders have shaped Latin American politics. Clientelism, she explains, 
“is not about equality but inequality…it is not about rights but about favours…it is not about 
democracy but about negotiated authoritarianism…[and] [f]inally, it is not about formal 
relationships but personal ties” (2004, 214). Her comments are applicable to the broader region, 
including the Caribbean. While The Bahamas is far from being an authoritarian State – as I 
explain in chapter 1, it is considered a democracy – favoritism and the use of personal ties 
(cronyism) to achieve a particular good or political gain has plagued much of its post-
Independence history, infiltrating the realm of citizenship determination.   
 Sir Lynden O. Pindling, the individual who led the country to Independence and who 
became the country’s first Prime Minister, is heralded as the “Black Moses” among many 
Bahamians. “I just remember people worshiping him…He was always this grand myth to me,” 
says Travolta Cooper, the writer and director of the “Black Moses” documentary on Sir Pindling 
(Nicolls 2013). Sir Pindling’s PLP government, which lasted 25 years (from 1967-1992) was 
accused of corruption and cronyism from many sectors of society, both Bahamian and abroad 
                                                        
13 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, November 8, 2012. Sears therefore recommends that there “should be a 
committee of Cabinet” that considers each application instead. All the quotations that I attribute to Sears throughout 
the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
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(Dahlburg 1982; Freedland 1992). As Frederick Donathan explains, “The government’s tentacles 
spread very far…You got accustomed to thinking, ‘I better vote for the old regime, in case they 
get in again’” (qtd. in Freedland 1992). When Hubert A. Ingraham, the then leader of the 
opposition FNM became the second Prime Minister of The Bahamas in 1992 he vowed to create 
a “government in the sunshine” where transparency and fairness would reign (Freedland 1992; 
see also Smith 2012).  
 A “government in the sunshine” never transpired, however, and accusations of corruption 
and cronyism continue to the present day. The PLP is once again in power and Former Prime 
Minister Ingraham recently lambasted the party for “victimising” civil servants and removing 
them from their jobs because they are not PLP supporters (Evans 2012). The current FNM 
leader, Dr. Hubert Minnis, recently published a statement on the PLP government’s 
“[u]nadulterated tribalism, cronyism and out-and-out nepotism!” The PLP has also issued its fair 
share of corruption and cronyism accusations against FNM administrations as well (Brown 
2013).  
 Just as Taylor finds that a “goods-for-power” deal operates in many Latin American 
countries, wherein “[p]eople support a certain patron because they gamble that to do so will 
improve their own or their family’s prospects” (2004, 215), Bahamian politics seems to be 
infused with such a mentality. When it comes to Haitian migrants and their descendants, the 
“good” is citizenship and no matter the party in power (PLP or FNM) this good suddenly 
becomes more readily available prior to a general election.  
 Study participants, Haitian and non-Haitian alike, remark that the number of citizenships 
awarded to foreigners escalates around election time. As one anonymous interviewee laments, 
“[t]here’s the issue of the politics of citizenship in terms of who gets it. How is it awarded? It’s a 
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Cabinet decision – there is just so much room for abuse, with so much room for timing it to 
coincide with elections. It’s a seriously flawed approach.”14 Gwendolyn Brice-Adderley, a 
lawyer for the Nationality Support Unit15 in Nassau, adds that “I know around election time 
some of those applications are fast forward.”16 While Harry Dolce, a Bahamian-born police 
officer of Haitian descent who went through the citizenship application process, explains how 
“you’ll have certain times during the election period” where “they’ll hold your citizenship – no 
matter if you’ve applied three years ago, two years ago. But when it comes time to election, [they 
say], ‘Okay, we’re gonna give you your citizenship. Okay, you’re a Bahamian.’”17 George 
Charité, a medical doctor of Haitian descent on the island of Abaco, similarly affirms that “[i]t 
could take elections” for individuals’ citizenship applications to be considered. “They normally 
get up around election time,” he says, “they make them citizens. So pray to God and thank God 
for elections. Election coming up…Most likely you’ll get [citizenship].”18 Such allegations are 
not limited to study participants either. The Bahama Journal (2013) cites Lovy Jean, a 
Bahamian-born student of Haitian descent who spoke before the Bahamas Constitutional 
Commission,19 stating that difficulties exist in getting Bahamian citizenship unless “you’re lucky 
during a general election [and] you’d get it right away.”  
                                                        
14 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, August 7, 2009. 
15 The Nationality Support Unit (NSU), established in 2012, is a legal clinic housed at the Etienne Dupuch Law 
School in Nassau, Bahamas. It provides legal support to “persons who were born in the Bahamas to Haitian 
parentage” (quote from Brice Adderley, personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 11, 2012) so that they can apply 
for Bahamian citizenship. 
16 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 11, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Brice-Adderley 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
17 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, October 29, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Dolce throughout the 
rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
18 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 13, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Charité 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Marsh Harbour on the aforementioned date. 
19 The Bahamas Constitutional Commission is a body instituted by Prime Minister Perry Christie to examine the 
extant Independence-era Constitution and make recommendations for change in diverse areas, one of which is 
nationality. In its final report, the Constitutional Commission made recommendations regarding nationality, but 
decided not to opine on the situation of children born to noncitizens in the country. The commissioners state instead 
that this subject should “be the subject of further study” and that another commission should be appointed “to 
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Newspaper articles and Letters to the Editor also report on the regularization of 
“hundreds” of Haitian nationals as Bahamian citizens prior to elections as a means for the ruling 
party to increase its vote share.20 The Nassau Guardian, for example, states that “a monthly 
average of 31” citizenship applications were approved “between May 2, 2007 and June 30, 
2010” for a total of “1,144 citizenship applications” (McCartney 2011). This number more than 
doubled to “a monthly average of about 75” applications “between November 18, 2011 and 
January 13, 2012” – less than four months prior to the 2012 general election (ibid.). According to 
then Deputy Prime Minister Brent Symonette of the FNM party, the increased number of 
citizenship approvals was due to “improved efficiencies” regarding “applications that had been 
languishing for many years” within the Department of Immigration (DoI) (ibid.)21 and not 
because of politically motivated reasons.   
Archival data that I obtained from the Haitian Embassy in Nassau points to an increased 
number of Haitian nationality renunciations in the years prior to the 2007 and 2012 general 
elections (see Table 1). This is of note because, as part of the Bahamian citizenship application 
process, a person must renounce his or her current nationality in order to be eligible to be sworn 
in as a Bahamian citizen. Table 1 demonstrates that 359 Haitian nationals renounced their 
nationality in 2006, or an average of 29 individuals per month. This number increases to an 
average of 41 renunciations per month in the period of January through April, 2007, just prior to 
the May 2nd general election. In relation to the aforementioned statistic provided in the Nassau 
Guardian article – 1,144 Bahamian citizenship conferrals in the period May 2007 through June 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
consider further questions relating to nationality and the basis on which nationality should be acquired by 
children born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents” (Government of The Bahamas 2013a, 35). 
20 See Evans (2012) and Dames (2012a).   
21 The same Nassau Guardian article lists figures illustrating the greater number of approved citizenship 
applications (2,038) – in addition to grants of permanent residency and the like – during the previous PLP 
administration. 
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2010 – the data in Table 1 illustrates that 543 persons renounced their Haitian nationality during 
this period.  
 
Table 1: Haitian Nationality Renunciations by year: 2003-2011 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Janvier 2 21 1 20 39 13 30 20 38 
Février 10 11 2 3 26 16 22 17 25 
Mars 4 5 2 16 66 20 18 15 60 
Avril 5 4 39 15 33 38 12 7 24 
Mai 3 12 74 29 21 9 9 7 26 
Juin 1 4 32 33 13 10 7 24 14 
Juillet 1 7 14 66 10 9 12 27 13 
Aout 2 2 10 40 16 14 9 21 28 
Septembre 5 1 17 51 17 12 3 34 60 
Octobre 41 4 15 28 24 10 6 32 74 
Novembre 16 4 16 35 9 19 3 38 119 
Décembre 16 2 7 23 3 27 12 25 73 
TOTAL 106 77 229 359 277 197 143 287 554 
 
Source: Original printout provided to the author by Ambassador Rodrigue, Haitian Embassy, Nassau, Bahamas; 
October 31, 2012. Total of 2,229 renunciations. 
 
Without data from the Department of Immigration listing the number of former Haitian nationals 
who obtained Bahamian citizenship during this time, there is no way to know whether these 543 
individuals (or 47% of the 1,144 persons) obtained Bahamian citizenship or what the nationality 
was of the other 53% of Bahamian citizenship awardees.22 In email correspondence from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MFA notes that the Department of Immigration “does not have 
statistics on the number of applications for citizenship each year. However we do have statistics 
on those persons who are sworn in as citizens. On average, between 265 and 400 such persons 
are sworn in each year since 2007.” If we assume that these 543 persons in Table 1 obtained 
Bahamian citizenship, it appears that Haitian nationals make up a large proportion of naturalized 
                                                        
22 According to another Nassau Guardian article, of the 44 persons who were granted Bahamian citizenship two 
weeks prior to the 2012 general election, none of them were able to vote in the election “as voter registration had 
come to an end by the time they became Bahamians” (Dames 2012b). 
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Bahamians during this three-year period. This is not surprising, however, given the 
aforementioned statistic that Haitians make up 11% of the Bahamian population, which is the 
largest foreign presence in the country.  
Whether former Haitian nationals are the recipients of the majority of these grants of 
Bahamian citizenship, it appears – in the words of Haitian Ambassador Antonio Rodrigue – that 
“[t]he question of citizenship is very political here [in The Bahamas].”23 As Ambassador 
Rodrigue observes, pointing to the data in Table 1, the trend of Haitian nationality renunciations 
prior to general elections holds regardless of which political party is in power: 
When you are close to the election, it [the number of renunciations] rose. After 
the election, here, the number is almost close to zero a month. And when you go 
getting close to the election, there’s a peak. There’s a peak. In this formulation of 
2002, 2007, and 2012 you can see that. So each government…before the election, 
they issue a lot of citizenships. 
 
The politicized nature of Bahamian citizenship bestowal is not merely reflected in data held at 
the Haitian Embassy or in Bahamian newspaper articles, however. As the study participants 
make clear, obtaining Bahamian citizenship is often predicated on knowing someone in the 
Department of Immigration or elsewhere in government who can do you the “favor” of granting 
you citizenship. Formal politics and informal personal connections thus have an equally 
significant influence on citizenship decisions in The Bahamas. 
Bureaucratic Failures 
“[T]he only way to get anything done is to ‘pay an extra fee’ or ask a ‘friend’ to cut through the 
red tape on your behalf” states Taylor, describing the reality of Latin American politics (Taylor 
2004, 213). Taylor may as well have been writing about the Bahamian case as her quote aptly 
captures one of the problems associated with bureaucratic failure in The Bahamas: going through 
                                                        
23 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, October 31, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Amb. Rodrique 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
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official channels, and following the rules to acquire the “good” of citizenship does not 
necessarily translate into the most efficient way to obtain said citizenship. As Artist Bernard 
Petit-Homme explains, he applied for Bahamian citizenship when he turned 18, but it took him 
three years to acquire citizenship, despite being born in the country and meeting all the 
requirements. He thinks it probably would have taken him longer to acquire Bahamian 
citizenship if he had not run into a former high-ranking government official who had a friend in 
the Department of Immigration who was able to act on Petit-Homme’s application. “They called 
me the following week to say it is ready. So that’s how I got it,” he says.24 
Mark Desmangles, also born of Haitian descent in The Bahamas, similarly observes that 
“[i]t’s all about networking and who knows who in some instances.” He adds that in his case, “it 
came to a point where I had to think for myself, ‘Who do I know out there? Who can assist me? 
Who can make this possible?’”25 Bianca Zaiem, born of noncitizen parents in The Bahamas, also 
remarks that “a lot of people get citizenship by doing favors for other people. And I feel like 
that’s hurt us over the years. So normal people like me who want to do it the right way are 
pushed aside for somebody who’s getting a favor done by somebody else.” 26 Natacha Jn. Simon, 
a College of The Bahamas student, adds that sometimes these “favors” take on a more sinister 
tone:  
You know what they have the Haitian kids subduing to? It’s like okay, I’m a 
female, right, and you’re in Parliament or [you’re] someone who is connected 
with government. And let’s say you see me on the road or something, and you see 
that I look nice. And people have to realize that just as they say poverty is like a 
state of mind, you feel encapsulated, wherever you see a way out, it’s what you’re 
gonna do. So when these young ladies see these men [who say], ‘Oh, I’m gonna 
                                                        
24 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, November 5, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Petit-Homme 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
25 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, October 30, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Desmangles 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
26 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, November 11, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Zaiem throughout 
the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
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help you. I’m gonna do this for you. I’m gonna help you do this.’ That’s how a lot 
of them get their citizenship you know. This guy said, ‘Okay, well, just be my 
friend.’ You understand? ‘I have friends, I know people in immigration. I could 
get your stuff out.’ It’s sad…27 
 
As illustrated in Table 2, most of the Bahamian-born participants of noncitizen parents waited 
several years to hear back from the Department of Immigration on their citizenship application. 
Desmangles believes that this is not uncommon. He thinks that maybe one out of a 100 
applicants will acquire their citizenship three to six months after they apply for it, but the other 
“99 of them, they’re gonna have to wait until five years to get it.” Ambassador Rodrigue notes 
that if a person applies for citizenship after the one-year mark beginning at age 18 then “[i]t can 
take up to 12 years. I’ve had people say they were waiting for 12 years. It can take 5 years, 8 
years, 10 years. Because now you are going through another type of process. Between 18 and 19, 










                                                        
27 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas November 1, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Jn. Simon 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
28 If a Bahamian-born person of noncitizen parents applies for citizenship between the ages of 18 and 19, s/he 
“registers” as a Bahamian citizen and fewer documents are needed as part of the application process. If, however, 
said individual misses the one-year time frame, then s/he must go through the regular naturalization process. 
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Table 2: Participants born to noncitizens in The Bahamas 
 
Participant Born in The 
Bahamas? 
Applied at age 
18? 
Length of Time to 
Acquire Bahamian 
Citizenship 
Mark Desmangles Y Y 1 year 
Harry Dolce Y Unsure29 3 or 4 years 
Luzena Dumercy Y N30 2 years 
Gillard Louis Y Y 3 years 
Bernard Petit-Homme Y Y 3 years 
Natacha Jn. Simon Y Y Currently under 
consideration 
Marie St. Cecile* Y N 8 years 
Bianca Zaiem Y Y 14 years 
* Name changed to protect anonymity, as per interviewee’s request.31 
 
While in Nassau, I was able to read an award of citizenship letter from the Bahamian 
government that was dated May 21, 2012. The person to whom the letter was addressed had 
applied for Bahamian citizenship on May 2, 1997. It took a decade and a half for the Department 
of Immigration to make a decision on that individual’s application.32 Whether or not this is an 
example of an extreme situation, Marie St. Cecile, born in The Bahamas to Haitian parents, 
remarks that her parents were able to acquire Bahamian citizenship before she did. St. Cecile did 
not apply for Bahamian citizenship at age 18 because “I basically didn’t know that I should, that 
                                                        
29 Dolce says, “I think I applied at 18,” but is unsure as he “wasn’t kind of interested anymore” because of the way 
the Department of Immigration was treating him at the time. He admits, however that “at a certain point you say, 
‘Listen here, okay, I going to do it.’ You have to comply and complain afterwards.” 
30 Dumercy began the process at age 18 but due to a number of complications submitted her application three days 
after she turned 19. As a result, she had to begin the process again, but under a new procedure – naturalization – 
with additional requirements and costs since she had missed the one year window in which to apply. 
31 See footnote 32, chapter 1 (p. 23), for an explanation of the use of “anonymous” interviewee references and the 
one instance of the use of a pseudonym (Marie St. Cecile’s case). 
32 The individual was born in Haiti, which may account for a longer waiting period than if the person had been born 
in The Bahamas of noncitizen parents. Nevertheless, the waiting period in both cases is excessive. 
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you should apply at 18 at that time. So I applied late.”33 She adds that she thought that “once I 
applied, I would automatically get it because of my age and all that stuff,” but that this was not 
the case. She had to wait eight years for the Bahamian government to give her citizenship and, in 
that time, her Haitian-born parents obtained Bahamian citizenship. 
[M]y dad got it a year before me and my mom afterwards because my dad gave 
my mom residency because they were married and he got his own before 
me…And you know, even though that’s my dad, I was saying, you know, I don’t 
understand the system. How come he could get his own [Bahamian citizenship] 
first and I could get mines afterwards? So that really made matters worse. 
 
St. Cecile adds that she even approached a person whom she knew at the Department of 
Immigration to explain to her why her Haitian-born parents obtained Bahamian citizenship 
before she did. “[T]hey could not explain that. ‘I don’t know. I really can’t tell you.’ He [my 
dad] knew someone there and he got his own before me.”  
 In addition to the clientelism displayed by some public officials and civil servants in the 
citizenship application process, a second bureaucratic failure is the inefficiency with which 
citizenship applications are processed. Beside Marie St. Cecile, who did not apply for citizenship 
within the one year time-frame, the duration of Zaiem’s case for Bahamian citizenship stands out 
because she did apply during the requisite period. As Zaiem, who applied for Bahamian 
citizenship in 1999, explains, she received a phone call from the Department of Immigration the 
day after the PLP obtained power in 2002, “saying that they don’t have my paperwork. It’s lost. 
So, every time I called before that, they were ‘dealing with it,’ they were ‘dealing with it.’ 
‘These things take time.’ ‘There’s a huge list of people’” and then, all of a sudden, her file went 
missing.  
                                                        
33 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, November 1, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to St. Cecile 
throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
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Once she received the call that her application was lost, Zaiem began the application 
process again. In fact, she states that she “ended up having to do the whole process…[t]hree 
times” because the paperwork for her application was again lost by the Department of 
Immigration. Jn. Simon, who is currently in the process of applying for citizenship, explains how 
her brother faced a similar situation when the Department lost his application documents. “They 
always lost a birth certificate. ‘Bring it again.’ They always lost something. ‘Bring it again.’” 
Two years into the application process, the Department of Immigration is still requesting 
additional documents from her brother. 
 Dolce was constantly told to come back with other documents when he tried to apply for 
citizenship at 18. “They tell you, ‘Listen here, we need this document.’ They keep turning you 
around and sometimes you get discouraged.” Luzena Dumercy agrees, stating that even when 
you provide them with all the documentation required on the citizenship application form, “every 
time you come, they ask you for these other documents…They say, ‘Oh, you need this and 
that.’” She says that the additional documents are not always “easily, readily available” or are 
“not on the [application] form. So why didn’t you tell me that [I needed these documents] the 
first time? [And] why are they asking for that?” She reveals that this kind of bureaucratic 
inefficiency causes many potential applicants to “just give up” and she almost did, too. Whether 
or not it is the intention of some persons within the Department of Immigration to discourage 
persons from completing the citizenship application process – hence the “lost” documents and 
requests for additional documents – the process does appear to be arbitrary in nature and 
provides ample leeway for some persons to engage in discriminatory acts under the guise of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies.   
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 Even when documents are not lost or “extra” documents are not requested, a few 
interviewees lament the lack of communication they received from the Department of 
Immigration regarding their application status. Petit-Homme relates,  
There is no communication between you and the Department of Immigration. You 
know, no one updating you to say what you might be missing or what other things 
are necessary. It’s just that you go up there, or you follow them and they say, 
‘Well, it’s not been approved as of yet.’ They’re ‘still looking at it,’ which never 
makes sense to me, you know. There’s not a definite time to respond [to 
applicants].  
 
Gillard Louis, a College of The Bahamas student, states that “there was no run-around in terms 
of missing documents. However, there was a back-and-forth for me in terms of checking. I had 
to keep a constant check. It got a bit frustrating at a point. It was a bit frustrating because my 
thing is, don’t give me a date to come back and then tell me when I reach that, you know, it’s not 
ready or come again.”34 
 In some cases the problem was not only that documents were lost or that individuals were 
told to come back at another time with additional documents that were not part of the original 
application, but that once approved for Bahamian citizenship, it took them an inordinate amount 
of time to actually be sworn-in as a Bahamian citizen. Dumercy explains that her sister’s 
application for Bahamian citizenship was approved in less than a year – “one of the quickest 
[turnarounds] I’ve known thus far” – but it took more than a year for her sister to be sworn in. 
When asked why it took so long, Dumercy says, “They didn’t have any swearing in going on” or, 
if they did, “they just didn’t let her know.”  
Zaeim’s story is once again extraordinary in this regard. After finally receiving her letter 
of citizenship approval from the Department of Immigration, she “was told that within three 
                                                        
34 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, November 5, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Louis throughout 
the rest of the dissertation took place in Nassau on the aforementioned date. 
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weeks35 I’d get a phone call stating when to come in to get sworn in. That didn’t happen for 
about a month and a half, and me still calling every week. You know, they’re ‘checking on it.’ 
‘They’re checking on it.’ I’m straight. It’s just the next one [swearing-in ceremony] I’m gonna 
be in.” Finally Zaiem “got a phone call saying, ‘Be here’… [The DoI employee] said, ‘Two 
o’clock on Thursday.’ She told me what to wear. She told me to be there 45 minutes early. I 
show up, this was in July. Yeah, I show up, and they have a note on my file saying, ‘Could not 
be contacted.’ And they said, ‘Well, we tried these numbers’” and the numbers they had called 
were from her second application, “the one that they had lost. So, it was from my job that I 
worked at like ten years ago. So I told them somebody did contact me. ‘It’s too late. You’re not 
on the list’ [they said].”  
Zaeim had reached her breaking point. She had now been without citizenship for six 
months, having already renounced her former nationality as part of the application process, and 
she had shown up at what was supposed to be her swearing-in ceremony, only to be denied entry 
because of bureaucratic errors within the Department of Immigration. A month later she was 
finally sworn in as a Bahamian citizen in the country of her birth. “[T]he only reason” she 
believes that she made it onto “that list was because at this point, which is really stupid of me, I 
should have done this ten years ago, I involved somebody.” She called a family friend who knew 
the then-Director of Immigration who ensured that she was included in the next ceremony and 
was sworn-in as a Bahamian citizen. 
                                                        
35 As happened in Zaiem’s case, Dumercy relates, “they tell you on the letter [of approval for citizenship that] it 
takes 3 to 4 weeks before you get a call for the swearing-in, but that’s not true. They don’t call you in 3 to 4 weeks. 
It could be months–some people, a year.” However, the letter sent to applicants on their approval for Bahamian 
citizenship clearly states that “[a]fter you have submitted the required documents, please allow at least three (3) 
complete weeks before contacting the Naturalization Unit at telephone 502-0533 to arrange an appointment to be 
registered as a citizen of The Bahamas.” It thus appears incumbent upon the applicant, on receipt of his or her 
approval letter, to contact the Naturalization Unit to be registered as a Bahamian citizen.   
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 In addition to the clientelism and bureaucratic inefficiencies, a third reason that allows for 
the politicization of the citizenship application and bestowal process in The Bahamas is the lack 
of transparent and/or clear guidelines regarding the process. I interviewed several people who 
were involved in the citizenship application process within the highest echelons of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Immigration. None of these persons was able to 
provide me with a definitive answer on how long it takes for a person to be sworn-in as a 
Bahamian citizen after receiving his or her approval.  
One participant from the Department of Immigration stated that individuals are sworn in 
“right away. Right away. We don’t hold up with that. If you renounce today–it’s been approved 
by Cabinet last week–you renounce today, in the next swearing in exercise, we ensure that you 
are on the list.”36 This individual was unsure, however, as to how many swearing-in exercises 
had occurred for the year or how long the average wait time was to be sworn-in. Another 
participant, who worked in the MFA, declared that it was “a matter of days” for a person to get 
sworn-in,37 while a third admitted that “we try to do it quickly” – and when asked what the 
average of “quickly” was, stated, “I’d say a few weeks.”38 Comments such as these, along with 
the absence of official, publicly available data on citizenship processing, belie a lack of 
standardized procedures that results in inefficiency and undue personalization of the citizenship 
application process. 
These comments from government officials stand in stark contrast to the aforementioned 
stories given by the Bahamian-born interviewees of noncitizen parents. Beside Dumercy’s sister 
and Zaeim, Dumercy had to wait four months between renunciation and Bahamian citizenship 
acquisition. Louis thinks it was closer to “two months” in his case and Petit-Homme recalls it 
                                                        
36 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, August 7, 2009. 
37 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 27, 2009. 
38 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 31, 2009. 
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“happening in a matter of months.” Dolce, while being unable to remember how long it took for 
him to be sworn in as a Bahamian citizen tells the story of his friend “who recently gave up her 
Haitian citizenship and it took her like up to, I would say, two or three months.” He says that 
others also “wait for two months, three months. I know it doesn’t take days. I know [that] for 
sure.”  
Email correspondence from an administrator at the MFA – as opposed to the 
aforementioned quotes from elected officials – is more in line with the interviewees’ 
experiences. This official notes that “[t]he time between the submission of the [renunciation] 
documents and the swearing-in ceremony can range on average between three (3) and six (6) 
months.”39 Thus despite the fact that government officials contend that individuals are quickly 
sworn-in as Bahamian citizens once approved by Cabinet, the experiences of the interviewees 
born to noncitizen parents in The Bahamas contradicts this assertion.  
Beside the arbitrariness in the waiting period to be sworn-in as a Bahamian citizen and 
the inefficiencies in communicating when a person is to come in for a swearing-in ceremony, 
ceremonies are sometimes cancelled as well. This is particularly problematic for individuals who 
live in the Family Islands and who have to make a special trip – and all the costs associated with 
that trip – to Nassau for the ceremony. Dumercy, for example, travelled from Abaco to Nassau 
for her swearing-in ceremony only to receive a call from the Department of Immigration that it 
had been cancelled once she “was already in Nassau.” If an individual does not have family or 
friends with whom to stay, or if the next swearing-in ceremony is a week or longer away, the 
cost of waiting in Nassau can be prohibitive in terms of employment, living expenses and 
personal time commitments.  
                                                        
39 This person also notes that “[s]ince July 2012, the Department has increased the frequency of the swearing-in 
ceremonies to shorten the period between the submission of documents and the ceremony” (personal communication 
(email), April 13, 2013). 
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It is important to emphasize that in all of these cases, during the interim between 
renunciation of one’s former nationality and the acquisition of Bahamian citizenship, the 
individual is de jure stateless. He or she is not formally covered under the operation of any 
State’s law, whether in theory or in practice. For as the approval letter from the MFA states, “[a]t 
the time of registration, you will be required to take an oath as prescribed by Regulation 7 of The 
Bahamas Nationality Act, 1973 and thereupon from the date of registration you will be a citizen 
of The Bahamas” (italics added). Statelessness is thus a very real possibility, especially for 
persons of Haitian descent, in The Bahamas.  
Statelessness  
As noted in the previous section, part of the process of acquiring Bahamian citizenship, an 
individual must renounce any citizenship that he or she holds and provide proof of this 
renunciation to the Department of Immigration. Although this is the last part of the process – an 
individual is not required to give up his or her citizenship until said person receives the approval 
letter to become a Bahamian citizen from Cabinet via the Department of Immigration – the 
participants’ aforementioned experiences demonstrate that a person can be without the 
citizenship of any State for several months, and in some cases up to a year. This is a highly 
problematic position for someone to be in, as I demonstrate in chapters 2 and 5.  
Although a Department of Immigration official admits that persons could fall into the 
category of de jure stateless during this time, he contends that it is “a priority of ours” to ensure 
that such instances rarely occur:  
Let me say this–if there is a need for a person to be sworn in, if there’s an 
emergency or there’s an urgency, we swear them in separately outside of an 
established or arranged swearing-in. So it’s [the formal acquisition of citizenship] 
not limited to a swearing-in. Let’s just say a person has to go off to college or they 
say, ‘This being de jure stateless is a problem’ for any reason, for any number of 
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reasons…we would move to have a single swearing-in when necessary. We don’t 
have anything cast in stone or in law what says you have to wait for a grouping.40  
 
While further investigation is needed to corroborate this statement, one of the primary problems 
appears to be precisely that the Department of Immigration lacks “anything cast in stone” when 
it comes to establishing transparent deadlines, rules and procedures regarding the citizenship 
application process. This adds to the politicization of applying for and receiving Bahamian 
citizenship because an applicant cannot easily point to a rule or a procedure and ask to be treated 
in a fair manner based on said rule or procedure. Additionally, it is revelatory that the three 
officials, all of whom should be on the “same page,” or at least have a more defined idea of the 
timing between renunciation and Bahamian citizenship acquisition, offer inconsistent 
explanations on the nature and duration of the citizenship acquisition process.  
One of these individuals, who was in the best position to answer questions dealing with 
the citizenship application and approval process given the nature of his professional duties, 
readily admits that he does not know what happens when there is “a pregnant woman” who has 
renounced her original citizenship as part of the citizenship application process. “She’s about to 
give birth and the child’s nationality is dependent upon the mother. And the woman gives birth. 
What happens to the child? That’s a good question that you may want to follow-up [on].”41 If 
people at the highest levels of the Department of Immigration and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs are unsure of procedures and timelines in the citizenship application and approval 
process, it is unsurprising that the Bahamian-born interviewees faced the types of obstacles that 
they did on their path to becoming Bahamian citizens for “the functionaries of the state 
themselves find the practices of the state to be illegible” (Das 2004, 234). The system for 
awarding citizenship is dysfunctional and statelessness consequently arises. 
                                                        
40 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, August 7, 2009. 
41 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, August 7, 2009. 
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 Beside the cases of de jure statelessness that exist during the interim between the 
renunciation of one’s original citizenship and being sworn-in as a Bahamian citizen, the risk of 
statelessness is heightened in The Bahamas for other reasons as well. The Bahamian Constitution 
does not accord its female citizens the same rights as their male counterparts when it comes to 
passing on their Bahamian citizenship. A child born outside of the country to a Bahamian father 
becomes a Bahamian citizen at birth (Article 8), but a child born outside of the country to a 
Bahamian mother does not have this same right if the mother is married to a foreigner.42 Her 
child is entitled to apply for Bahamian citizenship at the age of 18, alongside those who are born 
in The Bahamas to noncitizen parents. The only difference is that the child born overseas to a 
Bahamian mother has until the age of 21 to register as a Bahamian citizen (Article 9).43 In this 
case, the child born overseas to a Bahamian mother is susceptible to statelessness if the child is 
born in a State that does not automatically grant citizenship via jus soli and there are restrictions 
on the ability of the child’s father to pass on his citizenship via jus sanguinis.44 Thus formal 
belonging, or the fulfillment of a human right to a nationality, also has a gendered component in 
the Bahamian case.  
Lack of parental documentation is one of the primary problems among irregular migrants 
and another reason for potential statelessness in the country. Individuals who are unable to prove 
who they are and where they are from via documentation – such as birth certificates, passports, 
driver’s licenses and so forth – often pass on this insecure status to their children. The Haitian 
                                                        
42 Only if the Bahamian mother is unmarried does the child acquire Bahamian citizenship at birth. Note also that the 
gendered dimension of citizenship acquisition continues in the arena of marriage since the Bahamian Constitution 
makes explicit reference to non-Bahamian women being “entitled” to register as Bahamian citizens, provided certain 
criteria are met, if they marry a Bahamian man (Article 10), but Bahamian women who marry non-Bahamian men 
are not provided the same right in the Constitution. 
43 Article 15 of Chapter 191/Immigration Act (Government of The Bahamas 1967) briefly discusses how the 
Immigration Board “shall grant” a permanent residence certificate to children born “legitimately” to a Bahamian 
woman married to a non-Bahamian man outside of the country. 
44 If the father is stateless, then the child would also be stateless. 
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Embassy in The Bahamas cannot provide Haitian citizenship to those who are unable to provide 
proof of their parent’s Haitian nationality or who cannot produce two witnesses to attest to the 
citizenship of the child’s parents.  
Lack of parental documentation is often particularly pressing for children born to parents 
from rural parts of Haiti, such as the Northwest, where most Haitian migrants to The Bahamas 
come from. As one Haitian official states, “Don’t forget you’re dealing with a poor country 
where governance is a big problem, particularly at the level of the Registrar[’s] office. [Because] 
the main archive is in Port-au-Prince [and] because of poverty, many people give birth to their 
children and they do not go to the Registrar[’s] office to register their children. That’s a big 
problem.”45 Ambassador Rodrigue supports this assertion, describing how many parents “cannot 
get a birth certificate [from Haiti]. That’s the big thing. The big, big, big problem” when it comes 
to obtaining Haitian citizenship for their Bahamian-born children.  
This issue is not unique to children born of irregular Haitian migrants in The Bahamas. 
As I note in the previous chapter, lack of birth registration is one of the reasons that individuals 
are placed at risk of statelessness globally. While a high-ranking official at the Office of the 
Registrar in The Bahamas asserts that it is “very rare” for a child born in The Bahamas not to be 
registered and receive a Bahamian birth certificate, a former Haitian official discusses how many 
children born in The Bahamas end up being repatriated with their parents:  
And now suddenly, when they are 16, 18, and they want to come here to get their 
citizenship that’s a big problem because there’s no way to prove that [they were 
born in The Bahamas]! The reason there is no way to prove that [is] you [were] 
born, [but] before leaving they don’t even think about having an official 
document here. They cannot have a passport, but at least they could have a travel 
document. They did not. Then no vaccination, nothing; how you going to prove 
[birth in The Bahamas]?  
 
                                                        
45 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 28, 2009 
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The number of undocumented Bahamian-born children of Haitian parentage in this situation is 
unknown but as the official at the Office of the Registrar made clear, a parent must have a “valid 
government issued picture identification” in order to register the Bahamian-born child.46 Brice-
Adderley provides an account that supports the official’s assertion:  
We have a case where that was brought to my attention. The father was born in 
The Bahamas. He’s from Haitian parentage. He is 32-years-old. I think he may 
have submitted his documents for citizenship, but they haven’t come through as 
yet, for whatever reason. The mother was an illegal immigrant, but she came here 
somehow and stayed for two years, met him, had a child. But two months ago she 
was detained and repatriated. But before, in between being detained and being 
repatriated, they called me in to see if I could assist her because she had a young 
baby. The young baby was not documented…So the mother was the one who 
would have taken the child to be registered, but because she was illegal for 
whatever reason, she did not have any ID. So she couldn’t do anything for the 
child…She couldn’t get the notice of birth from the hospital because she didn’t 
have an ID. 
 
Without such a valid ID, the ability of the child to acquire a Bahamian birth certificate, a 
Certificate of Identity/travel document and then apply for Bahamian citizenship at 18 is placed in 
jeopardy. Such children are exposed to an obvious risk of statelessness, having no proof of where 
they “officially” belong.  
 A former employee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the FNM administration also 
notes that children who are born in The Bahamas but who “go back to Haiti” with their mothers 
at “the age of two or three, or whatever” face difficulties in securing Bahamian citizenship for a 
different reason: “There’s no connection with The Bahamas until one day before their 18th 
birthday, which they just happen to come back to Nassau just to file this piece of paper and then 
leave again. That puts a different spin on it [the citizenship acquisition process] in that they 
                                                        
46 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, November 9, 2012. 
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haven’t been here for that length of time, etc., etc.”47 What exactly the “spin” is, given that no 
transparent rules and procedures exist for acquiring Bahamian citizenship, is unclear. 
 It is also unclear how many individuals fall into the situation of being repatriated with 
their mother to Haiti and then returning to The Bahamas at age 18 to apply for Bahamian 
citizenship. Dr. Charité, who offers his medical services in various Haitian communities in 
Abaco, believes that “[w]e have quite a bit [who] are put in that situation. A lot of them go and 
come back when they’re 18, 19” and those who come back are “a large enough number to affect 
a community.”  
  According to Ambassador Rodrigue, however, even undocumented persons of alleged 
Haitian nationality are able to obtain a letter from the Haitian Embassy that “serves as an ID 
because we put a picture on it and that person, we request he or she bring two witnesses who can 
identify her and say, ‘Yes, this is so and so.’” This letter is then accepted at the hospital as “valid 
government issued picture identification,” allowing that individual’s child to obtain his or her 
Bahamian birth registration. But if the undocumented parent does not come to the Embassy for 
such a letter, and does not possess his or her own Haitian birth certificate, then that becomes, in 
the words of Ambassador Rodrigue, a “big, big, big problem,” especially if “[t]he parent dies. 
The parent dies and that kid doesn’t know anything…We have cases like that.”  
 However, this ID letter, which serves as a form of identification for a pregnant woman 
who lacks a Bahamian government issued ID cannot, according to the Ambassador, be used to 
acquire Haitian nationality: “But that document or that letter we give is used only for that [as ID 
at the hospital]. They cannot use it [to] afterwards come and say, ‘I have that from you. I need to 
have a passport.’ Because no matter what, for the passport we need a birth certificate.”  
                                                        
47 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 27, 2009. A different MFA participant stated that “[i]nformation on 
these children [who are deported with their mothers] are carefully taken and kept for safekeeping to assist in their 
subsequent application for Bahamian citizenship at the age of 18” (email correspondence, April 15, 2013). 
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 As part of the Bahamian or Haitian citizenship application process for their Bahamian-
born children, Haitian nationals must obtain a certified copy of their birth certificate (“extrait”). 
The Haitian Embassy in The Bahamas is unable to provide this service to Haitians despite having 
tried to convince the Haitian government to allow them to do so.48 Haitians must therefore either 
return to Haiti – a voyage that few undertake – or solicit the services of a person or agency to 
acquire the certified copy of their birth certificate for them. Says Ambassador Rodrigue,  
Some service they call it, where people can go and that person…tr[ies] to get 
those document[s] for them. At that point you give your information: born here, 
born this day, in what city, etc. And that person tr[ies] to get that information [the 
birth certificate] for them. But sometimes the person just hires someone to give 
them [a] false document. And when that person bring[s] that document here at the 
Embassy, we verify it’s not authentic. We have to tell them, ‘I’m sorry. We 
cannot legalize the document.’ 
 
The Ambassador adds that sometimes a person goes through the process multiple times, paying 
individuals to obtain a certified copy of their Haitian birth certificate only to find out that the 
document is not genuine and cannot be accepted by the Embassy in Nassau. “When they come 
the third time and you say, ‘No, it’s not good,’ the problem is you. The problem is the Embassy 
because ‘I paid all that money’ and we refuse to take it. ‘You are blocking me from doing this or 
doing that.’” This is why, in the words of another former Haitian official, “if you go outside of 
the Embassy, talking to the people in the yard, the Embassy is not popular.”49 This same 
individual notes that fraudulent documents are not the only problem that the Haitian Embassy in 
Nassau faces when trying to authenticate the Haitian nationality of an individual; a black market 
for Bahamian birth certificates also exists. 
That is, the birth certificate of a deceased child of Bahamian nationality is sold to another 
person who attempts to use the deceased child’s birth certificate for his or her child. The former 
                                                        
48 As of March 2014, the Haitian government is set to launch a program to provide documents to its overseas 
nationals in the DR and Turks and Caicos (Daniel 2014).  
49 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 28, 2009. 
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Haitian official states that “I think the Bahamian government has a big problem to solve” in this 
area and that “[y]ou have a lot of cases like this…Sometimes they even steal document[s].” The 
Haitian Embassy cannot provide a Haitian birth certificate or passport to individuals under such 
circumstances. “If you come to the consular section and ask me for a passport, if you cannot 
prove [to] me beyond any doubt that you [are] Haitian, I’m not going to give you the passport. 
I’m not going to issue the passport. You have to prove me that. Okay? That’s why you may find 
many Haitian[s] who left Haiti to come here…they’re coming to the Embassy for 2 or 3 years 
[and] they [still] cannot get a [Haitian] passport.”50 
The problem of false documents also affects these persons’ ability to obtain Bahamian 
citizenship. Without the extrait, as Ambassador Rodrigue points out, “they cannot bring all what 
they need to bring to the immigration service…So it’s a challenge, it’s a real challenge for the 
people.” The former Haitian official also points out how “very often people try to blame the 
Bahamian government” for the inability of Bahamian-born children of Haitian descent to obtain 
Bahamian citizenship, “but the people also complicate the situation with fraudulent document[s], 
and we have to pay attention to that.” Statelessness is thus a real risk to those children born to 
Haitian parents who are unable to secure Haitian citizenship from the Embassy due to their lack 
of documentation or their use of fraudulent documents. 
 Another issue is that some Bahamian-born individuals are ignorant of their ability to go 
to the Haitian Embassy and obtain a Haitian passport. A few interviewees, for example, note that 
their parents did not know they could have taken them to the Embassy to secure Haitian 
nationality documents. Whether this is due to ignorance or a deliberate act on the part of the 
parent(s), the children are at risk of statelessness because they lack Haitian nationality documents 
                                                        
50 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 28, 2009. 
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and are not yet able to apply for Bahamian citizenship. Ambassador Rodrigue explains how even 
though the Haitian Embassy provides Haitian birth certificates to children born in The Bahamas,  
when they get the birth certificate from the Bahamian authority, they are satisfied 
with that. And, as a matter of fact, they keep it preciously because that is the only 
thing that can prove they were born here [in The Bahamas] and that is going to 
give them the possibility, at 18 years old, to apply for [Bahamian] citizenship. 
 
Although possessing Haitian identity documents does not affect a child’s ability to apply for 
Bahamian citizenship at 18, many parents believe that it does. As Ambassador Rodrigue states, 
“They think if they come here at the Embassy and get a Haitian birth certificate,” it is “never 
going to happen that they get the Bahamian citizenship.” They believe that “having a Haitian 
birth certificate…compromise[s] their chance or the possibility of becoming Bahamian.” So, 
says the Ambassador, “no one” comes to the Embassy to obtain Haitian identity documents for 
their children. This again poses a real risk of statelessness for Bahamian-born children. 
A former Haitian official concurs, adding that Embassy personnel go to churches to 
explain to the Haitian congregations that having a Haitian passport or birth certificate does not 
hinder an applicant’s ability to acquire Bahamian citizenship later on. “I invite them to come to 
the Embassy to get [a Haitian] passport for their children. But they’re still waiting for [the] 
Bahamian passport.” An MFA official agrees, stating that  
[m]any persons born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents, especially 
persons of Haitian descent do not see themselves as Haitian nationals 51  and 
therefore do not wish to claim Haitian citizenship and would rather have a 
Bahamian certificate of identity instead of a Haitian passport. The Haitian 
Embassy willingly issues Haitian passports to persons born in The Bahamas to 
Haitian parent/s.52  
 
These individuals – who have the ability to obtain Haitian nationality documents and choose not 
to – are not stateless according to Ambassador Rodrigue. “[I]f you don’t want to take it [a 
                                                        
51 Chapter 5 discusses how these individuals understand their place identity.  
52 Email correspondence, April 15, 2013. 
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Haitian passport], I can say that’s your problem. That’s you. But you have the potential 
nationality…[I]f for any reason you say, ‘No, this [passport] I don’t want it.’ No one put you in 
the position to have no nationality. You are the one.” The MFA official adds that “[i]t can be 
contended that there are cases of de facto statelessness” in The Bahamas, but that such “cases are 
due to choice of the individual and not by any discriminatory practice of the Bahamas 
government.”53  
It is important to emphasize, however, that the responses of the Ambassador and the 
MFA official do not hold for Bahamian-born children because they are unable to undertake 
citizenship and passport application procedures themselves and cannot, therefore, make active 
choices one way or the other. Moreover, and in the words of Open Society Foundation program 
officer Sebastian Kohn, “Having a right to a nationality is not the same as actually having a 
nationality.”54 They are thus once again vulnerable to statelessness, even if it is because of the 
inaction or choice of their parents.  
Despite the predicaments generated by Bahamian nationality law – both for children born 
of noncitizens in the country and for children born abroad to Bahamian mothers married to 
foreign men – the Government of The Bahamas has not ratified either of the two statelessness 
conventions 55 and denies that statelessness is an issue in the country. If it does exist, in the 
words of a former high-ranking MFA official, it “is not necessarily stateless here, but it’s a 
statelessness of their country;”56 meaning that if persons are found stateless in The Bahamas, it is 
a result of problems in the laws and procedures of other countries, not of The Bahamas. An 
anonymous official from the MFA asserts that “[i]t is believed that there are no cases of de jure 
                                                        
53 Email correspondence, April 15, 2013. 
54 Personal interview, February 7, 2012, New York, NY. 
55 See chapter 2, p. 57, for a description of the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions. 
56 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 27, 2009. 
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statelessness in The Bahamas…Persons born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents are 
considered under Bahamian law to be the nationals of the country of their parents.” 57 In the case 
of children born of Haitian parents, therefore, the assumption is that the children are covered 
under Article 11 of the Haitian Constitution,58 which states that any person born of a Haitian 
mother or father who has not renounced his or her Haitian citizenship is also a Haitian at birth. 
This chapter demonstrates, however, that many such persons are unable to claim and 
acquire Haitian citizenship in practice. Beside the cases provided above, Gonçalves Margerin 
and Teff (2008) point out that children born to undocumented parents or parents seeking asylum 
do not acquire Haitian citizenship at birth and Wooding adds that “[t]he reality is that under the 
Haitian Constitution and Haiti’s 1984 law on nationality, there are several groups of people of 
Haitian origin born outside Haiti who do not have automatic access to Haitian nationality” (2009, 
24). UNHCR goes further to observe how  
complying with the documentary requirements to demonstrate descent from a 
Haitian national is very difficult and costly for those outside of Haiti. An 
additional problem is the lack (to UNHCR’s knowledge) of clear, concise written 
consular regulations on interpretation of the law. For example, in a 2008 survey 
conducted by UNHCR of four Haitian consulates in locations with the highest 
numbers of Haitians and their descendants living abroad, consular officials 
disagreed on how far, i.e. to which generation, lineage rights could extend to grant 
nationality (UNHCR 2011). 
 
Alarmingly, it appears that Haiti may not consider such persons “Haitians” either. When Haitian 
President Michel Martelly visited The Bahamas in 2012, for instance, he referred to the 
“stateless” people of Haitian descent living in The Bahamas, asserting that it “could be 
                                                        
57 Email correspondence, April 15, 2013. This participant also notes, however, that “[t]here is some concern about 
the children born to Jamaican parent/s, as a change in the Jamaican Constitution removed automatic Jamaican 
citizenship to children born to Jamaican parent/s outside of Jamaica. Such children now have to apply for Jamaican 
citizenship, but they are almost guaranteed to be granted Jamaican citizenship. The same requirement applies to the 
children born outside of Guyana to Guyanese parent/s.” 
58 “Possède la nationalité haïtienne de naissance tout individu né d'un père haïtien ou d'une mère haïtienne qui eux-




considered as a crime” that they are denied citizenship in The Bahamas and repatriated to Haiti. 
“[B]ut that’s not the issue to talk about crime here; the issue is to stand by them and find the right 
solution. Be responsible, be humans and see how to better assist these Haitians.” Such assertions 
resulted in a public outcry and then Prime Minister Ingraham declared that “[s]uch persons are 
not stateless; they have the nationality of their parents” (Rolle 2012b).59 
 Where then do these Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent belong? Not only has 
The Bahamas not ratified the two statelessness conventions, which could potentially improve 
their situation, but it also has no statelessness status determination procedures in place either. 
Without any statelessness status determination procedures or provisions to address statelessness 
within its nationality or immigration laws, The Bahamas is unable to accurately and transparently 
verify whether the “potential [Haitian] nationality” of which Ambassador Rodrigue speaks is 
actually enjoyed in practice by the Bahamian-born individuals in question, exacerbating the 
potential for statelessness in the country.  
 Although no statelessness status determination procedures exist, the aforementioned 
MFA official affirms that “[t]he Department [of Immigration] seeks confirmation of citizenship 
from the assumed country of citizenship in writing or by asking the individual to apply for a 
national passport.”60 Based on the above testimony from the former Haitian official and the 
current Ambassador, however, the Haitian Embassy cannot provide a Haitian passport or a 
written letter attesting to the nationality of those who either lack the requisite identity documents 
from Haiti or who cannot produce two Haitian witnesses to verify their Haitian nationality.  
                                                        
59 The Haitian Embassy was quick to issue a clarification stating, “President Martelly’s sole purpose during his stay 
in The Bahamas was to seek opportunities to improve the lives of Haitians, so they don’t have to migrate to other 
countries…At any moment, President Martelly did not intend to interfere in any way in the internal politics of The 
Bahamas” (Rolle 2012a). 
60 Email correspondence, April 15, 2013. 
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It is thus not apparent that the Bahamian government’s reliance on written letters is 
sufficient for establishing the nationality of all persons born in The Bahamas of noncitizen 
parents. Moreover, asking people “to apply for a national passport” as “confirmation” of their 
nationality is not proof that they are nationals. An application for a passport is not the same as 
actually possessing a passport. What happens to those individuals whose parents lack identifying 
nationality documents is thus unclear. Once again, it seems that the current operating procedures 
of the Bahamian government expose Bahamian-born persons of noncitizen parents to the risk of 
statelessness, the government’s denial notwithstanding.  
Through a combination of various factors, therefore, Bahamian-born children of Haitian 
descent are at a heightened risk of statelessness in the country. Protection gaps in Bahamian 
law,61 bureaucratic inefficiencies, obscure citizenship decision-making rules and practices and 
the politicized nature of citizenship bestowal place them at risk of statelessness on the Bahamian 
side; while parental inability or refusal to obtain Haitian identity documents for themselves or 
their children place them at risk on the Haitian side. As former Attorney-General Sears, points 
out, “When someone has no evidence of another nationality, has never applied for a Haitian 
passport, has never had a Haitian passport…because they’ve never had any documentation to 
evidence a Haitian nationality…this is where the issue of statelessness comes in.” Another 
former Bahamian government official similarly notes that 
the social reality is that we have a very large number of persons in this society of 
Haitian extraction who have a very dubious status in The Bahamas; neither fish 
nor fowl. They don’t qualify for Bahamian citizenship constitutionally and 
conversely there are issues as to whether they have retained Haitian citizenship. 
[…] In any case, there is a very great question as to whether we do not 
unwittingly have within our borders a very large number of people who may 
possibly be stateless or who may become stateless at a certain point in time.62 
                                                        
61 Such “gaps” affect all children born of noncitizens, as well as children born overseas to Bahamian women married 
to foreigners. 
62 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, August 4, 2009. 
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When these Bahamian-born persons are not relegated into liminality, they are – as explained 
above – assumed to be Haitian. Purportedly the Bahamian government is also trying to 
instantiate the “Haitian” nationality of Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent at a critical 
time in the citizenship application process. According to Dumercy, the Bahamian government is 
failing to renew travel documents at age 18 for those who have not gone to the Haitian Embassy 
to acquire Haitian identity documents. A travel document, which is a Bahamian-government 
issued Certificate of Identity, is issued to children born of noncitizen parents in The Bahamas. 
This document serves as an ID and allows children born of noncitizens on Bahamian soil to 
travel abroad as well. According to the MFA official,  
The certificate of identity is issued at any age up to the 18th birthday. The expiry 
date therefore varies, and does not automatically expire on the 18th birthday. The 
last certificate of identity will be issued on the eighteenth birthday and is valid for 
five (5) years enabling the holder to remain in The Bahamas, and re-enter The 
Bahamas during the processing of the application for registration as a citizen.63 
 
As Dumercy explains, however, it used to be that you could go to the Department of Immigration 
to get a letter stating that the travel document could be renewed at the age of 18. But “[n]ow they 
stopped doing that.” Instead, “what they’re making the kids do” is “go and apply to the Haitian 
Embassy in Nassau…in order to get a valid ID.” While additional data is needed to corroborate 
this allegation, Dumercy is certainly right that the Bahamian government is “sending a mixed, 
confused message” if they are refusing to renew the Bahamian-issued travel document and 
forcing these Bahamian-born persons to acquire Haitian identity documents at age 18. Age 18 is, 
after all, when they can apply for Bahamian citizenship, as per Bahamian law.  
                                                        
63 Email correspondence, April 15, 2013. 
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Conclusion  
This chapter illustrates that determining who belongs where is no simple endeavor. It is not 
merely a matter of identifying whether an individual falls within a given State’s law as one of its 
nationals. In order to establish whether a person’s human right to a nationality is fulfilled in 
practice, we must examine the political practices and bureaucratic procedures of States to see 
how laws are implemented in reality. As this chapter shows, a large gap exists between what 
Haitian law says regarding the acquisition of Haitian nationality and what actually occurs in 
practice for those born of Haitian migrants in The Bahamas. The offspring of such migrants are 
exposed to statelessness because the country of their birth, The Bahamas, denies them citizenship 
for at least the first 18 years of their life and because they do not possess nationality documents 
from the country of their parents’ alleged nationality (Haiti). 
 While Bahamian government representatives claim that statelessness does not exist, I 
demonstrate in this chapter that de jure statelessness exists, especially during the Bahamian 
citizenship application process. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official asserts that 
discrimination plays no role in engendering statelessness in The Bahamas, without publically 
available data on the number of persons who are denied or granted Bahamian citizenship by 
national origin, we have no way of corroborating this statement. What is known, and what I 
illustrate in this chapter, is that the obscureness, arbitrariness and politicization surrounding the 
granting of Bahamian citizenship provide ample cover for the government to defend a position of 
neutrality, even if the experiences of the Bahamian-born noncitizens demonstrate otherwise.  
That the majority of study participants, both citizen and noncitizen, remark on the 
prevalence of Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent among those at risk of statelessness 
also speaks to a problem of discrimination. As James Goldston points out, “Indirect 
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discrimination—also known as de facto discrimination or disparate/adverse impact or effect—
occurs when a practice, rule, requirement, or condition is neutral on its face but impacts 
particular groups disproportionately, absent objective and reasonable justification” (2006, 328). 
Whether it is because they are the largest foreign-descended population (and consequently by 
their sheer numbers will have more affected persons) or because of discrimination, Bahamian-
born persons of Haitian descent do appear to be disproportionately affected by the Bahamas’ 
exclusionary citizenship laws. They are either thrust into the liminal space of statelessness or 
assumed to take on the nationality of a State with which they have no effective ties.  
Unlike the postnationalist world of blurred boundaries then, these Bahamian-born 
noncitizens come up against the very real boundaries of formal belonging to the Bahamian State. 
Rejected by the country of their birth for at least the first 18 years of their life and assumed – or 
made – to hold a nationality that they feel does not belong to them,64 these individuals are unable 
to enjoy their human right to a nationality. This situation is not unique to The Bahamas, 
however. Only a few hundred miles to the south, in the Dominican Republic, the precariousness 
of belonging is exposed in a far more overtly discriminatory manner.  
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Chapter 4 – Dominican Republic 
 
Whereas in The Bahamas, Bahamian law clearly denies persons born of noncitizens Bahamian 
citizenship at birth, in the Dominican Republic (DR) the negation of belonging has not always 
been so clear-cut. While the DR has engaged in various exclusionary membership practices 
toward individuals of Haitian descent for several years now, it was not until September 2013 that 
mass denationalization became a real possibility. In Sentence TC/0168/13 (Government of the 
Dominican Republic 2013b) the Constitutional Court ruled that civil registry officers were not 
acting unconstitutionally when they refused to issue citizenship and identity documents to 
persons whose parents’ residency status was unclear or illegal when they were born in the 
country. In one fell swoop, the Constitutional Court paved the way for tens, and possibly 
hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent to be stripped of their citizenship 
(Archibold 2013; Edmonds 2013; Rojas 2013).1  
As I explain in further detail below, Sentence TC/0168/13 is only the culmination of a 
series of exclusionary membership practices carried out by the Dominican State. Like the 
Bahamian case, legal, political and bureaucratic factors work together to preclude Dominican-
born persons of Haitian descent from enjoying the fulfillment of their human right to a 
nationality in practice. What distinguishes the Bahamian and Dominican cases is the prevalent 
anti-Haitianism that exists in the DR and the fact that those born in the country of Haitian 
                                                        
1 Due to the repudiation of this Sentence by political progressives and others in the Dominican Republic, as well as 
concern from the Haitian Government, a bill was recently passed in May, 2014 by the Dominican Congress to allow 
“[t]hose without documents…[to] apply for legal residency and eventually citizenship if they can prove they were 
born in the Dominican Republic” (Archibold 2014, n. pag.). “Advocates for Haitian migrants and their children said 
the change was an important, if imperfect, step. While it may clear up and validate the legal status of thousands of 
people, many others, including some of the poorest who lack documents, may remain in limbo or be forced to 
register as foreigners, no matter how long they had been there” (ibid.). 
pass a law in May 2014 that specifies a path for Haitian descendants born in the Dominican Republic prior to 2007 
to claim Dominican citizenship, while keeping the citizenship-stripping provisions of the high court ruling intact for 
those born after 2007, 4) but uncertainty still remains about how many Haitian descendant Dominicans will, in 
practice, be able to retain their citizenship rights. 
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descent were once Dominican citizens, as per Dominican law. This chapter thus illustrates how 
people are being turned into foreigners in their own country (see chapter 2, pp. 45-46) by being 
“forced to be Haitian.”2 The chapter therefore demonstrates that in a seemingly postnational 
world, the State continues to erect clear boundaries of belonging and to deny citizenship to those 
it feels should have no place within them. 
Situating the Case Study 
The Dominican Republic (DR) is the second largest country in the Caribbean.3 Located on the 
island of Hispaniola, it shares a 223 mile border – and a long history – with Haiti. Although both 
Haiti and the DR served as colonies for European powers, slavery and plantation-style 
agriculture were most prominent in Haiti. The brutality of this system led to black slave revolt 
and the eventual overthrow of the French in Saint Domingue (Haiti), with Haiti declaring its 
independence in 1804. Less than 20 years later its eastern neighbor declared its independence as 
well. The Republic of Spanish Haiti’s (DR’s) independence was short-lived, however. The once-
colonized became the colonizer as Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer led some 10,000 troops 
into the country as a means to unify the island.4  
While Haitian rule only lasted 22 years, its legacy in the DR lasted far longer. Many, 
especially those of a nationalist persuasion, fear the threat of another “Haitian invasion” akin to 
what occurred during Haiti’s rule of the DR.5 This particular “invasion” takes the form of Haitian 
migration, with the “illegal” Haitian being the primary source of concern, although Dominican-
                                                        
2 “[F]orced to be Haitian” are the words of Justice Jiménez Martínez in her dissenting opinion in Sentence 
TC/0168/13. She stated that the Deguis case was one of denationalization, but “not only denationalization, but being 
forced to be Haitian” (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 140). Both The Bahamas and the DR assume 
that children born to persons of Haitian descent on their territory are Haitian. 
3 Cuba is the largest. 
4 Martínez (2003, 85) citing Moya Pons, states that Haitians entered Haiti at the invitation of several Spanish Haitian 
political elites. Haitian rule was thus “neither an ‘invasion’ nor an ‘occupation” (ibid., 86). Haiti considered the 
move a means of securing itself against European attempts to invade the newly independent country from the East.  
5 Refer to Human Rights Watch (2002, 8), United Nations (2008b, 15) and Martínez (2003, 85). 
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born descendants of Haitian migrants also generate unease. It is thus not uncommon, as 
Francisco Henry Leonardo of the Centro Bonó6 points out, to read newspaper headlines that 
glare: “‘Immigrants mobilize to demand they be given their documents.’ ‘Haitians demand they 
be given their documents.’ ‘Judge in San Pedro orders Haitians be given their documents’”7 
when the subjects of these stories are neither immigrants nor Haitians, but Dominicans of Haitian 
descent.  
Even though the Dominican economy is weaker in comparison to other Haitian migrant 
destinations (such as The Bahamas or the United States) it is nevertheless much stronger than 
that of Haiti, and the quality of life that a person can enjoy is higher in the DR than Haiti as 
well.8 Thus many Haitians migrate to the DR in the hopes of finding more secure and profitable 
employment in the construction, agricultural and private security sectors. Although debate exists 
regarding the number of Haitian nationals and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the country, a 
recent survey conducted by the DR’s Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas9 determined that 87.3% of 
the immigrant population is Haitian-born (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013a, 29), 
while 86% of the immigrant-descended population is made up of individuals of Haitian descent 
(ibid., 30). Despite increasing alarm at the Haitian presence, the total number of Haitians is 
estimated to be less than 5% of the DR’s overall population (ibid., 62). Given the country’s 
recent political and judicial moves to denationalize and potentially render stateless hundreds of 
thousands of citizens of Haitian descent, however, this percentage is likely to increase. 
                                                        
6 The Centro Bonó is a Jesuit organization that focuses on social justice and solidarity for persons who face poverty 
and social exclusion. The organization legally assists many denationalized Dominicans to try to reacquire or retain 
their Dominican nationality documents. 
7 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 13, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Leonardo throughout 
the rest of the dissertation took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
8 As per the Human Development Index, Haiti is ranked 161 out of 186 countries while the DR is ranked 96 (United 
Nations Development Program 2013). 
9 National Office of Statistics. 
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The Legal Context  
The Dominican Republic has historically been a country of jus soli where the transmission of 
nationality occurs through birth on Dominican territory. The two exceptions to this form of 
citizenship acquisition were that a child born to a diplomat or a person “in transit” through the 
DR did not receive Dominican citizenship. A person was “in transit” if he or she remained in the 
country for ten days or less (Government of the Dominican Republic 1939). Until 2010, this 
understanding of citizenship acquisition held throughout various revisions of the Dominican 
Constitution, even if it did not always apply in practice. In 2010, however, the DR amended its 
Constitution to state that children born to parents who reside illegally on Dominican territory are 
also excluded from jus soli citizenship acquisition (Article 18, Government of the Dominican 
Republic 2010). A rather expansive definition of “in transit” was also promulgated, dismissing 
the temporal element and instead equating “in transit” status with not being legally present in the 
country (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 62-3). As Indira Goris of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative observes, “it didn’t really have anything to do now with how long you 
were in the country, it became a matter of proving that you were legally in the country.” 10 
 This broad understanding of “in transit” found its official formulation in Ley 285-04, 
which establishes the distinction between resident and non-resident noncitizens (Dominican 
Republic 2004). According to this law, resident noncitizens may be either “permanent” or 
“temporary.” The former enter the DR with permission from the relevant authority and with the 
intention of permanently residing within it; the latter only reside for a limited amount of time 
(Articles 29 through 31) and are considered “in transit” (Article 36). They allegedly have no 
intention of making the DR their home (Article 32). Groups that fall within this temporary 
                                                        
10 Personal interview, New York, NY, February 22, 2012. Goris was formerly a Program Officer on equality and 
citizenship for OSJI in NY. She is now the Director of Administration for OSJI. All the quotations that I attribute to 
Goris throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in New York City on the aforementioned date. 
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resident noncitizen category include tourists, students, business people, in transit passengers, 
temporary workers and border crossers engaged in petty commerce. As Goris’ OSJI counterpart 
in the DR, Liliana Gamboa points out, “migrants [who] come here from Haiti fall into almost all 
those categories.”11   
 This particular interpretation of the “in-transit” clause has therefore caused much 
consternation in the migrant and human rights communities in the DR, especially since it affects 
large numbers of individuals of Haitian descent, many of whom have been residing in the DR 
either for all of their lives or for decades (Beaubrun 2008, 21). Edwin Paraison, former Minister 
of Haitians Living Abroad and current Executive Director of the Zile Foundation, argues that “in 
no way can you consider people who have been living [in the DR] for 25 or 30 years ‘in 
transit.’”12 Leonardo similarly states that “it is absurd to consider a person, who has spent many 
years living in the Dominican Republic, even if undocumented, as being ‘in transit.’ It doesn’t 
make sense.” In 2005 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) also ruled on the 
matter in the Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. the Dominican Republic ([herein Yean and 
Bosico] IACHR 2005). 
In its ruling, the Court argued that when the DR denied birth certificates to Dilcia Yean 
and Violeta Bosico, children born on Dominican soil of Haitian descent, it was violating their 
rights to a nationality, a juridical personality, a name, and equal protection before the law 
(IACHR 2005). Moreover, the IACHR held that the DR’s interpretation of “in transit” was 
                                                        
11 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, June 26, 2012. Unless otherwise indicated, I translated 
all interview data from the DR fieldwork from Spanish into English. The interview with Gamboa was conducted in 
English and all the quotations that I attribute to Gamboa throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Santo 
Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
12 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 9, 2012. The Fundación Zile is a nonprofit organization established 
to serve as “an observatory of Dominican-Haitian relations.” According to Paraison, “We permanently monitor all 
areas of interchange between the two countries and try to provide recommendations to both governments on 
potentially conflictive areas.” All the quotations that I attribute to Paraison throughout the rest of the dissertation 
took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
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deficient according to its own 1939 migration law since a person could only be “in transit” if he 
or she were passing through a State’s territory, which the 1939 statute itself stipulated was 10 
days or less. Regardless of what interpretation the Dominican State wanted to give to “in transit” 
then, the IACHR held that it should be a “reasonable temporal limit” that kept in mind “that a 
foreigner who develops connections in a State cannot be equated to a person in transit” (ibid., 
62). Moreover, the Court stated that the mothers of Yean and Bosico were Dominican and that 
the girls were consequently not “in transit.” They therefore had the right to a Dominican 
nationality and all the concomitant rights associated with it.  
While the DR ended up paying the fine established by the IACHR and providing Yean 
and Bosico their birth certificates, the Dominican Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) found in that 
same year that the State had not acted incorrectly by equating “in transit” with being a non-
resident or an illegal. Thus, in a strange twist of logic, the SCJ argued that if a child born to a 
legally resident diplomat does not acquire Dominican citizenship according to the law, then a 
child born to an illegal resident certainly should not receive Dominican citizenship (Government 
of the Dominican Republic 2005; see also Government of the Dominican Republic 2013c, 5-6). 
It therefore contended that Ley 285-04 was not unconstitutional. The SCJ also ruled that 
individuals were not being rendered stateless because they were covered under Article 11 of the 
Haitian Constitution, which, as noted in Chapter 3, declares that any child born to a Haitian 
mother or father who has not renounced his or her Haitian citizenship is a Haitian. 
 Not only did “the category of ‘non-resident’ [become] conflated with the concept of ‘in 
transit’ status” (UN 2008c, 18) because of Ley 285-04, but this law also paved the way for the 
creation of a separate birth registry system for children born to “non-resident” mothers. Thus, 
according to Article 28 of Ley 285-04, health centers must issue an official declaration of birth 
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(“constancia de nacimiento”) to resident and non-resident mothers alike, but non-resident 
mothers must be given “pink,” as opposed to “white,” birth declarations and go to their 
respective embassies to actually obtain a birth certificate.  
Health centers are thus charged with performing an immigration task as they decide who 
should be issued a white birth declaration and who should receive a pink one. “And that’s why 
people were so upset about the pink certificate,” says Gamboa. “Because it left at the discretion 
of hospitals to decide who were entitled to which documents. Because once you received the one 
at the hospital, then you were screwed if you didn’t get the right one…I mean, at the hospital it 
was made the decision whether you would get the actual document for a [Dominican] birth 
certificate or not.” Additionally, Goris adds that she “believe[s] that the rate at which the 
Dominican government hands out this pink birth certificate does not match the rate of children 
born to Haitian migrants, Haitian non-residents.” Such children are therefore left without proof 
of their birth and at risk of statelessness.  
 Article 28 of Ley 285-04 also requires health centers to inform the Junta Central Electoral 
(JCE) 13 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of these births to non-resident mothers so that the 
Ministry can know who is and who is not a national and so that the mothers can inform their 
respective embassies that one of their nationals has been born on Dominican soil, thereby 
allowing the embassy to begin the process of providing citizenship to the child.14 Yet, as a 
UNCHR officer based in the DR observes, “it never occurs. It never happens. It hasn’t really 
worked, the mechanism.”15 Gamboa adds that although embassies are supposed to receive 
notification from the Ministry on the birth of a child to one of their non-resident nationals, “it 
                                                        
13 In English, the Central Electoral Board. It is also the body mandated with setting elections. 
14 This same Article stipulates that if the father is Dominican, then the child can be registered at a Dominican civil 
registry and obtain his or her birth certificate there.  
15 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 5, 2012. 
 114
never worked with embassies…The Haitian Embassy says that it never received a copy of 
anything [from] the government.” Bridget Wooding, Director of the Observatory on Migration 
and Development in the Caribbean16 in the DR, agrees, stating that  
It’s not quite clear that they’ve actually been receiving any of these papers, or 
quite what they’ve been doing with them. If you actually ask them, ‘Have you 
seen a pink paper? What do you do with it?’ It’s less than clear. So this pink paper 
system, it’s not clear that they exist in all the hospitals. It’s not clear that, even if 
they exist in the hospitals, people know how to fill them in…So the evidence so 
far is that this pink paper system, at least insofar as Haitian residents are 
concerned, has not been very functional.17 
 
Moreover, it is highly problematic to expect mothers who have just given birth to visit their 
respective embassy or consulate to register the birth of their child and obtain a birth certificate, 
especially if the process is, as Gamboa says, “never explained to people. So people never really 
understood that they are to go the Embassy” to register their child and acquire a birth certificate. 
Consequently, “a large number of children still remains unregistered” (UN 2008a, 7) – a 
vulnerable position to be in, as I explain in chapter 1, since birth registration is the first and 
primary means by which a person is able to obtain a nationality.  
 Despite the fact that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the DR in 
violation of international law in this, and other areas in 2005, Dominican authorities passed 
Resolutions 02-2007 and 12-2007,18 which have further disenfranchised an untold number of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent. Thus what used to be sporadic individual “rogue registry 
officers” engaging in racially motivated denationalization acts in the country has become “a 
concentrated State policy to deny and deprive entire ethnic groups of nationality.”19 
                                                        
16 This think tank was founded in 2009 and initially approached the subject of migration from a gender perspective. 
Today it continues its work in this field by focusing on human trafficking in the region, but has also broadened its 
scope to examine nationality issues and other issues pertinent to regional migration flows. 
17 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 5, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Wooding throughout 
the rest of the dissertation took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
18 Resolution 02-2007 was passed on April 18, 2007 while resolution 12-2007 was passed on December 10, 2007. 
19 Personal interview, Indira Goris, New York, NY, February 22, 2012. 
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Resolution 02-2007 creates a foreigner’s book or the “Registry of Births to Foreign Non-
Resident Mothers in the Dominican Republic”20 (Government of the Dominican Republic 
2007a). Local civil registry officers are required to record all births to foreign non-resident 
mothers. The Junta Central Electoral applauds the enactment of this resolution because it fulfills 
a child’s right to a name and birth registration, regardless of mother’s legal status in the country 
and regardless of whether or not she took in her pink birth declaration to her specific embassy 
(Government of the Dominican Republic 2014d). Critics argue, however, that it provides a 
means by which Dominican authorities can deny citizenship to people of Haitian descent born on 
Dominican soil prior to the 2010 Constitutional amendment. Gamboa thinks that it may also 
simply be a means of “shut[ting] up NGOs in terms of registration because there’s an argument 
that people should be registered and there’s a whole campaign in the Americas about the right to 
registration.” 
 Furthermore, Gamboa wonders if this foreigner’s registry book does not serve to further 
confuse parents on their child’s right to a nationality. “[I]t doesn’t necessarily mean what 
nationality [a child has], but [it] just [means] to be registered. And there’s an argument of 
nationality rights as a right. So to go into that direction and say, ‘Well, we have registered [the 
children], we are not leaving them unregistered’ may not be a fair position.” She wonders 
whether  
maybe purposefully, maybe not, [the] underlying intention was to confuse people. 
I mean, we’re talking about migrants who a lot of the time are not even literate. 
[They] don’t necessarily know what’s going on with the laws…I mean, it’s 
complicated for us to understand everything that has happened and how laws have 
been changed and, you know, how you can challenge them and what you have [a] 
right to. Imagine for migrants who haven’t even heard about this. 
 
                                                        
20 Author’s translation of “Libro Registro del Nacimiento de Niño (a) de Madre Extranjera No Residente en la 
República Dominicana.” 
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Paraison, an early proponent of the pink birth declaration and foreigner’s book, concedes that the 
system has not worked as he had initially hoped, but, unlike NGOs who see it as a form of 
discrimination and a means of denying Dominican citizenship to individuals of Haitian descent, 
he believes that it still serves as a basis from which these children can mount claims in the future. 
“It is going to be more difficult to fight for one’s rights without having anything [registered in a 
book]. And for us, it’s better to be mentioned in that [foreigner’s] book so that in the future we 
have a place [to go to that states] where that child was registered.” It is not enough, therefore, to 
be present in the country of one’s birth to engage in rights-claiming. One’s personhood must also 
be documented.  
 Allegedly, some persons who were born on Dominican soil prior to the 2010 
Constitutional amendment – and who are, therefore, Dominican by law – are being deregistered 
from the registry of legal resident births and transferred to this foreigner’s book. As Leonardo 
points out, this is being done without these individuals’ consent.21 Gamboa adds that this action 
“is a new development and we haven’t analyzed the impacts or necessarily the consequences of 
it.” She explains how the Open Society Justice Initiative of the DR received a case wherein a 
child born prior to the 2010 Constitutional amendment “had a birth certificate [registered] in one 
book” and when she went to get a certified copy of this certificate, “they told her it was her only 
copy and it was for judicial purposes only, and [the civil registry officer] said that it was 
registered in a foreign book, number 1 page 1–it was a completely different registration” from 
the one she previously held. 
 Simultaneously with the implementation of the pink registration system/foreigner’s book, 
the Dominican authorities passed resolution 12-2007 (Government of the Dominican Republic 
                                                        
21 Leonardo states, “And we are aware of people who have been transferred to the foreigner’s book without their 
consent.” 
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2007b). This resolution effectively placed thousands of Dominicans, primarily of Haitian 
descent, in legal limbo as it ordered all civil registry officers to provisionally suspend the 
issuance of all vital records and documents to individuals suspected of originally obtaining such 
documents in an “irregular” manner. Vital records include, among others, a Cédula de Identidad 
y Electoral (cédula/national ID) – akin to a voter registration card – and a certified birth 
certificate. The latter, as noted earlier, is one of the primary documents for obtaining a 
nationality (i.e., it provides proof of where one is born and to whom), while the cédula is needed 
to perform almost any function in the public realm.  
As a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) officer explains, “Under the 
Dominican legal system, an identity card is indispensable for the exercise of certain rights…If 
you do not have an ID, you cannot open a bank account…[You] cannot cash a check, get a credit 
card, enter into a contract.”22 Leonardo agrees that in order to exercise one’s rights as a citizen 
you have to have a cédula. Without the cédula or a birth certificate, “you do not exist under the 
law” (see also Government of the Dominican Republic 2013c, 7). Moreover, the cédula or ID 
generates a sense of security. As Eddy Tejeda, a member of the Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences in the DR, says, “You need it [the cédula] for everything. If I don’t have my ID card 
with me, I feel afraid you know. You feel more secure if you have your ID with you here with 
the police.”23 And, according to Gamboa, a person can “be arrested for up to 30 days for not 
having a cedula [sic]” (Gamboa 2010, n. pag.).  
 These problems of document denial and the consequent inability to exercise citizenship 
rights all came to a head once again in the judicial realm in 2013. In Sentence TC/0168/13 
(Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b) the Dominican Constitutional Court heard the 
                                                        
22 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 13, 2012.  
23 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, July 5, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Tejeda throughout the rest 
of the dissertation took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
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case of Juliana Deguis Pierre who claimed that when she had tried to obtain her cédula at her 
local JCE office they took away her birth certificate and told her that she could not have a cédula 
because she was not Dominican. The Constitutional Court stated that Deguis’ parents were “in 
transit” (non-resident) at the time of her birth and she did not, therefore, satisfy the requirements 
for Dominican jus soli citizenship acquisition (ibid., 29-30).24  
Deguis was born in the DR in 1984 to Haitian nationals, well before the creation of Ley 
285-04 and the 2010 Constitutional amendment. In order to register her birth, her parents used 
fichas (i.e., a work permit generally issued by the owners of sugarcane estates to temporary 
foreign sugarcane workers). According to Gamboa, at different times in the DR’s labor history, 
these fichas could be used to acquire residency status and Dominican identity documents, while 
at others they were merely considered cards that granted permission to work for a given 
company:  
There were periods in which being here, working with one of those cards also 
meant being an actual resident and Migration would give you identity documents, 
too. The civil registry office would provide you with all identity cards that were 
for foreigners. So even though it sounded like modern things now, it existed back 
in the day, too. 
 
Gamboa continues that sometimes it was not clear in what capacity the ficha served and “State 
versus industry or company-owned identity documents were a lot of the time just mixed all 
together.” Nevertheless, these fichas “were sufficient for registration. So civil registry officers 
received those documents as a proof of an ID, of an identity… [And] these identity documents 
were enough for people to register their children and so a lot of the children of migrants were 
registered” in this way “[a]nd got Dominican citizenship and grew thinking that they were 
Dominicans.” William Charpantier, coordinator of the National Roundtable on Migration and 
                                                        
24 All quotes from Sentence TC/0168/13 are my own translations.  
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Refugees, agrees, stating that civil registry officers considered the ficha to be a valid ID 
document, “the photo and name of the person was there.”25  
 Despite the fact that fichas were used to register the births of Haitian workers’ 
Dominican-born children in past decades, the President of the JCE, Roberto Rosario, states that 
children born to foreigners who registered them with fichas or “other documents not permitted or 
authorized by law” are “irregularly” registered as Dominicans (Government of the Dominican 
Republic 2013c, 7; author’s translation). The Constitutional Court has taken this position as well, 
finding that Deguis’ parents lacked the requisite ID to be able to declare her birth as a Dominican 
(Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 36) as they were temporary workers or 
“nonimmigrant foreigners” (ibid., 55). The Court therefore held that Deguis’ parents fell under 
the “in transit” clause of the 1966 Constitution (ibid., 65), which was in operation at the time of  
Deguis’ birth.  
According to the Court, even then, as per various laws, persons were considered “in 
transit” if they lacked a legal residence in the DR or if they lacked a legal residency permit. 
Consequently, the Court held, it was not possible for persons in Deguis’ situation to argue that 
they were being denied Dominican citizenship as it was “legally inadmissible to establish an 
entitlement from an unlawful situation in fact” (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 
66). Furthermore, the Constitutional Court argued that the IACHR had interpreted Dominican 
law incorrectly when giving its opinion on the “in transit” clause (ibid., 70) and that persons in 
Pierre Deguis’ situation were not being rendered stateless because they were covered under 
Article 11 of the Haitian Constitution. 
                                                        
25 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 3, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Charpantier throughout 
the rest of the dissertation took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
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Leonardo and others take umbrage at the argument that the ficha did not serve to legally 
register a child born in the Dominican Republic. According to Leonardo, 
One of the fallacies that they have sold from a political vantange point is to say 
that they are dealing with, that all those who are registered, those records are 
illegal because the parents were undocumented and they [the children] should 
never have been registered. And that’s not completely accurate. In the first place, 
even if the parents were undocumented, according to the law in force at the time 
they were born, they could have been registered. Secondly, the majority of these 
people were children of immigrants whose admission into the Dominican 
Republic was authorized by the Dominican State. They were hired by this very 
State to work as sugarcane workers. And the private sector employed them with 
the consent of the Dominican State. So one cannot claim that they entered the 
Dominican State through unauthorized means. They entered with State permission 
and the ficha is proof of this. 
 
Despite what Leonardo and others think, or the fact that the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights already found the DR in violation of international law when it came to discriminatory 
practices against individuals of Haitian descent in its civil registry system, the DR has continued 
to engage in practices that are deemed discriminatory. 
The Political Context 
As the Constitutional Court recognizes, issues surrounding nationality are “a particularly 
sensitive issue for all sectors of Dominican society” (Government of the Dominican Republic 
2013b, 74). Human rights and migrant rights NGOs emphatically believe that the Dominican 
government, no matter which political party is in power, deliberately discriminates against 
people of Haitian descent when it comes to citizenship acquisition or retention. Goris contends 
that nowhere else in the Caribbean or Latin America is there “a concentrated state policy to deny 
and deprive entire ethnic groups of nationality” as occurs in the DR. Altair Rodríguez, a 
Dominican social scientist, agrees, noting that the discriminatory nature of the DR’s treatment of 
Haitians in particular has been “driven – it hasn’t happened by chance, of course – it’s been an 
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intentional, deliberate effort from the elites.”26 Leonardo adds that as each day has passed, “it 
became clearer that we were dealing with a deliberate policy on the part of the State that had 
clearly discriminatory overtones.”  
 Akin to Rodríguez, Leonardo believes that the current Dominican “worldview, all of it, is 
a construction of an elite that has had politico-economic control from colonial times.” This 
worldview consists of embracing its Spanish heritage, while ignoring, if not denying, its black 
heritage. As Leonardo explains, the Dominican “national identity that people have constructed 
[is one in which] we are not black. We are indios. My complexion is indian. They think as if they 
were a Hispanic from Spain, as if they were Spanish. And they assume Spanish aesthetic 
standards as their own.” Rodríguez agrees, explaining how the cédula or national ID does not 
allow for the category of black as a race. You are either white or indio.27 “I have india on my 
ID,” she shows. She believes that the cédula only gives these options because Dominicans want 
to think of themselves as “white, Spanish, Catholics; as opposed to Haitian, black, voodooist.” 
Goris concurs, “I think in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican identity is in a large part, not 
a large part but an important part of what it means to be Dominican when you are talking about 
the island of Hispaniola is to say, ‘Well, we are Dominican. We are not Haitian. We are not 
black.’” 
 Allegedly the blackness of one’s skin is often enough to find oneself deported to Haiti, 
even if not a Haitian. Human Rights Watch claims that “the Dominican Republic has deported 
hundreds of thousands of Haitians to Haiti, as well as an unknown number of Dominicans of 
                                                        
26 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, July 14, 2012; interview conducted in English. All the quotations that I 
attribute to Rodríguez throughout the rest of the dissertation took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned 
date. 
27 The new biometric ID’s will not have this information. See Government of the Dominican Republic (2014a) for 
the proposed format.  
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Haitian descent” (2002, 11)28 and “[s]uspected Haitians are targeted for deportation based on the 
color of their skin, and are given little opportunity to prove their legal status or their claim to 
citizenship” (ibid., 3). Samuel Martínez, an anthropologist who provided an expert affidavit in 
the Yean and Bosico case, explains how “deportations generally do not follow the process 
stipulated by Dominican law. Generally, people determined at the point of arrest to be Haitian, 
on the basis of their appearance or accent, are quickly transferred without legal proceedings to 
buses for transportation across the Haitian border” (2011, 60).  
The former UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène, and the former independent 
expert on minority issues, Gay McDougall, similarly found that 
[m]anifestations of racism were also identified in the framework of expulsions 
and deportations. These procedures were noted to be particularly targeting those 
who are presumed to be ‘Haitians,’ a determination that would be mainly based 
on skin colour, without distinguishing between Haitians, Dominicans of Haitian 
descent and black Dominicans with no ties at all to Haiti (UN 2008c, 14-15).  
 
In their visit to the DR, Diène and McDougall were even told of cases where “black foreigners, 
with no ties at all with the Dominican Republic or Haiti…had also been threatened, just because 
of the colour of their skin, with deportation to Haiti” (ibid. 15). They were also “told that 
rejection of blackness is very present in interpersonal relationships” (ibid.) and that blackness 
was frequently associated “with both illegal status and criminality,” as well as other demeaning 
references (ibid., 13). 
 The color of one’s skin and one’s last name also have important ramifications when a 
person is present at a local JCE office. In the Deguis case, Deguis claims that the local civil 
registry officer confiscated the copy of her birth certificate on the mere grounds that she had a 
                                                        
28 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has also received complaints that Dominicans of Haitian 
descent have been deported to Haiti. See Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (2005). 
 
 123
“French” (meaning “Haitian”) last name. This is not unusual as Rodríguez states, “Your last 
name and how you look often determines whether you are deemed Dominican or not.” Gamboa 
agrees, describing how when it comes to the JCE and the issuance of identity documents, if a 
person’s “last name sounds like someone of Haitian origin, then it starts an investigatory 
process” and that is where “the whole discrimination and racial profiling comes in.” Charpantier 
also believes that Circular 17, which was issued to examine irregularities among all holders of 
Dominican identity documents, was mainly applied to “those persons who have a strange last 
name. When they have a strange last name it is a French-sounding one – like Pierre, Jacques.”  
Some contend that the above quotations illustrate that a deep strain of anti-Haitianism 
exists in the country. Anti-Haitianism is “a set of perceptions, attitudes and negative stereotypes 
toward Haitians and Haiti” (Sagás 1998, 128; author’s translation). Paraison contends, along 
with Leonardo and Rodríguez, that the anti-Haitianism present in the DR emanates from the 
political elite and that they are “systematic[ally]” critical of Haiti, whereas Haitian elites do not 
exhibit the same hostility toward Dominicans. He laments what he considers to be the biggest 
problem facing the Haitian diaspora in the DR: “the denial of their very existence. For the anti-
Haitian groups in the Dominican Republic to help the Haitian community is to put – in their 
minds – is to put Dominican national sovereignty in jeopardy. Thus they do not even want to 
accept that we exist.”  
Although the Dominican government firmly denies that racial discrimination exists, that 
it violates the human rights of migrants or that it is rendering Dominican nationals stateless,29 the 
retroactive application of laws, the creation of a special registry that checks immigrant status 
from 1929 onward, and the Dominican government’s failure to comply with all of the 2005 
                                                        
29 See UN (2013), Government of the Dominican Republic (2013b) and Government of the Dominican Republic 
(2014b). 
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IACHR decision, undercut this position. Ley 285-04, which, as noted earlier, defines the 
distinction between a resident and non-resident immigrant and equates nonresidency with an “in 
transit” status, is being retroactively applied to those who were recognized as Dominican citizens 
prior to 2004.  
 As previously mentioned, many Dominicans of Haitian descent who go to their local JCE 
offices to obtain certified copies of their birth certificates or their IDs are being denied such 
documents on the grounds that they were irregularly registered. That is, their parents did not 
provide the appropriate documentation – such as a residency permit or a cédula – to prove that 
they were authorized to be in the DR. As such, the Dominican government contends that these 
children should never have been recognized as citizens. Although the Dominican government is 
not actively denationalizing such persons through legal means, it is administratively doing so, as 
Goris explains:  
There are very few cases of the Dominican government going after an individual 
in court, as they should, and saying, ‘We don’t think that you’re a Dominican 
citizen, so we’re going to follow all the procedural steps to officially withdraw 
recognition of you as a Dominican.’ There are very few cases of that. So what you 
have is, sort of denationalization by default because you don’t give these people 
these documents. And it’s true, when you refuse to give them these documents, 
it’s not like they give you a letter saying, ‘You are no longer a citizen.’ They are 
saying, ‘No, we understand that you don’t have a right to these documents 
because of this law’ [Ley 285-04]…And you have entire generations of people 
that were once recognized as Dominican citizens, but are no longer [recognized] 
because the government has decided to retroactively apply this 2004 migration 
law. 
 
The practice of denationalizing Dominicans via administrative means occurs even though the 
2010 Constitutional amendment is clear that all those who enjoyed Dominican citizenship prior 
to 2010 are Dominican citizens (Government of the Dominican Republic 2010, Article 18). 
Moreover, akin to the Bahamian case, seemingly neutral laws and policies appear to have a more 
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significant impact upon individuals of Haitian descent than any other group. We are thus faced 
with a case of institutional racism. 
When apparently neutral requirements for recruitment or routines affect certain 
ethnic groups more than others, or more generally when certain rules, instructions 
or everyday practice within an institution have systematic intended (or 
unintended) discriminating consequences…we may talk about institutional 
discrimination (Burns 2011, 157; see also Delanty et al. 2011, 5). 
 
Although the Dominican government claims that it is only applying its own law, the 
understanding of “in transit,” which is the root of the government’s justification for its actions, 
was only officially delineated in law in 2004 (OSJI et al. 2012, 4). It is thus unfair to use a 
contemporary understanding of “in transit” to that which operated prior to 2004. As Justice Katia 
Miguelina Jiménez Martínez makes clear in her dissenting opinion in the Deguis case, the 
common understanding of “in transit” until 2004 was that it was a 10-day period (Government of 
the Dominican Republic 2013b, 118). Furthermore, Justice Ana Isabel Bonilla Hernández, also 
dissenting, argues that “to equate the condition of a foreigner in transit with an illegal foreign 
resident violates the legal principle of retroactivity” because prior to the 2010 Constitutional 
amendment, the Constitution “was silent with regard to illegal foreign residents and nationality” 
(ibid., 114). 
In another demonstration of what Leonardo would call the politicized nature of the high 
courts,30 the Constitutional Court decided in the aforementioned Sentence TC/0168/13 that the 
JCE should perform an audit of all birth registry books as far back as 1929 to identify all the 
foreigners therein listed and then create another list that names all those who were irregularly 
registered. Such persons, who should not have been given Dominican citizenship according to 
Sentence TC/0168/13 (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b), must be placed in 
                                                        
30 Leondardo states, “It’s that the Supreme Court, the High Courts are very politicized and this subject is a very 
political one.” 
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special birth registration books, based on the year they were born, that identify them as 
foreigners. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must then notify such persons (and their 
embassies/consulates) of their transferal from the regular Dominican civil registry of births to the 
special foreigners’ books (ibid., 100).  
 The Constitutional Court also ordered the JCE to send the aforementioned List of 
foreigners irregularly registered in the Civil Registry of the Dominican Republic to the Minister 
of the Interior and Police, “who presides over the National Council on Migration,” so that the 
latter body can create a National plan on the regularization of illegal foreigners residing in the 
country (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 100). The Constitutional Court then 
instructed the executive branch of government to implement this plan. In a matter of months, the 
Dominican government has already taken steps to fulfill the orders given to it by the 
Constitutional Court. It has thus established a National Regularization Plan for Foreigners in an 
Irregular Situation, which consists of 40 Articles elaborating where, when and with what 
documents each person is to come forward to begin the process of regularizing their presence on 
Dominican soil (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013d). 
 The speed with which the government is implementing the orders given to it by the 
Constitutional Court in Sentence TC/0168/13 stands in stark contrast not only with the slow pace 
of processing citizenship claims (also discussed in the Bahamian case in Chapter 3), but also 
with the delay in implementation of those court decisions that do not mesh well with the political 
stance of the government. These can be local court decisions mandating that JCE offices give 
birth certificates or IDs to specific people, which are often ignored, or they can be the orders of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Thus, as Wooding explains, in the above-mentioned 
Yean and Bosico case,  
 127
[T]here’s been a partial implementation of the Yean and Bosico sentence. 
Whereas certain cosmetic things were done–there was some compensation given 
to the people involved, there was a publication of the sentence–but the more 
important things (in terms of creating a clear, nondiscriminatory civil registry 
system) that has not been obeyed. And on the contrary, there’s been a backlash 
where the discrimination has been widened further against a particular segment, 
which is those people of Haitian descent. 
 
Paraison agrees, stating that “the sentence was not applied. It was not respected by the 
Dominican State.” Furthermore, he contends that  
nationalist groups in the Dominican Republic used the sentence all the time to say 
that when we [Haitians or individuals of Haitian descent] claim our rights, what 
we are actually doing is carrying out a campaign of denigration against the 
Dominican Republic. A defamation campaign. 
 
Goris adds that “the politicians [are] going out there and saying, ‘We don’t believe in the 
legitimacy of this institution,’ meaning the IACHR. ‘They’re being manipulated by foreign 
NGOs that are trying to destabilize the country and ruining its reputation.’” The political 
backlash against the IACHR’s ruling in Yean and Bosico has therefore been harsh, with 
interviewees contending that discriminatory policies toward individuals of Haitian descent have 
become even stronger. Thus, while Rodríguez believes that “[i]t’s good that we got sanctioned” 
at the IACHR, “in the end, in the long view, it’s been more negative in the sense that there’s 
been now a very legal and concrete, determined policy to discriminate against Dominicans of 
Haitian descent. It wasn’t like that before the ruling. It wasn’t as concrete and as deliberate.” 
Leonardo concurs, stating that the Dominican authorities’ failure to implement the 2005 IACHR 
decision shows that “[t]he State was not committing errors, but that it was acting in a deliberate 
manner. And what it has done is reinforce its practice in the wake of the IACHR decision.” 
 This reinforcement came in the aforementioned Circular 17 and Resolutions 02-2007 and 
12-2007, which were all issued after the IACHR decision, and in the 2010 Constitutional 
amendment, which included illegal immigrants and non-resident persons (with the new 
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interpretation of “in transit”) among those who are ineligible for Dominican jus soli citizenship 
acquisition. The 2013 Deguis sentence is particularly troubling because it directly challenges the 
IACHR’s 2005 proclamation that the migratory status of one’s parents has no bearing upon a 
child’s migratory status. In Sentence TC/0168/13, the Constitutional Court argues that  
[A]ssimilating foreigners who lack permission to reside to in transit foreigners does not imply, 
in any way, that the migratory situation of the parents is being transmitted or transferred to the 
children, since the latter are not considered to be in an unlawful situation, they only lack the right 
to a Dominican nationality (2013, 75; bold in original). 
 
Ordering the creation of special birth registration books that extend the reach of contemporary 
law as far back as 1929, and using this data to determine whether or not a Dominican was 
“irregularly” registered based on the documentation used by their parents or grandparents, 
demonstrates how a parent’s – or even a child’s grandparent’s – migratory status can affect a 
child’s current nationality status, however. Deguis, for example, was denied Dominican 
citizenship on these very grounds.31  
Yet the Constitutional Court does not believe that it is engaging in discriminatory acts 
against persons of Haitian descent via this Sentence. It asserts that while it is lamentable that it 
takes so long for civil registry officers to resolve individual citizenship cases and to issue identity 
documents, this is not due to a State policy of discrimination, but to “deficiencies in the [civil 
registry] system” instead (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 89). Whether or not 
this is an example of deliberate discrimination, the fact is that citizenship issues are highly 
politicized and racialized in the DR and this begs crucial scrutiny of government action in this 
area. That this politicization occurs in an environment of institutional weakness does not help 
those who find themselves at risk of statelessness either. 
                                                        
31 She was also denied citizenship because she allegedly has the right to Haitian nationality, too. “[Y] también 
conviene destacar que la circunstancia de que la demandante señora Juliana Dequis (o Deguis) no tenga el derecho a 
la nacionalidad dominicana por jus soli no la coloca en situación de apátrida, ya que tal como se expone a 
continuación, ella tiene derecho a la nacionalidad haitiana” (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 75). 
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Bureaucratic Failures  
In Resolution 12-2007, the Junta Central Electoral recognizes that institutional weaknesses 
plague the civil registry system and exacerbate many of the problems the country now faces 
when it comes to citizenship matters. The JCE itself admits that “[t]he lack of supervision of 
Civil Registry offices and the complicity of quite a few of their employees, made it relatively 
easy for these unlawful acts [the giving of Dominican birth certificates and other identity 
documents] to occur” (Government of the Dominican Republic 2007, 3; author’s translation). 
Likewise, in Sentence TC/0168/13, the Constitutional Court acknowledges that the Civil 
Registry system “has been affected by unlawful issuances, forgeries, identity theft and 
falsifications of civil registry acts; as well as by deficiencies in the upkeep of the registry books,” 
affirming that they “are implementing a program of rescue and clean-up of the Civil Registry 
system in order to reinforce it against harmful and fraudulent actions…that have so long 
affected [it]” (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013b, 9; italics in original). 
 The issue of documentation is an important one in the DR. As I note earlier in the 
chapter, a cédula (ID) is needed to carry out many citizenship rights and functions, and a recently 
certified copy of one’s birth certificate is necessary to obtain this ID. Without it, as the UNDP 
official makes clear, you are an invisible person. The problem of undocumentation not only 
affects individuals of Haitian descent, however. The UNDP participant explains how a census of 
Dominican school students carried out by the Secretary of State for Education found that more 
than 17,800 students were undocumented. “They do not have birth certificates,” he says. “They 
are not going to be able to attend high school.” While a 2001 survey found that 25.4% of 
Dominican children under five are not registered (UNICEF 2014b), according to the UNDP 
participant, this problem of undocumentation or “citizen invisibility affects almost 20% of the 
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Dominican population.”32 It is for this reason that UNDP-DR has been focusing on strengthening 
the civil registry system. 
 From 2007-2012, the UNDP thus worked with the JCE in a project entitled 
“Strengthening the civil registry system.”33 The goals were to improve the JCE’s institutional 
capacity and provide identity documents, especially birth certificates, to those who lacked them. 
The UNDP used mobile civil registry units, engaged in door-to-door awareness raising in 
specific neighborhoods, and established a methodology by which future birth registrations could 
take place.34 According to the UNDP interviewee, at the time of the interview more than 13,000 
of the 17,000 plus students identified as lacking documents in the initial census conducted by the 
Ministry of Education have now received their birth certificates.  
Unlike the UNDP’s “Strengthening the civil registry system” project, which did not focus 
upon providing documentation for persons of Haitian descent, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) has also been active in the area of birth registration and works with the JCE and 
other organizations, both Dominican and international, to ensure that as many children are 
registered as possible. In the first phase of the “Register My Birth and You will Open Many 
Doors for Me”35 campaign, UNICEF and other organizations engaged in a mobilization effort to 
educate specific sectors of the Dominican population, which included the residents of particular 
bateyes, on the importance of birth registration. In its second phase, which it is currently in, 
UNICEF is disseminating registration materials broadly with the aim of reaching all of 
                                                        
32 Those most affected by lack of documentation tend to be poor. As the UNDP participant states, “It’s not the 
children of the rich who don’t have their birth certificates. It’s the children of poor people and they are not going to 
be able to go to High School.”  
33 “Fortalecimiento al sistema de registro civil y de identidad.” 
34 The UNDP participant states, “What we wanted to do was kill two birds with one stone by first resolving the 
critical problem of the birth certificate and [access to] education and on the other hand validate a methodology that 
once finalized would allow us as agents to continue using it. The objective was to validate a methodology, validate a 
procedure [of registration] ” 
35 “Declárame y me abrirás muchas Puertas;” see UNICEF (2014a) for further information. 
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Dominican society on this important issue.  
Cognizant of registration problems, the JCE issued Circular 32-2011. This Circular 
instructs civil registry officers to give individuals who are “born to foreigners,” and have had 
their identity documents suspended while their citizenship status is under investigation, their 
birth certificates until such time that the JCE rules on their nationality status (Government of the 
Dominican Republic 2011). Although this appears to be a positive step in ensuring that people 
whose citizenship status is being questioned are able to get on with their daily lives while being 
investigated, the Movement for a Civil Registry Free of Discrimination36 contends that many 
civil registry offices are not complying with this order (MRCLD 2013, 2). Moreover, and as 
Gamboa explains, it is the JCE’s own board of judges who make decisions on these cases when a 
person’s citizenship is under investigation.  
This board it’s right now what the JCE is sort of holding onto to review these 
cases. So we [the JCE civil registry officers] find you suspicious. So we take you 
to investigation. Eventually we’re going to take your case to our board and our 
board is going to make the decision on your case. And then it’s going to notify all 
of the rest, like civil registry officers. So they are being, as I said, judge and jury 
of their own actions. 
 
In what may prove to be just as questionable, civil registry officers are allegedly going to the 
homes of individuals who have brought claims to the lower courts concerning the issuance of 
their birth certificates and harassing them. In Sentence 259-12, for example, a judge from a Court 
of First Instance found the JCE in violation of the rights of 28 Dominicans of Haitian descent 
because local civil registry officers had denied them their cédulas. The judge ordered the local 
civil registry officers to reinstate these individuals’ IDs (Government of the Dominican Republic 
2012, 23). As Leonardo points out, not only did the JCE not abide by the ruling, but “it is 
intimidating the claimants. It is hounding them; visiting them in their homes; interviewing them; 
                                                        
36 Movimiento por un Registro Civil Libre de Discriminación. 
 132
asking them for documentation that is not found in the law.” He adds that they are also making 
the claimants’ parents sign blank papers.  
Although Leonardo does not know why JCE representatives are asking the parents to sign 
blank papers, he surmises; “So putting myself in the shoes of the Central Electoral Board, the 
most likely reason for having them sign blank papers is to state that the children were not born in 
the country, or that they were ‘in transit’ when the child was born in the country.” He says that 
the parents end up signing these papers because  
[y]ou have to realize that most of these people, the parents, are illiterate. They 
don’t have a high level of education and since they are undocumented 
immigrants, they are in a situation of extreme vulnerability…They feel pressured 
and they think that if they don’t sign whatever they ask them to sign, they are 
going to use it against them and repatriate them.  
 
Whether or not this is an isolated and extreme example of JCE harassment, it appears more 
common that local JCE officers simply let languish irregular birth certificate cases that they are 
supposed to be investigating. According to Gamboa, the investigative process – which is 
generally triggered because a person’s “last name sounds like someone of Haitian origin” – may 
last “up to three years, two years. Sometimes it is never resolved if there are too many cases and 
they don’t get to yours.” She adds that investigators “never actually in writing said, ‘We’re 
investigating your parents’ residency status.’ Cause they don’t want to be really clear about it 
because they’re afraid that they will be accused.” Even the Constitutional Court in the Deguis 
case admits that “it is worrying…because it potentially threatens the fundamental rights of 
foreigners, even if they reside unlawfully in the country, that it takes many years to legally 
resolve the irregularities regarding their identity documents” (Government of the Dominican 
Republic 2013b, 89). The Constitutional Court goes on to say, however, that this problem does 
not just affect foreigners, but Dominicans as well. Thus, “it is not a matter of a discriminatory 
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policy, but, simply, weaknesses in the system” (ibid.). 
Another weakness in the system, and one that is paralleled in the Bahamian case, is that 
individuals are not kept up to date on the status of the investigation into their documents and/or 
citizenship status; sometimes they are not even told that they are under investigation. Every one 
of the participants in Katerina Civolani Hischnjakow’s study,37 for example, said that “confusion 
and disinformation prevailed throughout the process [of trying to obtain documents from the 
JCE]” (2011, 48). Like their counterparts in The Bahamas, they are often required to bring 
numerous extraneous documents that are not part of the process to obtain a birth certificate or a 
cédula. “We observed the delaying tactics [of civil registry officers] and all of the excessive 
requirements that were demanded of those affected” (ibid., 50).  
It is thus a cumbersome process that does not always end with a person receiving his or 
her identity documents. Rodríguez explains, for example, how she tried to help a Dominican-
born individual of Haitian descent obtain identity documents. She says that he had been multiple 
times to his local civil registry office for his cédula, but was constantly denied because his 
parents had registered him with a ficha. The local civil registry officers told him to go to the 
capital to get things sorted out. Rodríguez went with him to the main JCE office in Santo 
Domingo. There Rodríguez “ran into the mother of a friend that went to high school with me. I 
explained to her the situation…She said, ‘It’s great that you’re doing this, but he’s not going to 
get a positive reply.’” The individual was never able to make any headway at the JCE after 
multiple attempts and Rodríguez heard that “he ended up buying a fake ID. You pay 5,000 pesos 
for a fake ID.”  
While in the DR, and elsewhere in the developing world, “the apparently dry details of 
                                                        
37 In Vidas Suspendidas (Lives on Hold), Civolani Hischnjakow documents the effects of Resolution 12-2007 upon 
15 Dominicans of Haitian descent. Wherever I quote a source from her study within the dissertation, the translations 
are my own from the original Spanish. 
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the rules for obtaining papers can hide an ocean of discrimination and denial of rights” (Manby 
2009, 2),38 the problems that Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent face in relation to 
documentation and their citizenship status is not only hampered by actions – or inaction as the 
case may be – on the part of Dominican authorities. As I describe in chapter 3, acquiring 
nationality and identity documents from the Haitian government is also challenging in many 
cases.  
Although the UNHCR-DR official thinks “the willingness of the Haitian government to 
support its people…[is] amazing. They are really very cooperative,”39 some interviewees are 
concerned that parents cannot perform a “late [birth] declaration” at the Embassy. As Gamboa 
explains,40 “Only children under 24 months can be registered at the Embassy. This in turn, 
obviously, comes to be a practical problem that results in people not having a nationality.” She 
continues, “It’s not that by law they were prevented from having a Haitian nationality, it’s just 
that because their parents are undocumented, they cannot travel freely back and forth. They 
probably do not have the means to go back and forth to Haiti, so probably that child remains 
without Haitian citizenship.” 
Council Minister Pierrot Delienne, who works at the Haitian Embassy in the DR, denies 
that this is the case. He says that as long as the mother or father is Haitian “and can prove this,” 
the child “will have the right to be [a] Haitian citizen,” regardless of age. “There are no 
exceptions.”41 It is important to highlight, as I do in the previous chapter, that Haitian citizenship 
is not automatically acquired via birth to a Haitian parent, Bahamian and Dominican government 
                                                        
38 Blitz and Sawyer, examining statelessness in Europe, similarly remark, “the implementation of rules and policies 
which destroy lives often comes about through minor administrative or bureaucratic processes whose banality belies 
their catastrophic effects” (2011, 284).  
39 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, July 5, 2012. 
40 Charpantier also states that if the child is older than two, the Embassy will not register them as Haitian.  
41 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, DR, Juy 9, 2012. All the quotations that I attribute to Delienne throughout the 
rest of the dissertation took place in Santo Domingo on the aforementioned date. 
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claims to the contrary. As Delienne points out: “He has the right to have [Haitian citizenship]. 
When I say the right, if he comes here with his papers, he will have it.” But just because a child 
comes to the Embassy “speaking Krèyol telling me he is Haitian, how can I tell he is a Haitian? 
He does not have a stamp on his head saying that.”   
The importance of documentation, and having the correct documentation to prove birth 
and parentage again stands out. Wooding notes, however, that “it’s very difficult for people born 
here to acquire Haitian nationality” because of problems with documentation in Haiti.42 The JCE 
agrees, stating that it is one of its biggest obstacles in trying to put its civil registry system in 
order (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013c, 7); while Charpantier, who is Dominican 
of Haitian descent admits, “[W]e also have the problem that there isn’t a culture of 
documentation on the part of Haitians in Haiti itself. That has to be said, too.” Delienne again 
takes umbrage at this claim. He states that “it is not true” that “Haitians do not have documents” 
as “there are laws that facilitate their acquisition…[I]f a persons says that he does not have a 
birth certificate, my question is going to be, ‘Where do you live?’ Look, we have 550 rural 
sections in the country [Haiti] and each one has its own functionary to give documentation. This 
doesn’t just happen in city centers.”  
Delienne thus argues that “[n]o one in the world can tell me that the Haitian government 
is not going to give citizenship to its citizens…But there are NGOs that are saying that the 
Haitian government does not want to give them citizenship. Look, they are in the business of 
talking poorly about officials and saying that I do not do my job because that’s what they have to 
do to get money for their work.” He then explains how the Embassy – akin to its Bahamian-
based counterpart – tries to reach out to those born in the DR of Haitian descent who lack 
identity documents or birth certificates through mobile registration units every Saturday. He 
                                                        
42 See also Fletcher and Miller (2004, 671-2). 
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says, however, that he cannot force an individual to use their services. “[I]t is the person who 
must first want to do it.”  
A recent publication by the Dominican Republic’s Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas 
contradicts the claims that Haitians are unable to acquire identity documents from Haiti and 
supports Delienne’s assertion instead. In the “First National Survey of Immigrants in the 
Dominican Republic,” ONE finds that 92.6% of those born in Haiti, living in the DR, have a 
birth certificate, while 51.9% of them possess a Haitian ID. It is those who are born in the DR 
who lack documentation, with only 55.3% of such persons possessing a Dominican birth 
certificate and even fewer possessing a Dominican ID or passport (Government of the 
Dominican Republic 2013a, 31).43  
Part of the problem in the high number of unregistered persons may be that people do not 
know what they are supposed to do or where they are supposed to go in terms of registration 
because, depending on whether one was born prior to the 2010 Constitutional amendment or not, 
a different set of laws is in operation with regard to the acquisition of Dominican nationality. As 
the UNHCR officer points out, “People are extremely confused on what legal framework applies 
to them…What happens [is] mothers don’t know anymore if they’re supposed to register 
children in the civil registration offices or in the consulate.” Gamboa adds that a “grey area” 
exists especially for those born in the Dominican Republic between 2004, when Ley 285-04 was 
passed, and the actual Constitutional amendment of 2010. For this and the other reasons 
explained above, the risk of statelessness looms large in the Dominican Republic. 
                                                        
43 Another survey, conducted by Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demográficos in 2007, found that 22% of those 
interviewed in the bateyes did not have a birth certificate and a third did not have a cédula (CESDEM 2008, 18). 
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Statelessness  
As I describe above, since the 2005 IACHR decision in Yean and Bosico, the Dominican 
Republic seems to have changed its domestic legislation, and reinforced its political practices, in 
such a way that it increases the likelihood of statelessness in the country. With the current 
equation of “in transit” to illegality and nonresidency, and the JCE’s refusal to grant Dominican 
birth certificates to many children born prior to 2010, individuals are finding themselves unable 
to enjoy their right to a Dominican nationality. Whereas it used to be that individuals born prior 
to the 2010 Constitutional amendment were being rendered stateless via administrative fiat,44 
today denationalization has found judicial approval in Sentence TC/0168/13 of the Constitutional 
Court and is affecting tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people.  
The Dominican Republic is not alone in engaging in mass denationalization. The most 
prominent example, discussed in chapter 2, is the denationalization of Jews and other minorities 
during the World War II era. In recent years, however, several States have engaged in mass 
denationalization. Mauritania confiscated the citizenship documents of, and then expelled, tens 
of thousands of its black, “non-Arab” citizens during the 1980s and 1990s (Lynch and Calabia 
2007; Manby 2009); Bhutan confiscated the citizenship cards of its ethnic Lhotshampa citizens 
(Bradley 2013, 198); Ethiopia summarily denationalized hundreds of thousands of its ethnic 
Eritreans at the end of the last century (Manby 2009; Campbell 2014); and, in the past two years, 
the Republic of Sudan denationalized those citizens who had involuntarily acquired the 
citizenship of the newly formed Republic of South Sudan (Sanderson 2014). The act of creating 
people who no longer formally belong is not, therefore, a relic of Arendt’s dark times.  
                                                        
44 As the UNCHR-DR officer says, “Remember, here it’s not an open denationalization, the policy of 
denationalization. Not at all. The only thing is that people are not given documents and you know what it means.”  
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The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which visited the DR in December, 
2013 found that “[t]he violations of the right to nationality that the Commission observed during 
its last on-site visit, in 1997, continue, and the situation has been exacerbated as a result of 
Judgment TC 168/2013 of the Constitutional Court.” In fact, the Commission argues that this 
sentence “denationalized a broad group of people born in the Dominican Republic between 1929 
and 2010” and that this denationalization was both arbitrary and retroactive, leading to 
statelessness (OAS 2013, n. pag.).  
 The Dominican government claims that Sentence TC/0168/13 is not a means of 
denationalization, but a “regularization plan” (Kajouee 2014); and, along with The Bahamas, 
claims that these people are not stateless, but Haitian under Haitian law. In Sentence 
TC/0168/13, for instance, the Constitutional Court held that Deguis “has a full right to Haitian 
nationality because she is the daughter of Haitian parents” (Government of the Dominican 
Republic 2013b, 78) and that the Dominican government’s refusal to give citizenship to the 
children of “in transit” foreigners “does not under any circumstances generate statelessness” 
(ibid. 77).  It bears highlighting again, however, that just because a person has the potential to 
acquire a given nationality does not mean that the person is actually recognized as a national of a 
given State in practice.  
Whereas Ambassador Rodrigue notes that individuals have a “potential” Haitian 
nationality in the Bahamian case, Delienne is careful to say that people have a right to Haitian 
citizenship, but that citizenship is not automatically granted just because an individual is born to 
a Haitian parent. The parent(s) must have the appropriate documentation to prove Haitian 
nationality in order to pass it on to his or her child. Additionally, and as I note in chapter 3, not 
all individuals born to Haitian parents have the right to Haitian citizenship. If a child is born 
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outside of Haiti to a Haitian mother, but a non-Haitian father, for instance, Haitian law is clear 
that the child takes the nationality of the father until he or she reaches the age of majority and is 
then able to make a declaration at a district court in Haiti for citizenship (Beaubrun 2008, 16). In 
the eyes of Haitian law, then, the child of a Dominican father and a Haitian mother is a 
Dominican regardless of the residency status of the mother.45 While Dominican law recognizes 
the child of a Dominican as a Dominican citizen irrespective of the legal status of their 
noncitizen parent (Government of the Dominican Republic 2013c, 6), it does not recognize the 
right to Dominican nationality of a child born on Dominican soil to noncitizen parents who are 
not legal residents or who are “in transit.”  
Statelessness thus arises when the child is born to a Haitian mother who does not possess 
a cédula demonstrating legal residence and who cannot prove that her child’s father is 
Dominican. As Beaubrun observes, “But in reality, many of the children born of such unions are 
not registered. The Dominican father often abandons the mother even before the child is born 
and, without means or resources, and lacking documentation and facing marginalization, she has 
no opportunity to register her child” (2008, 22; author’s translation). Confusion over where to 
register one’s child further complicates the situation. As the UNCHR participant points out with 
regard to the pink birth declarations, “they don’t know what those documents mean. So they 
think that if they register their children in the foreigner’s book they are Dominican. But as you 
know, they become stateless.”  
Although, as described above, the Haitian Embassy makes an important effort to register 
its citizens who live in the DR, it does not allegedly as readily accept as Haitian children born on 
Dominican soil prior to the 2010 constitutional amendment. Leonardo asserts that while the 
Dominican State says these individuals are not Dominican because of the “in transit” status of 
                                                        
45 This is also pertinent in the Bahamian case. 
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their parents, “the Haitian State says they are not Haitian and that this is the Dominican 
Republic’s problem.” Charpantier agrees, “if the child was born before 2010, they [the Haitian 
Embassy] are not going to accept him either because they are Dominicans. That’s what they’re 
saying. Now, from 2010 onwards, and provided the child is less than two years old, then they 
will accept him because the Constitution already provides for that.”  
Not only is there confusion over who is covered under which law, but – as in the 
Bahamian case – the fact that the DR has no statelessness status determination procedures means 
that it has no definitive way to identify who is and who is not a national in a transparent manner. 
And even though international law is supposed to have the same legal status as domestic law 
within the country (Government of the Dominican Republic 2010, Article 26), several of the 
individuals whom I interviewed believe that the DR readily violates the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), which it ratified in 1991. It violates the CRC because it deprives 
children of their citizenship documents or denies citizenship to those born on Dominican soil 
because of the irregular status of their parents. Paraison, for example, says that “[m]any times 
they talk about how the parents arrived and stayed in an unlawful manner, but this argument 
clashes with the Convention on the Rights of the Child that children cannot be responsible for the 
status of their parents.”46 
As noted earlier, in Sentence TC/0168/13, which gives constitutional weight to the 
government’s practices of denationalization, the Constitutional Court holds that the migratory 
status of parents is not being transferred to children. Yet in this very Sentence the majority of 
Justices find Deguis responsible for violating the Constitution by seeking a cédula. They state 
that she “cannot take advantage of her own fault and receive Dominican nationality through such 
                                                        
46 Article 2 of the CRC states that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is 
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, 
or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members” (UN 1989). 
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an illegal act [initial “irregular” birth registration]”47 (Government of the Dominican Republic 
2013b, 11). But it was Deguis’ parents who performed the “act” of registering her birth with their 
fichas. Deguis was only trying to obtain her cédula for the first time, using a previously issued 
and approved Dominican birth certificate. She is thus being held responsible for the actions of 
her parents, which is clearly in violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the JCE, in Resolution 02-2007, does not focus 
on all of Article 7 of the Convention when explaining the function of the foreigner’s registry 
book. Article 7 of the CRC states that “[t]he child shall be registered immediately after birth and 
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, 
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents” (UN 1989). The JCE only acknowledges 
that the CRC “established as a principle, that each child, regardless of the parents’ migratory 
status, has the right to a name and to birth registration” (Government of the Dominican Republic 
2007b, 3). It mentions nothing about the right to a nationality, clearly illustrating the JCE’s 
disregard for this right.  
 Worse still, three of the five study participants from El Caño were unable to even register 
their child’s birth, much less obtain a Dominican birth certificate or proof of citizenship for them 
because they had been the victims of identity theft. Whereas in The Bahamas a black market 
exists for the birth certificates of deceased persons, in the Dominican Republic corrupt local JCE 
officers have been known to sell someone’s identity documents to another individual for the right 
price. Thus when these young women from El Caño went to their local JCE office to try and 
obtain their cédulas they were told that their cédula had already been issued to someone else. 
                                                        
47 The full text reads, “siendo violatoria a la constitución y las leyes la Declaración de Nacimiento del impetrante, 
éste no puede aprovecharse de su propia falta y recibir la nacionalidad dominicana por tal actuación ilícita” (italics 
in original). 
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Unable to acquire their identity documents, these young, Dominican-born women have been 
unable to register the births of their own Dominican-born children.  
 Akin to The Bahamas, the situation of individuals of Haitian descent in the DR is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the Dominican government has not ratified either of the two 
statelessness conventions. It signed the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, but 
never instantiated the convention’s provisions into domestic legislation. Based on current 
practice, it does not appear that the DR will be ratifying either of these conventions any time 
soon either.  
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that the maintenance of formal belonging, via citizenship, is not a guaranteed 
status. What can be given to you at birth, via the laws in operation at the time, can be taken away 
when said laws are either retroactively applied (Ley 285-04, the Constitutional Amendment) or 
are interpreted in a different way (the “in transit” clause of the 1939 law). Although the 
Dominican Republic engaged in exclusionary membership practices for many years, it was not 
until 2013 that such acts found judicial sanction by the country’s highest court in Sentence 
TC/0168/13. Hundreds of thousands of people have been summarily stripped of their Dominican 
citizenship as a result.  
 This chapter also reveals the many ways in which people can be rendered stateless 
outside of the legal sphere. Statelessness may occur because of the application of the Junta 
Central Electoral’s various resolutions and circulars that order local JCE officials to investigate 
the citizenship documents of “irregular” persons and then let languish the cases of such persons. 
Statelessness may take place because of outright document denial on discriminatory grounds or 
because of corruption, wherein one’s citizenship documents are given to someone else. It may 
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also happen because those who could qualify for Haitian citizenship are unable to obtain it due to 
the undocumented status of their parents, or because their parents chose not to get Haitian 
identity documents for them. As in the Bahamian case, Haitian parents sometimes “abstain from 
it [registering their child at the Haitian Embassy], whether because of ignorance or because they 
would like to bestow the enjoyment of the rights and privileges inherent in Dominican 
citizenship to their offspring” (Beaubrun 2008, 21; author’s translation). Some of them may even 
“prefer to remain stateless instead of becoming Haitian” (ibid., 22; author’s translation).  
That some of them would prefer to remain stateless and not be “forced to be Haitian”48 is 
unsurprising, however, since most of these persons grew up “Dominican.” They were provided 
Dominican birth certificates and were Dominican citizens until the retroactive application of Ley 
285-04 and the implementation of resolutions 02/2007 and 12/2007. Unlike the individuals of 
Haitian descent born in The Bahamas, therefore, these persons once formally belonged to a State 
– in this case, the Dominican Republic. Beyond formal belonging, however, many of these 
people also feel culturally Dominican, as the next chapter illustrates.  
Whereas this chapter and the previous one demonstrate that the human right to a 
nationality is not implemented in practice for the offspring of many Haitian migrants born in The 
Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, the next chapter shows that exclusionary State 
membership practices reach beyond the realms of law and politics. They have significant 
repercussions on these individuals’ sense of place identity and their ability to access other human 
rights. Personhood does not, therefore, suffice for them to enjoy the rights that supposedly no 
longer attach to citizenship in a postnational world and it certainly does not serve as a foundation 
for belonging in the present era. Citizenship is still key.  
                                                        
48 From Justice Jiménez Martínez’s dissenting opinion in Sentence TC/0168/13 (Government of the Dominican 
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Chapter 5 – On Non-Belonging 
 
The two previous chapters reveal how Bahamian- and Dominican-born persons of Haitian 
descent are displaced into the realm of liminality or forced to be Haitian by a confluence of legal, 
political and bureaucratic factors in the countries of their birth. In contradistinction to the 
postnational assertion that citizenship in the State is a weakening or obsolete institution then, 
these chapters illustrate that citizenship is not an easily acquired or retained status precisely 
because it continues to be a highly valuable good. States continue to jealously guard their right to 
determine who belongs, even if this entails using arbitrary or discriminatory measures. Chapters 
3 and 4 thus demonstrate that a large gap exists between the declaration of a human right to a 
nationality and its enjoyment in practice. 
Whereas the two previous chapters examine how a right to a nationality is instantiated in 
practice through the operation of a State’s laws and procedures, chapter 5 investigates 
statelessness from a less legalistic and more social and interpersonal perspective. Instead of 
showing that individuals are not covered in practice by Article 11 of the Haitian Constitution in 
the countries of their birth, this chapter approaches the question of “Where do they belong?” 
from the vantage point of those who have been or are at risk of statelessness. It demonstrates that 
the consequences of their noncitizen status have ramifications far beyond the legal realm as 
many of these Bahamian- and Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent are unsure of where 
they belong. Their sense of place identity is ambiguous. Additionally, like their stateless 
counterparts elsewhere in the world (see chapter 2), stateless persons in The Bahamas and the 
Dominican Republic are unable to rely on their mere personhood to access rights, freedoms and 
protections. Postnational claims of the decoupling of human rights from citizenship do not apply 
to them. 
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In order to make these arguments, and demonstrate the continued significance of 
citizenship in the contemporary era, I explain how the stateless fit Turner’s (1984) four 
characteristics of liminal subjects and how their liminal status affects their sense of belonging 
and rights fulfillment. I thereby demonstrate that the realm of statelessness is more than one 
where the law ceases to operate. It is one in which an individual’s place in the world becomes 
ambiguous, or even outright negated. We have not, therefore, come very far from Arendt’s 
conclusion that “the loss of citizenship deprived people not only of protection, but also of all 
clearly established, officially recognized identity” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 364). 
Liminality 
Liminality is a term that has been used to explain the experience of stateless people (Thomassen 
2009, 19). It refers to the condition of being between statuses (Riggan 2011), “be these fixed 
cultural classifications or more formalised legal statuses” (Hynes 2011, 2). One arrives at this 
liminal space through separation from one’s former identity and only leaves it via a rite of 
passage, taking on another identity in the process (Beech 2011, 287). Sometimes the transition 
from one identity to the next does not go as expected, however, and people become stranded in 
the liminal stage (Higgot and Nossal 1997, 170). They remain in limbo, as “entities that are 
neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arranged by law, 
custom, convention, and ceremonials...They elude or slip through the network of classifications 
that normally locates states and positions in cultural space” (Turner [{1969}1995], cited in 
Rumelili 2003, 220).  
As I explain in chapter 1, the stateless fall outside the framework of international practice 
wherein each person is supposed to belong to some State as its national. They are noncitizen 
insiders (Belton 2011b). They are insiders because they have not migrated from elsewhere. They 
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remain, for the most part, in the States where they were born. Yet they are noncitizens because 
the State either rejects them as members or does not fully provide the means by which they can 
be prevented from falling into statelessness. The stateless have thus undergone the first stage of 
the initiation rite, separation. They are separated from formal citizenship through citizenship 
denial or deprivation in the countries of their birth. Yet, unable to take on formal citizenship, 
they remain “betwixt and between;” in a space of invisibility, impurity, rightlessness and 
reflection (Turner [1984] in Beech 2011, 287).  
Invisibility 
 
As Nic Beech, interpreting Turner (1984), explains, “the liminar1 is socially if not physically 
invisible. Their ambiguity means that they are outside definition” (2011, 287). Statelessness 
scholarship is replete with terms expressing the invisibility of stateless populations. In Arendt’s 
time stateless people were referred to as “‘displaced persons’…for the express purpose of 
liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence” (Arendt [1948] 2004). Today 
adjectives such as “ghosts” and “voiceless,” and the use of euphemisms such as “without status” 
and “erased persons,” are used to describe them.2 Not only are the stateless described as 
invisible, but they are often numerically invisible as well. Most countries do not collect data on 
their stateless populations and neither The Bahamas nor the DR does so.3 It is thus often hard to 
gauge the extent of statelessness, which, in turn, affects policy responses towards them.  
 While the previously stateless or at risk participants interviewed for this study do not 
describe themselves as invisible, those who were not stateless, but citizens of the DR, Haiti or 
                                                        
1 Beech uses the term “liminar” while other works use the term “liminal.” I use “liminal” when not quoting Beech. 
2 See Belton (2010 and 2011a), Blitz (2006), Green and Pierce (2009, 34), Hayden (2008, 249), OSJI and CEJIL 
(2012, 8), UNHCR (2003) and Zorn (2004). 
3 In fact, of the 74 States that responded to a survey on statelessness commissioned by UNHCR in 2003, 43% 
acknowledged that they were unable to identify stateless persons on their territory while some denied that stateless 
populations existed within their territory even though the UNHCR had provided technical assistance to such States 
concerning their stateless populations (UNHCR 2004). 
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some other third country, do use the term to describe them. The Dominican UNDP officer 
explains how without a national ID card (cédula), people are “invisible… They are not subjects 
of the law. They don’t exist as citizens.”4 While admitting that “Yes, as human beings [they 
exist] because they are present,” the officer emphasizes that they “do not exist in the civil sense 
of the word.” Leonardo agrees, observing that if an individual in the DR does not possess a birth 
certificate or a national ID, “civilly you do not exist.” This premise stands in direct 
contradistinction to the postnational claim that personhood is what counts in the contemporary 
era.5  
In those instances when they are given formal citizenship, many formerly stateless 
persons are still “invisible” as they are denied social recognition as a Bahamian or a Dominican 
citizen. As Hanauer, discussing the different types of relationships migrants can have to their 
host communities observes, “Legal citizenship does not mean acceptance within the nation-state” 
(2011, 202).6 Several interviewees express this concern. Dolce observes how Bahamians “still 
see me as Haitian” even though he now has Bahamian citizenship. “For example when I go to 
work, if a Haitian comes into the office to make a complaint they say, ‘You ga deal with your 
people.’ They don’t see me as Bahamian.” Dumercy similarly states that even after obtaining 
Bahamian citizenship, “people are calling me ‘this Haitian girl in the back of there.’ Is there any 
change? No. So it’s like the quality of life is still the same. I still have to battle. And the thing is, 
if anything, I have to now carry my passport everywhere–to maybe say, ‘Yeah, okay, I’m a 
Bahamian.’” 
                                                        
4 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, July 13, 2012. 
5 Rodríguez also notes that “[m]ost people are unaware of their [the stateless’] existence” and, as noted in chapter 4, 
Paraison considers “the denial of their very existence” to be the biggest problem facing the Haitian diaspora in the 
DR. 
6 See also Staples (2012) chapter six, “Contemporary Statelessness in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo” for 
an elaboration of the way in which the formal right to a nationality rings hollow when local practices of recognition 
are not extended. 
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Julian Lockhart, a Bahamian of non-Haitian descent who wrote on Haitian Bahamian 
events as a journalist for The Tribune, observes how many individuals of Haitian descent born in 
The Bahamas are not considered fully “Bahamian” even when citizenship is acquired. 
Discussing the “negative connotation” that adheres to Bahamians’ usage of “Bahaitian,” 
“Bahamian Haitian” and “Haitian Bahamian,” he says that “what it is, is Bahamians are letting 
you know, ‘Hey, you may be Bahamian by status, but you’re not a Bahamian. We might accept 
you [legally], but don’t get yourself fooled [into] actually thinking you are a Bahamian.”7 Dolce 
concurs, adding that “the real issue is being recognized as a Bahamian if you’re born here or if 
you’ve spent all your life here.”  
The societal rejection of the naturalized ‘Other’ is part of a “shift towards xenophobic 
restrictionism,” which, according to Gaim Kibreab, “is increasingly a universal pattern” (1999, 
400). Describing the rejection faced by refugees in host countries, Kibreab explains how  
states, communities and individuals within geographically bounded spaces have 
become more territorial than ever before. Because of this, territorially-based 
identity has become a scarce resource which is jealously guarded and protected by 
those who perceive themselves as standing to lose by an influx of refugees or 
immigrants from other countries (ibid.) 
 
In the Bahamian case at least, the guarding of a territorially defined identity is displayed when 
people are judged to be a “true true” Bahamian or not. “True, true” Bahamians are those who are 
able to trace their ancestry back to one of the Family Islands and who, in the words of one 
interviewee, “have a name that we can associate with one of those Family Islands, some 
settlement or community in one of those Family Islands.” “True true” Bahamians are also black,8 
but not as black as their Haitian counterparts. As a prominent talk show personality points out, 
                                                        
7 Telephone interview. August 12, 2009. 
8 Although Bahamian anthropologist Nicolette Bethel points out that the Eleutheran Adventurers, white Puritans of 
English descent from Bermuda, settled in The Bahamas long before Loyalists from the United States brought slaves 
to the islands (Bethel 2003).  
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the character, the tone, the construction that Bahamians have of Haitians is almost 
identical to so many racist constructions of them – of black people generally…So 
they [Bahamians] did not create it, but they have embraced it. And they see 
themselves on a hierarchy of being in which the Haitian is beneath them. And 
that’s class prejudice as well as ethnic difference.9 
 
A lawyer and former government official concurs, stating that “the so-called true Bahamian sees 
himself as socially superior to these immigrants [the Haitians] and wants to maintain that social 
separation, doesn’t want equalization.”10 This interviewee went on to say that it has little to do 
with race, however, but is more of a “class and status” issue. He continues,  
Bahamian prejudice toward Haitians is something that transcends race altogether. 
It has nothing to do with race. It has more to do with the stratification of society 
along class lines and that historically a person who is born here of Bahamian 
parents is accorded a higher social status than a person who has either come here 
from Haiti or who is the immediate child of Haitian parents. 
 
Whether or not the rejection of the Haitian noncitizen insider is due to perceived racial, ethnic or 
class differences, it affects the way in which Bahamians, Haitians, and Bahamians of Haitian 
descent interact with – and view – each other. Bahamians generally consider Haitians “an 
undifferentiated mass” (Craton and Saunders 1998, 455), made up of “illegal immigrant[s]” 
(Marshall 1979, 54; Fielding et al. 2008, 44). As one interviewee observes, “[t]hat’s where the 
problem comes, they just say illegal for everyone…because to most people every Haitian born in 
the Bahamas is an illegal.”11 A former Bahamian government official is also emphatic that 
children born to undocumented parents are illegal. “[I]f you’re illegal, you should not be able to 
produce a person who becomes legal when they are born here.”12 Jn-Simon faced this forced 
categorization first-hand at the College of The Bahamas forum on “21st Century Slavery in The 
                                                        
9 Personal interview, Nassau, August 6, 2009. 
10 Personal interview, Nassau, August 4, 2009. 
11 Personal interview, Nassau, July 29, 2009. 
12 Personal interview, Nassau, July 31, 2009. 
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Bahamas: A Discussion on Statelessness” in October, 2012.13 After she spoke about what it is 
like to be stateless in the country of her birth, an audience member approached her and “had the 
audacity to tell me that I was born here illegally.”  
 The premise that children born of Haitian descent are largely “illegal” is not specific to 
The Bahamas. The equation of Haitians with an unwelcome and unauthorized presence – 
domestic labor needs and evidence of work permits notwithstanding – is apparent in the 
Dominican Republic, too. Human Rights Watch captures the then-head of the Dominican Army, 
Manuel Polanco, likewise stating that “[a]n illegal person cannot produce a legal person” (2002, 
22). Additionally, and as in the Bahamian case, many people in Dominican society view Haitians 
as an undifferentiated mass and/or illegals.14 As discussed in chapter 4, the inability of many 
Dominicans to accept otherwise hails in part from the particularly strong and historical form of 
anti-Haitianism that exists in the country. This anti-Haitianism, while not rendering people of 
Haitian descent completely invisible, takes away their humanity.  
Impurity 
 
Even when not rendered invisible or emplaced in the space of their skin color, individuals of 
Haitian descent are often described in derogatory terms or associated with unclean or impure 
practices. This is a common phenomenon “when people, things and practices are seen as ‘out-of-
place’” (Cresswell 2004, 103). During Arendt’s time the stateless were described as “the scum of 
the earth” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 341), “outlaw(s)” (360, 363) and “barbarians” (384). In the 
Caribbean context, they are often associated with unclean animals such as pigs, hogs and/or 
dogs. For example, Dominican anthropologist Tahira Vargas comments on how Dominicans 
                                                        
13 The author was in attendance as a presenter. 
14 See Wooding and Moseley-Williams (2004, 33-34), Martínez in IACHR (2005) and Aber and Small (2013, 81). 
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often say that “all Haitians are dogs.”15 In their report to the UN Human Rights Council on the 
situation in the Dominican Republic, Doudou Diène and Gay McDougall16 also recount how 
“references [were] made to blacks as being ‘pig feed’, ignorant or unhygienic” (UN 2008c, 13). 
One of the two local politicians interviewed in Abaco, Bahamas consistently compares 
the people living in Haitian settlements in Abaco to hogs. For example, when describing the 
living conditions of those of Haitian descent, the person says that “only hogs can live like that.”17 
When discussing crime in the settlements and how locals attempt to get a “Haitian Bahamian” 
informant from within the communities to identify any illegal activity, the interviewee says that 
“the Bahamian-Haitian will say yes, but he never does [act as an informant] because they don’t 
squeal on their own breed. They don’t squeal.” The same participant, when asked about solutions 
to the issues surrounding citizenship denial and the problems confronted by people in the 
settlements, only offered the “bulldoze” the settlement option because “as long as they’re left 
there in that square, they’ll be the same low-class pigs! Living like pigs.” The other local 
Abaconian official also thought that the settlements should be bulldozed. The individual stated 
the Bahamian government ought to “hire two big tractors and we push down all those houses 
which have been built here illegally. Put diesel and gas on it and burn it. Purify the place.”18  
Associations with impurity are also present when the Bahamian-born persons of Haitian 
descent are associated with criminal activity due to their “betwixt and between” status. As one 
Abaconian official asserts, “The Haitian Bahamians is the ones that’s breaking in and stealing. 
                                                        
15 Vargas was one of the presenters at the “Simposio sobre Derecho a la Nacionalidad y Estado de Derecho en 
República Dominicana” that was held in Santo Domingo on February 8, 2013. The author was also a presenter. 
16 Diène was the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance from 2002-2008 and McDougall was the UN Independent expert on minority issues from 2005-
2011. 
17 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 12, 2012. 
18 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 14, 2012. 
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They’re the worst. The Haitian-Haitians aren’t half as bad as the Haitian Bahamians.”19 The 
interviewee continues,  
Haitian-Haitians are nicer people than Bahamian Haitians. The Bahamian 
Haitians is too biggity. They too sassy. They too stealing, into stealing. The 
Bahamian-Haitians are worse. A Haitian Haitian, like this man I’m talking 
about,20 they’re more trustworthy. They don’t steal. I wouldn’t say you might find 
one out of a hundred that steals out of the Haitian Haitians, but the whole hundred 
of Bahamian Haitians will steal. 
 
The interviewee attributes the criminal nature of Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent to 
the fact that “[t]hey don’t know where they belong. They’re not accepted. They’re not accepted 
by the Haitians and they’re not accepted by the Bahamians.” The other Abaconian official, after 
declaring that “Bahamians are peaceful people, generally speaking,” affirms that “[a]ny time you 
find these fellas getting out of hand and they’re doing the serious, serious cruel acts, check it 
close–some kind of Haitian blood mix.”21 Thus the fact that they are neither Bahamian nor 
Haitian, but some “impure” mixture of the two, results in their criminal inclinations in the latter 
interviewee’s eyes.  
Due to their “impure” nature, individuals of Haitian descent must therefore be contained. 
As Beech explains, liminals “are regarded as unclean with contact being prohibited or curtailed 
during liminality lest they should ‘pollute’ those who have not been ‘inoculated’ against them” 
(2011, 287). The settlements where many persons of Haitian descent reside within The Bahamas 
and the DR are often in poor condition, separated from citizens’ homes. Batey residents for 
example, housed in settlements adjacent to sugarcane plantations, “live in pitiable conditions 
with no access to running water, sanitation or electricity…They live in informally constructed 
                                                        
19 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 12, 2012. 
20 The interviewee was describing a Haitian national who was “as clean and well-spoken as you could find” because 
“he married a girl [whose] family is high-class black people. So she brought him up to her level.” This supports the 
aforementioned assertion of another interviewee (p. 151) that Bahamians assume they are of a higher social standing 
than Haitians. 
21 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 14, 2012. 
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shelters with dirt floors” (UN 2008c, 24). In its study of HIV/AIDS in the bateyes, the Centro de 
Estudios Sociales y Demográficos found that nearly 40% of the homes of Haitian migrants 
lacked sanitation facilities, with only 12% having a fully operational toilet (2008, 21). 
On my visit to the batey of El Caño in 2013, I was taken to the home of a person who had 
the only private latrine in the neighborhood. The only way to flush the toilet was to carry water 
from an outside water source and fill the tank. The home had cement floors, but no covering for 
the floors. It had several bedrooms, but no doors. Curtains served to separate one space from 
another. Inside the bedrooms, plywood, covered with a sheet, lay on top of box springs to serve 
as mattresses. The house was minimalist in nature, but it was not dirty. 
 During my visit to the settlements of The Mud and The Peas in Abaco in 2012, I noticed 
that the homes were haphazardly-placed, many with barely a walkway between them. Due to the 
fact that many settlement residents in The Bahamas “still cook outside on charcoal burner 
stoves” (Weatherford 2011, 108) and that several homes illegally tap into one electricity source, 
fires often break out in these communities. Pastor Robin Weatherford, who has worked with and 
ministered to the Haitian community in Abaco for decades, notes that “[a] feeling of dread never 
fails to enter our mind when we look out our windows to see a plume of black smoke rising from 
that area, knowing that it more than likely could be disastrous” (2011, 108).22  
 Besides vulnerability to fires, the homes in The Mud and The Peas are surrounded by dirt 
roads that are prone to flooding whenever hurricanes or storms pass through because of the 
settlements’ location on reclaimed swamp land. As in many bateyes in the DR, the majority of 
homes in The Mud and The Peas also lack access to running water, sanitation or electricity. 
When I visited The Mud, however, I did not observe any open cesspits (as are often rumored to 
                                                        
22 Haitian settlements in the Abaco have suffered fires in recent years in which homes have been destroyed and 
hundreds of people left homeless (Rolle 2014; Turnquest 2014). 
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exist), and the homes appeared to be well maintained despite their close proximity and largely 
wooden frameworks.23 Instead, what struck me was how clearly the settlements were delineated 
from the surrounding “citizens’” homes.  
Whether the delineation between the spaces where the descendants of Haitian migrants 
live and citizens reside is purposeful in either country, the offspring of Haitian migrants are made 
to feel separate from, and even “dirty” to, the citizens who surround them. Being a “Haitian,” 
according to Dolce was made to “seem like it’s a bad thing. A child growing up… [is hearing] a 
Haitian is something bad” and ends up “thinking ‘I don’t want to be Haitian no more. Haitian is 
bad. Haitian is a bad thing.” Louis agrees, stating that “the term Haitian, growing up for me, that 
stigma was always this concept that ‘They’re illiterate. They’re poor’ and such.”  
Jn-Simon believes that it is worse than that, “it almost seems as if in this country [The 
Bahamas] to be a Haitian, you’re ostracized almost like a person who has HIV.”24 She tells the 
story of her younger sister who was teased at primary school because of her Haitian ethnicity and 
how her sister stopped speaking Krèyol; “she would even tell you that she is not a Haitian. The 
way how she felt when she went to school and children would tell her–like this one girl in 
particular would tell her that she looks like garbage or ‘You need to go back on the boat with 
your mother.’” Akin to The Bahamas, Diène and McDougall found in the Dominican case that 
“‘Haitian’ is also used as a label for improper behavior, lack of civility, and often as an insult in 
Dominican society” (UN 2008c, 15).  
                                                        
23 Few people were present on the dirt roads that day as most had left for work outside of the community and only a 
few adult women remained to sell their wares on the ground in front of their homes.  
24 In addition to “this theory that Haitians brought AIDS to the Bahamas,” Jn-Simon says that Bahamians also 
believe that they brought tuberculosis. Petit Homme also explains how he was listening to a radio talk show in 2002 
and “this guy called the radio station and say AIDS originated in Haiti. I was so shocked…I was thinking we had 
already passed all these things.” 
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Petit Homme insinuates that Bahamians’ pejorative use of “Haitian” is more than a 
means to label someone unclean or uncivil, however; it has strong connotations of enslavement.  
[I]t’s almost like Haitians now are like the field niggas, you know what I 
mean?...Look at the way they call Haitians. Like if you have a Haitian gardener 
maybe you call him ‘My Haitian’…But then they [Bahamians of non-Haitian 
descent] don’t like the other Haitians. They want to get rid of all the other ones, 
but then they want to keep ‘theirs.’ And sometimes they even use citizenship–
residency papers as leverage. They own these people, you know?  
 
Just as the Atlantic slave trade engendered the deaths of millions of persons of African descent in 
the New World, Beech explains that during the “impurity” stage of liminality, “there is a link to 
death” and the liminal “may be ritually buried/lie motionless/stained black/covered in blood)” 
(2011, 287). The “link to death” reveals itself in various ways in the two cases studied here. 
First, there is the practice of “kill[ing] the juridical personality” of an individual (Arendt [1948] 
2004, 577) through document denial and deprivation. According to Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, this 
is civicide. Describing denationalization procedures in Nigeria, Odinkalu explains, “There are 
two ways to kill in human community: you can kill a human being or you can kill the citizen. 
The first is biological; the second is sociological but no less real. The former is called homicide; 
the latter is civicide” (2009, n. pag.). I explain earlier in the dissertation how the Dominican 
government (and to a lesser extent the Bahamian government) engages in civicide against its 
Haitian migrant descended population.  
Second, there is the association of blood and death not with the liminals or noncitizen 
insiders, but with the citizens. For example, when I question the aforementioned local Abaconian 
official about the effects of a “bulldoze and purify” policy on Bahamian-born children who could 
one day become Bahamian citizens, the official responds, “That’s what’s killing us now.”25 
Former Minister of State for Immigration, Branville McCartney, similarly stated that “[w]e need 
                                                        
25 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 14, 2012. 
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to stop the bleeding” when it comes to giving citizenship to children born in The Bahamas of 
“illegal immigrant[s]” (Dames 2011).  
In the Dominican context, the portrayal is slightly different. It is not that the Haitians and 
their descendants are bleeding the non-Haitian citizens dry, but that the latter are perhaps out for 
the Haitian-descended population’s blood. As reported by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights after its visit to the DR in December 2013,  
Ana María Belique, a leader and activist with Movimiento Reconocido [who had 
spoken up against Sentence TC/0168/13], 26  reportedly received threats from 
individuals via the social media network Twitter: ‘We’re going to have to move 
Belique to the same barrio where Sonia Pierre lives’ (a reference to a human 
rights activist and defender who died in 2011), and ‘we’re ready for anything; if 
it’s blood they want, blood they shall have’ (Organization of American States 
2013, n. pag.). 
 
Jn-Simon relates the story of a Bahamian woman (of non-Haitian descent) who insinuates that 
death is the best response to, and place for, Bahamian-born Haitians: “the best Haitians in The 
Bahamas are those in the cemetery.” Despite sporadic episodes of violence in the DR, however, 
the stigmatization of and discrimination against Bahamian and Dominican-born persons of 
Haitian descent has not engendered the type of ethnic conflict that occurs in other parts of the 
world when a minority group is oppressed or the ethnic majority feels threatened. Nonetheless, 
and contrary to postnational assertions of the severing of human rights from citizenship, it has 
generated a group of people whose access to human rights is seriously curtailed because of their 
stateless or liminal status.  
Rightlessness 
 
“[D]uring liminality,” writes Beech, “the liminar has no rights” (2011, 287). As I illustrate in 
chapter 2, statelessness is a condition wherein the fulfillment of rights is contingent at best or 
                                                        
26 See chapter 4, pp. 117-118. 
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non-existent at worst. This is because citizenship is an intrinsic human right – important to hold 
in and of itself – but also because it is an instrumental human right. Its non-fulfillment leaves 
almost every other right in the UDHR susceptible to violation (Belton forthcoming). As the 
IACHR states in Yean and Bosico,  
nationality is a prerequisite for recognition of juridical personality…the failure to 
recognize juridical personality harms human dignity, because it denies absolutely 
an individual’s condition of being a subject of rights and renders him vulnerable 
to non-observance of his rights by the State or other individuals (2005, 67).27 
 
As individuals who occupy a liminal space, the stateless encounter difficulties in accessing many 
of the rights, freedoms and protections that citizens take for granted. Specifically, those who are 
stateless, or at risk of statelessness, in The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic face limits in 
the areas of education, employment, access to health care and justice, as well as restrictions upon 
their movement.  
As parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1989), both The Bahamas 
and the DR should provide free public elementary education to those children resident in their 
territories. This does not always occur in practice, however. One participant, who ministers in the 
Haitian community in The Bahamas, notes that when Haitian migrants go to register their 
children for school they are sometimes turned away and told that registration is not taking place 
for a few more weeks yet when, in fact, registration is underway. When the Haitian parent 
returns, registration is closed. This interviewee also says that some Haitians have set up a school 
of their own to get around this type of discrimination, noting that children coming from Haiti are 
even less likely to be able to attend public school than their Bahamian-born counterparts: 
                                                        
27 UNHCR is also clear that the possession of a nationality is “a fundamental aspect of the system for human rights 
protection” (UNHCR 2012a, 10). 
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“children who [are] born in Haiti, who come here, you have a 90% chance they will never take 
them in [public] school…They will have to go to private school.”28 
While an elementary school administrator in Abaco asserts that all children are provided 
elementary school education, the interviewee also states that “we will not register a child without 
any documents” because “we risk exposing the children to danger in terms of health if we do 
that…That’s why we say that the immunization card must be up to date.” This school official 
was unable to provide information on how many children have been turned away from this 
particular Abaco school because of lack of documentation or an up-to-date immunization card, 
but the participant’s comments lead one to question how many children of Haitian descent are 
being prevented from attending school due to their parent’s irregular status.   
 Even when these students manage to enroll in school, a few of the Bahamian case study 
interviewees remark that this education is not free from exposure to discriminatory teachers or 
classmates. Dumercy, for example, relates how confrontations between Bahamians of non-
Haitian descent and “Haitians” would become violent when she attended school. “They would go 
to war. It became physical. It’s not like you [just] feel it mentally, socially, or whatever–it 
became physical to some extent. It affects every aspect of your life as a child.” She narrates how 
children of Haitian descent do not feel the hostility until “they get to school” because their 
parents “are very protective” of them.  
So when they get to the schools, a lot of kids, they don’t know how to handle it. 
So they react to how they’re being treated. You’d be surprised at how young these 
little Bahamian kids would come to school and they already feel hostile toward 
Haitians. Why? Because that’s what they’re hearing from their parents. So they 
already have that hostile feeling towards us. So they start picking on these kids or 
start picking fights–and trust me, you fight, they’ll fight hard…So then they’ll 
always have war. 
 
                                                        
28 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 29, 2009. 
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The aforementioned elementary school administrator in Abaco admits that sometimes “quarrels” 
occur between the two groups where one accuses the other of being “Haitian,” “Bahamian” or 
“black,” but that the confrontations do not get “to the point where it’s something that we have to 
deal with or it becomes a school problem where we have to look into it.”29  
 As concerns the Dominican case, until 2012, the DR limited children’s access to post-
elementary school education if they lacked a birth certificate (Féliz 2012).30 This is one of the 
reasons why UNDP-DR placed so much emphasis on registering school children in its 
Strengthening the civil registry system program, discussed in chapter 4. However, a recent fact-
finding mission to the Dominican Republic, conducted by Georgetown University Law School’s 
Human Rights Institute (GULSHRI) found that primary school students of Haitian descent 
continue to encounter problems in accessing education:  
problems of arbitrary denial of education in primary school still exist. Although 
the Ministry of Education has stated that children are allowed to attend primary 
school while pursuing documentation, not all schools seem to understand this 
policy. Of those interviewed, fourteen school officials and families reported that 
some primary schools turn away children without birth certificates, and some 
officials have publicly stated that they are opposed to letting “Haitians” attend 
school (GULSHRI 2014, 28). 
 
Moreover, high school students allegedly still need to possess a Dominican birth certificate in 
order to take the national high school exams, which are required in order to attend university 
(UN 2008c, 23). Francía Calis García,31 for example, a 21 year old born in the Dominican 
Republic to Haitian parents, had difficulties finishing high school because the local Junta Central 
Electoral office would not give her a certified copy of her birth certificate. After overcoming 
many obstacles, she finished high school, but has been unable to attend university or secure a job 
                                                        
29 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 14, 2012. 
30According to an administrator at one of Abaco’s primary schools, birth certificates are needed to identify when a 
child is born so that s/he is placed in the appropriate grade. 
31 All quotes from Calis García are from the online video “Statelessness in The Dominican Republic” (MOSCTHA 
2012); the translations are my own.   
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because the authorities will not grant her a cédula. Participants in the Georgetown study report 
similar stories, noting that “[i]n contrast to the capricious implementation of state regulations 
regarding high school enrollment, graduation, and national testing, access to university is 
uniformly denied to those students over the age of eighteen who are unable to obtain a cédula” 
(GULSHRI 2014, 36). 
  Several of the participants from El Caño confirm that they were unable to pursue their 
university studies after completing high school. One notes that although she received good 
grades in high school and was the recipient of a scholarship for her work, the scholarship was 
never given to her because she was “from a batey.”32 She feels like she was discriminated against 
because of her Haitian heritage and adds that the denial of scholarship opportunities to 
Dominican-born students of Haitian descent “happens a lot.”  
Interviewees in Civolani Hischnjakow’s work (2011) similarly observe how their 
inability to procure a certified birth certificate from the JCE prevented them from taking the 
national exam, continuing their post-secondary studies or taking part in overseas athletic 
opportunities.33 “It prevents me from doing many things,” says Eduardo Dierdito Exilien, such as 
attending workshops and travelling, visiting the doctor and continuing his studies, which “is 
what I most want to do” (2011, 29). Nico Paredes and Rogelio Exil de La Rosa explain how their 
athletic careers were cut short and that they were unable to continue their studies as well (ibid., 
31). In addition, the rate of illiteracy among those located in bateyes, such as El Caño, is 
particularly elevated. Nearly a third of those ten years and older are illiterate (CESDEM 2008, 
15), and a quarter of the children aged six and older have no schooling whatsoever (ibid., 13). 
The latter statistic is more than double the national rate of 11% (ibid., 15). 
                                                        
32 Personal interview. El Caño, Monte Plata, Dominican Republic, February 6, 2013. 
33 See the Georgetown Law School’s Human Rights Institute 2014 report for similar experiences. 
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 The Bahamian-born interviewees of Haitian descent also faced limited educational 
prospects or roadblocks on their way to finishing high school and attending college. Several 
explain how they had to pass up educational opportunities overseas because they could not travel 
to study in the United States using the aforementioned Bahamian-government issued “travel 
document,” or Certificate of Identity. Others note how they had to pay the non-Bahamian school 
tuition or “foreigner’s fee” at their tertiary institutions in The Bahamas, while most lament their 
inability to apply for scholarships or take part in extra-curricular activities. Akin to the 
participants who were denied athletic opportunities in Civolani Hischnjakow’s study, Louis 
describes how  
growing up there are many opportunities that came my way, but because I didn’t 
have a passport, it kind of like hindered me. I could just give you one [example]. 
In high school, I was in athletics, into sports pretty good. I had an opportunity to 
be a part of the Bahamian national soccer team, but that chance was crushed 
because, you know, they said that I don’t have a Bahamian passport…I was hurt. 
Dumercy similarly notes how her younger sister was encouraged by a local police officer in 
Abaco to apply to the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture for a sport’s scholarship. This 
officer was so impressed with her sister’s athletic ability that he personally took the application 
to Nassau, confidant that she would get a scholarship. As Dumercy relates, however, the 
Ministry never even sent a letter of acknowledgment about the application.  
So to this day what she’s doing now actually, is she is working in my [other] 
sister’s store–because she has a children’s store. That’s what she’s doing now. But 
this girl could have gone on to run in the Olympics. This girl had the fastest time. 
Like, she broke all kinds of records. But because of her last name, she never got 
anywhere. There’s a lot of talented kids out there who could have been achieving 
so much more. 
 
Dumercy also notes that Bahamian-born students of Haitian descent are often passed over for 
prestigious positions in high school. “I’ve seen kids who they don’t give you valedictorian 
because you’re Haitian. They’ll give you maybe salutatorian.” She says that this type of 
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discrimination happens “every day…it’s so regular.” Jn-Simon faced this discrimination first-
hand. She became Deputy Head Girl, but was actually threatened by a parent of another (non-
Haitian descended) student. This parent, whose daughter had been in the running for Head Girl, 
grabbed her and “told me she was investigating me…Teachers started shifting me in my seats in 
class…I was so depressed. I didn’t even want to go to school anymore. It was that serious.” Her 
grades plummeted due to the harassment.  
 After-school programs, such as the police and nursing cadets, were also off-limits for the 
Bahamian-born interviewees of Haitian descent. St. Cecile explains how in grade 12 she “wanted 
to join the cadet corps and I remember the police officer–she was a lady–telling me ‘You can’t 
join the cadet corps because you don’t have a Bahamian passport.’ Yes, I remember that. And 
then it hinders you from moving forward.” Jn-Simon similarly adds how the police cadets, which 
is “a very, very good program… once you go to school under them, they pay for your school 
tuition,” is off-limits to Bahamian-born students of Haitian descent. She adds,  
If you don’t have a [Bahamian] passport, you can’t join the police cadets. Then 
there is the nursing cadet program where they have this nursing program in high 
school and then when you get out of high school, they pay for your tuition to go to 
nursing school. However, if you don’t have a passport, you don’t get the nursing 
grant. 
 
Desmangles says that many Bahamian-born children of Haitian descent want to be included and 
want to participate “in the economic well-being and the growth and the building of this nation… 
They want opportunities, but it gets to the point where they are stagnated from these 
opportunities.” Former Attorney General Sears agrees, stating that  
some of the highest achieving students are Haitian Bahamian students. The 
challenge for many of these young people is when they finish high school. They 
would have done well. Some would have gotten distinction and awards for their 
academic, athletic, and civic performance within the school, but they cannot 
advance… they are faced with this roadblock. 
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Due to the obstacles they face during high school and the limited prospects they have attending a 
tertiary education institution, Bahamian and Dominican-born students of Haitian descent often 
end up either unemployed, underemployed or engaged in 3D work – work that is dirty, degrading 
or dangerous. Jn-Simon, for example, relates how her Bahamian-born friend was a great 
basketball player and had been offered a basketball scholarship to study in the United States. 
Once his Bahamian passport was revoked, however, this opportunity was taken away.34 He 
ended up not graduating from high school, has two children – and “one on the way” – and is 
unemployed. She explains how another friend “who got the highest [Bahamas Government 
Certificate in Secondary Education exam results] in the government schools in her year… didn’t 
even have an opportunity to go to [university] because…she wouldn’t be able to get a 
scholarship.” Jn-Simon says that after working so hard in high school, her friend now “has to 
work and settle for mediocrity. Like certain jobs that she would never see herself doing, she has 
to settle for them in order to get where she wants to get in life.”  
 Jn-Simon, who is currently a College of The Bahamas student, adds that many of the 
young female students of Haitian descent in her neighborhood see limited opportunities post-
high school because of their ethnicity. They thus decide to “jump out of school pregnant. And 
then they’ll tell you you’re wasting your time going to school cause you still can’t do anything 
because you’re a Haitian.” She continues,  
Even at my job where I work now they told this girl the other day, ‘It don’t make 
no sense. It doesn’t make sense going to school because you have to work and pay 
for school.’ And listen now, they work at a food store, but yet they’re telling you, 
because you’re a Haitian–the girl who was saying this was a Haitian because she 
has her passport–she is saying that it would be better if you stayed and didn’t go 
to school and stayed working in the food store, so you could grow in the 
company. 
                                                        
34 I did not speak with this individual to know why his Bahamian passport was revoked. According to Jn. Simon, 
“His father and his mother were not married at the time when he got the passport so [Bahamian authorities said] ‘It’s 
time for it to be revoked.’” 
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The Dominican-born interviewees of Haitian descent in the Georgetown Law report relate 
similar experiences of frustration and “impoten[cy]” (2014, 40). Several of them dropped out of 
school, either fearing that they would be asked to show documents that they did not have or 
because they knew that even if they did well in high school, it would not matter because they 
would be unable to attend university afterwards. Juan, who had been denied his cédula and 
prevented from attending university “despite an excellent academic record,” laments that “my 
future has been destroyed…Very early I had a vision that at twenty I would finish high school, 
go to college, and earn a degree and by 25 have a family. Now I am 25 and I have not even 
begun” (GULSHRI 2014, 37). Lack of citizenship thus leaves many of these Bahamian- and 
Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent with little hope for the future. 
 Government jobs are out of the question without a Bahamian or a Dominican passport, as 
are many jobs in the private sector. Desmangles notes how many young Haitian Bahamians “take 
menial positions and then some of them they get stuck in them” because of difficulties in 
securing Bahamian citizenship. Dumercy adds that “[t]he stigma of the last name” haunts those 
who get an education and who try to advance in a career. She says that “local employers here, 
they look at your name and not at your qualifications.” St. Cecile, who previously worked in the 
healthcare industry, explains how, “when I applied for jobs… they see the qualifications there” 
but that “just by looking at my name…you won’t get hired.” Petit Homme describes how one’s 
last name automatically places a person in certain menial positions in the eyes of many non-
Haitian Bahamians. He describes how he was at The Bahamas National Film Festival holding a 
conversation with an American filmmaker when 
this lady, this Caucasian Bahamian, decides to interrupt our conversation. ‘Oh I 
haven’t met you two guys. Are you filmmakers?’ And he said, ‘Yeah.’ He told 
her his name and I told her my name and she asked me where my name was from. 
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And I told her my name was Bernard Petit, and she said, ‘Where’s that from?’ 
And I said, ‘That’s from Haiti.’ ‘Oh really? Do you mow lawns and weed 
gardens?’ 
 
Apparently some Bahamians have difficulties envisioning individuals of Haitian descent in any 
profession other than manual labour. Dumercy argues that it is not in their interests to do so. She 
says that while it is common to find persons of Haitian descent in “risky and life-threatening” 
jobs, you will not them “in tourism or some of the other key areas that might be useful to have 
international, multicultural knowledge” because “[t]he stigma of the last name” is so great.  
 These Bahamian-born interviewees’ Dominican counterparts encounter similar obstacles 
in employment. Calis García explains how although she took courses in accounting, computing 
and basic English, without a cédula, she cannot find employment as a teacher. Once, when she 
found employment as a teacher’s aide, she was paid very little money and told that she could not 
continue because she did not have a cédula. She has faced many such career limitations and it 
has left her despondent. “Many times I don’t feel like going on,” she says. Exilien likewise 
expresses dejection: “They killed me morally because when you are in a society and you cannot 
have a career, you cannot be in a job unless you are doing things that a person who has no worth 
does,” it is like being “an immigrant, an unknown, an undocumented person” (Civolani 
Hischnjakow 2011, 35). He says that he has had to take on jobs that he would not have chosen if 
he had been given his cédula and been able to pursue the opportunities that had been presented to 
him (ibid., 42). Other interviewees agree and lament their inability to advance economically as a 
result.35 Akin to undocumented youth in the United States then, these Bahamian- and 
Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent are “full of discardable potential” due to their 
noncitizen status (Gonzalez and Chavez 2012, 267). 
                                                        
35 On their visit to the DR, Diène and McDougall observed how batey residents were only able to find employment 
“for substandard pay and without contracts” (2008c, 24). 
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 Although part of the lowest economic classes, poverty affects Haitian descendants in The 
Bahamas and the DR differently when it comes to healthcare. Like their citizen counterparts, 
noncitizens are readily able to access healthcare in The Bahamas. In fact, one of the biggest 
complaints from Bahamian society is that undocumented or “illegal” persons are using the 
nation’s hospitals and clinics without paying for the services. Dr. George Charité, who runs his 
own medical clinic in Abaco and who is a Bahamian of Haitian descent, “[does not] know if it is 
true or false that they are overcrowding the public system because once it’s affordable, they 
pay.” He states that not only are persons of Haitian descent “paying for their services,” but 
“there’s a preference, even the ones who go to the public system, they go to the public doctor’s 
private residence and they pay to see him at his house.”  
Moreover, those who have to use the public clinic end up paying a higher fee, according 
to Dumercy. “We’re paying two to three times what you’re paying,” she says, “and then you’re 
criticizing me for going to see the doctor when I need it.” In contrast, in the DR, health care 
services for people who are undocumented are limited, whether due to lack of proximity to such 
services or because of discrimination. NGOs, like Batey Relief Alliance-Dominicana, end up 
providing vaccines, gynecological and dental care, as well as a range of other health services to 
those who live in the bateyes, irrespective of their status in the country.36  
 Even though the health care situation is different for the noncitizen insiders in The 
Bahamas and the DR, similarities exist when it comes to lack of freedom of movement and 
access to judicial remedies. Beside the aforementioned inability of some interviewees to travel 
overseas for athletic and educational activities, participants in both countries explain that when 
authorities perform round-ups to deport individuals, many individuals of Haitian descent, both 
                                                        
36 Personal interview with Maria Virtudes Berroa, Executive Director of BRA-Dominicana, Santo Domingo, July 
11, 2013. 
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legal and illegal, feel trepidation and are reluctant to leave their communities. As described 
earlier in the Dominican case, being black – whether of Haitian descent or not – can get one 
forcibly removed to Haiti. As Human Rights Watch reports, “The threat of deportation causes 
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent to restrict their travel, avoiding cities and remaining 
within the bateyes, which migration officials rarely enter” (2002, 12).  
That many of these people now lack Dominican identity documents due to the various 
practices described in chapter 4, and “that Dominicans are legally required to carry the national 
identity card (cédula), the lack of official documentation also imperils individuals’ right of free 
transit within the country” (Martínez 2011, 61). One of the participants in Civolani 
Hischnjakow’s study, Feliciana Pelsien Yan, reveals for example that she leaves for work very 
early and returns late because she is afraid of being rounded up and deported to Haiti for lack of 
a cédula. “I feel very insecure,” she admits (2011, 28).37 Organization of American States 
representatives heard a story from a woman who, “out of fear of being deported to Haiti, ‘where 
I don’t have anyone,’…does not travel to see her grandchildren, who live in a city less than an 
hour away from where she lives” (OAS 2013, n. pag.).38 
These comments reveal how “deportability” (De Genova 2002) affects the everyday lives 
of persons of Haitian descent by causing them to restrict their activities.39 Moreover, and as 
Bridget Anderson et al. point out, “deportability” “robs individuals, particularly those without 
                                                        
37 Even Tejeda, a Dominican of non-Haitian descent, states that “[i]f I don’t have my ID card with me, I feel afraid 
you know. You feel more secure if you have your ID with you here with the police.” 
38 Gonzalez and Chavez’s (2012) study also reveal that these types of fears are prevalent among undocumented 
youth in the United States. 
39 Movement into the DR from Haiti can also be restricted for Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent who carry 
a Bahamian-government issued Certificate of Identity/travel document (see chapter 3, p. 100). Describing a recent 
trip to the DR with his church youth group, Louis explains how the Dominican border authorities prevented him 
from entering the country. “I could not cross the border. They would not accept my travel document…They wanted 
the passport [which he did not possess]…They claimed [the Certificate of Identity] was not legitimate enough” for 
him to enter the DR. He ended up staying in Haiti for a few days and then returned to The Bahamas. 
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lawful migration status, of the practical ability to claim even the most basic of rights lest they 
bring themselves to the attention of immigration authorities” (2011, 552). The act of deportation 
completely severs “the relationship between the state and the individual” (ibid., 556) “and 
affirms the political community’s idealised view of what membership should (or should not) 
mean. Deportation thus shows the citizenry not simply as a community of law, but also as a 
community of value” (ibid., 548). 
 This community of value does not readily extend to the family of those who are deported, 
however. Diène and McDougall report, for instance, that “[d]eporations occur so rapidly that 
family members are not informed. Parents are deported leaving children unaccompanied” (UN 
2008c, 5). Several years later, Charpantier affirms that this activity is still occurring. “And they 
leave the children behind,” he says, “and we are also denouncing that they are leaving children 
abandoned.” In the Bahamian case, Bahamian-born and educated students sometimes spend 
weeks or months in detention because of their parents’ undocumented status, while others are 
deported. “[S]ometimes you find more children who born in The Bahamas than Haitians 
themselves” in the detention center, notes one interviewee.40 Even those who hold Bahamian 
government issued travel documents are deported, according to this participant, who adds that 
this happens “[a]ll the time. All the time.” Jn-Simon concurs, “I know a lot of Haitian children 
whose parents are deported and they have to live with, you know, Haitians. They have all sorts of 
family. Everybody is their cousin–and then they have to live with a cousin’s cousin. The things 
that happened to them, it’s depressing. And my mother takes in a lot of people. So I could tell 
you, these people go through a lot.” 
                                                        
40 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 29, 2009. 
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Dr. Charité sees the problem of deportation of Bahamian-born children as particularly 
pressing when it comes to their identity. He explains how the Department of Immigration rounds 
up irregular migrants and deports their Bahamian-born children along with them.  
When the child reaches Haiti that child knows nothing about Haitian culture. 
Most of them can’t even speak Krèyol. So what’s going to happen? That child has 
to now try to learn the culture, which he or she might not be able to fit in. When 
that child reaches Haiti, that child is going to be also a misfit because the people 
in Haiti don’t understand the child either. Whenever the child reaches 18…that 
child is going to pine to come back to The Bahamas. That child now comes back 
to The Bahamas, knows nothing about Bahamian culture, knows not how to read 
English or write in English. So what [do] you do with that child now? You put 
that child in an environment where he or she can’t function.  
 
Dumercy explains how in The Bahamas some Haitian migrant parents are trying to counteract 
this situation by enlisting a service wherein they “sign these papers to say if something happened 
to you [e.g. deportation], this person can be a legal guardian for your child. So now a lot of 
persons in Nassau are filling out these documents in advance. So if something happened to them, 
their kids would still be able to go to school and have a life here [in The Bahamas] because they 
don’t know anything about Haiti.” Others find themselves in a situation of family separation, 
unable to accompany their sick children to overseas hospitals or unable to join their partners in 
another country.41 The right of a family “to protection by society and the State” (UN 1948, 
Article 16) is therefore jeopardized when one is stateless. 
 As pertains to legal remedies and access to justice, one of the main problems that 
stateless people face is that they lack a juridical personality. As the IACHR asserts, “The right to 
the recognition of juridical personality implies the capacity to be the holder of rights (capacity 
and exercise) and obligations; the violation of this recognition presumes an absolute disavowal 
                                                        
41 In the case of Emildo Bueno Oguís v. Dominican Republic (OSJI and CEJIL 2010), for example, Mr. Bueno had 
solicited a certified copy of his birth certificate from the JCE so that he could join his wife in the United States. 
Despite having already possessed Dominican identity documents, the JCE refused to issue him a certified copy of 
his birth certificate and he could not travel. 
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of the possibility of being a holder of such rights and obligations” (2005, 66). A stateless 
individual, the Court continues, “ex definitione, does not have recognized juridical personality, 
because he has not established a juridical and political connection with any State” (ibid., 66-67). 
Lacking this connection, stateless people are unable to lawfully acquire property, obtain loans, 
credit, enter into contracts or sue. Thus, as Leonardo points out, the stateless  
really have nothing to lose. The only thing [those who were denationalized] had 
was their juridical personality. They are poor people, extremely poor. The only 
thing they have is their juridical personality, which allows them to develop in 
society; to get married, purchase, sell, open a bank account – all of these 
possibilities were taken from them arbitrarily by the State. They have nothing to 
lose. They don’t have anything. 
 
On their recent trip to the Dominican Republic, Organization of American State representatives 
“spoke with many people who stated that without a cédula they are unable to file a claim or 
follow through with a judicial proceeding. One mother informed the delegation that, since 
neither she nor her son have documents certifying that they were born in the country, she cannot 
sue her son’s father for child support” (OAS 2013, n. pag.). Not only is it nearly impossible to 
press a case in the courts, but those who are stateless also encounter difficulties registering the 
births of their children. Three of the five participants from El Caño were mothers and related 
how they were unable to register their Dominican-born children because of their own lack of a 
birth certificate or a cédula. “I feel terrible,” confesses one, knowing that her child’s life 
prospects have diminished as a result. Not only do the stateless “live in a state of extreme 
vulnerability” (OAS 2013, n. pag.) because of these various challenges, but the rejection they 






As explained by Beech, “Turner also sees liminality as a phase in which the liminar reflects 
about their society and their cosmos in order to return to society in a new identity with new 
responsibilities and powers” (2011, 287). Stateless interviewees, or those who had been at risk of 
statelessness, readily reflect upon what their insecure citizenship status means for them in terms 
of their identity (who they are) and their place in the world (where they belong).  
It was commonplace for the Dominican interviewees who were or who had been at risk 
of statelessness to evince a strong sense of Dominican identity. The five persons interviewed in 
El Caño felt Dominican, even though they were facing problems in obtaining their cédula or in 
registering their children as Dominican.42 Tejeda contends that “[t]hey feel like Dominicans 
because they were born here. They learned our cultural system and our history and they talk 
Spanish and they don’t practice voodoo. They’re Dominicans in the whole sense of the word.” 
Paraison agrees, “They are culturally much more Dominican than Haitian…They all know the 
Dominican national anthem, but not the Haitian national anthem. They play baseball; they don’t 
play football.”  
The participants in Civolani Hischnjakow’s study also “[a]ll felt very Dominican despite 
the discrimination they had received” (2011, 45). Yan, for example, states that “I am Dominican 
even if they keep my document: I am Dominican…it is an identity that is mine, not theirs” (ibid., 
24). She adds that “I am simply of Haitian descent, but I carry Dominican culture in my blood…I 
have no knowledge of Haiti” (ibid., 25). Gamboa contends, however, that the strength of one’s 
sense of Dominican identity depends on whether a person feels entitled to Dominican citizenship 
or not.  
                                                        
42 Interviews took place in the batey of El Caño in the province of Monte Plata on February 7, 2013. 
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[T]here’s people who will say, ‘No I am Dominican and I feel Dominican. I have 
documents that say I am Dominican. They are just now trying to discriminate 
against me’…There’s other people who say, ‘Well we’ve always been 
discriminated [against]. The government has not wanted us and they are making 
us stateless’…And then there’s the other people who do not necessarily feel 
entitled to Dominican nationality because it’s been so hard for them to actually 
even get it or to have their children obtain it…Not sure if stateless would be the 
word they would use. But [they are] definitely unwanted here and [are] not able to 
access Haitian nationality either.  
 
While a stronger sense of “being Dominican” exists among many of those who have been 
rendered stateless in the DR, a strong sense of “being Bahamian” does not as readily exist among 
the study participants from The Bahamas. Arguably what accounts for this difference is the sense 
of entitlement that Gamboa spoke of. As noted earlier, those born in The Bahamas of Haitian 
descent, or of noncitizens generally, have no right to Bahamian citizenship. Most of them know 
that they can apply for Bahamian citizenship at age 18,43 but few of them grow up thinking they 
are Bahamian. As Desmangles states, the possession of a Bahamian government issued 
Certificate of Identity, which demonstrates where and to whom a noncitizen child is born so that 
they may apply for Bahamian citizenship at age 18, only leads a person to being “treated as 
though you are a foreigner.” Anyone born in the Dominican Republic prior to the 2010 
constitutional amendment, however, had the right to Dominican citizenship. Thus, as explained 
in chapter 4, many of the persons who are being rendered stateless now once held Dominican 
citizenship documents and this affects the strength of their sense of belonging to the Dominican 
State.  
 Although the Bahamian-born interviewees of Haitian descent were under no illusion that 
they were Bahamian citizens, they did not consider themselves Haitian either. Dumercy explains 
how there were two soccer teams in her neighborhood when she was growing up. One “was a 
                                                        
43 Bahamian lawyer Dexter Reno Johnson writes that he knows of “a number of young persons of Haitian 
extraction” who were born in more rural parts of The Bahamas who “were totally unaware of the constitutional 
requirements” (2008, 69). 
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‘real’ Haitian team” while the other was made up of “Haitian Bahamians.” “I’d side with the 
Haitian Bahamians as a spectator compared to the real Haitians,” she says, “because I’m Haitian 
Bahamian” and she feels that “unless you’re part of the family,” the “real Haitians” reject those 
of Haitian descent. “The real Haitians look at us, they’re like, ‘Oh yeah, you born here, you little 
Bahamian,’” she remarks in a pejorative tone.  
Despite her self-identification as a “Haitian Bahamian,” Dumercy then states something 
that reveals how ambivalent she is about the “Bahamian” side of her identity. Describing how 
she would “pick who I like” if two Haitian soccer teams played against each other, she adds that 
she would “side with the Haitian team” – whether or not they were good players – if they “went 
up against Bahamians.” Yet when asked by the Haitian Ambassador during her Haitian 
“renunciation” procedure for Bahamian citizenship if she was “sure you want to give up” Haitian 
citizenship, Dumercy did not hesitate to renounce Haitian citizenship and become a Bahamian. 
“So when I finally got to see him, he asked the question [of whether she knew what she was 
giving up]. I was like, ‘Yes! Where do I sign?’” Dumercy admits that she feels “conflicted” over 
where she belongs, but this is because of the rejection she – and others – feel from the Haitian 
and Bahamian communities. “I don’t feel like, you know, if they had to pick between me and 
them, they’d pick me. They would always pick themselves.” So she identifies with the “Haitian 
Bahamian” even though she is now a Bahamian citizen. 
Discussing the use of “Haitian Bahamian” to refer to children born of Haitian descent in 
The Bahamas, Jn-Simon asserts that she feels “neither” Bahamian or Haitian. She admits, 
however, that “I feel more comfortable saying that I am Haitian.” When asked why she is 
uncomfortable calling herself a Bahamian, Jn-Simon relates, “Okay, let’s say I am in class and I 
am asked ‘What are you?’ And you say, ‘Bahamian.’ You get that look. You know? And let’s 
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say, you’re filling out an application; you put Bahamian and they look at your last name. You get 
the look” of disapproval. A person of Haitian descent cannot be a “true-true” Bahamian. When 
questioned whether her answer could change once she naturalizes, Jn-Simon says she will still 
call herself Haitian. 
Yes. Most definitely. Because, I mean, them giving [citizenship] to us when we’re 
18 it’s like, ‘Oh, I’ve been holding it from her long enough. Let me just give her it 
for giving’s sake.’ It’s not like it was ever mine and they gave it to me. It’s not 
like that. It’s just, I guess, so other nations would see that they’re not that cruel. I 
think that’s why they do the [allowing you to apply at age] 18. Otherwise they 
would not have given [citizenship] at all in my opinion. 
 
Additionally, when I asked the study participants about any Haitian nationality or identity 
documents they possessed growing up, they were perplexed. They did not have any. While a few 
were unaware of the possibility of going to the Haitian Embassy in Nassau to try to obtain a 
Haitian birth certificate or passport, Dumercy openly admits, “[F]rankly, I didn’t even want one. 
I’m like why should I have to get a Haitian passport when I was born here?” Others comment on 
the strangeness of renouncing a nationality (Haitian) that they never felt they had as part of the 
Bahamian citizenship application process. “That was always something that I questioned,” says 
Louis. “Why? Because I am denouncing a nationality that genetically I have. However, 
according to [the] State, I am not a Haitian.” When asked why he thought he was not considered 
a Haitian by Haiti, he responded, “I did not have a Haitian passport. I was not born in Haiti.” 
Jn-Simon, who is in the Bahamian citizenship application process, calls her alleged 
Haitian nationality her “quote unquote citizenship,” while Dumercy, who never had a Haitian 
passport either, comments that “we don’t know what we’re giving up” when they go to the 
Embassy and renounce Haitian citizenship. “We’re just going through the motion. You don’t 
understand it. But okay, this is what I need to get my [Bahamian] passport. I’m gonna do it.” 
Participants thus renounce a nationality they either never knew they had or never felt like 
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belonged to them. As Petit-Homme remarks, “I felt like I wasn’t really a Haitian citizen because 
I never saw the place and I didn’t really feel a direct connection to Haiti other than through my 
parents and speaking some of the language and some of my associations.” 
 Despite the Haitian identity that is firmly attributed to these Bahamian-born interviewees 
by non-Haitian Bahamians, Haitians from Haiti do not necessarily consider these persons 
“Haitian” either. Dolce observes how, “You have one group of people saying, ‘You are this’ and 
the other person saying that you are not. It’s like you are stuck in between…You’re saying I am 
Haitian, but if I go to Haiti they say that I am not Haitian. I am Bahamian.” Desmangles concurs, 
explaining how when he visited Haiti at the age of 15 people told him,  
‘Oh, no, no. You’re not Haitian, you know.’ They look at me…I say, ‘Ah my 
parents are Haitian. I understand that once you’re Haitian, you’re Haitian.’ ‘No, 
no, no! That’s not the case. You have to be born here.’… And the thing is, with 
Haiti, they don’t really want individuals who born in The Bahamas to be Haitians. 
That’s not something that they want to practice. 
 
Although Jn-Simon, as noted earlier, says she will continue to call herself “Haitian” even if she 
naturalizes, she admits that when her mother took her on a trip to Haiti, “how I was treated, I 
can’t ever say that I’m, okay, a Haitian.” When I ask her whether the Haitians on that trip 
considered her to be a Haitian, she declares, “No. Not at all.” Dumercy adds, 
The Bahamas don’t want to claim you and Haiti don’t either…Like we always 
say, ‘Bahamas don’t want us and Haiti don’t want us.’ So we are on our own 
basically. We’re in limbo. We are on our own because we don’t really have 
anyone looking out for us or looking for our interests to protect us. [Haitians say], 
‘You wasn’t born here, you’re a Bahamian.’ But then…it’s the same thing where 
the Bahamians say, ‘Well you’re born of Haitian parents, you’re Haitian.’ So 
that’s why a lot of us [are] saying we’re stateless or we’re in limbo because the 
Haitians don’t look at us as part of them…Haiti don’t look at you as part of their 
country and, well, literally you could say The Bahamas don’t want you to be part 
of their country until you’re 18, until you’re an adult. That means as a child, I 
mean nothing to you…Literally, that’s what they’re saying by their law. You are 
worthless to me. 
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In a revelatory comment made during his 2012 Bahamas country visit, Haitian President Michel 
Martelly said that “until they’re 18 [persons born in The Bahamas of Haitian descent] don’t 
belong to anywhere, and yet they were born here, meaning do I have to tell anyone if you send 
them back to Haiti they probably don’t know anybody or won’t recognize the place where they 
land?” (Rolle 2012b; italics added). If the President of the country whose Constitution in theory 
is supposed to cover these individuals as nationals does not recognize them as Haitian, then who 
will? 
 St. Cecile, discussing the personal and societal rejection that many of them feel from both 
The Bahamas and Haiti, remarks that “to be stateless means you have no identity. You have no 
say in what’s going on…It feels like you’re nonexistent…You feel like you’re trapped; you’re 
held a prisoner…Yeah, you feel like you’re trapped and there’s no way out for you. You have no 
identity.”44 Louis had a similar definition of statelessness: “to be stateless is to not have a 
nationality that is publicly known or I can say that falls under a country’s group of identity.”  
 The relationship that St. Cecile and Louis observe between identity and nationality is 
revealing in that the Convention on the Rights of the Child is explicit that nationality is a 
fundamental part of one’s identity. Article 8 of the convention asserts that “States Parties 
undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, 
name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference”45 (UN 1989;  
italics added). 
Dr. Charité believes that lack of identity is one of the greatest problems facing the 
Bahamian-born population of Haitian descent. “They don’t have an identity, even though they’ve 
                                                        
44 Personal interview, Nassau, November 1, 2012. 
45 It further adds – and this is important in the case of the Dominican Republic – that “[w]here a child is illegally 
deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and 
protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.” 
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been in The Bahamas for all the days of their lives.”46 He adds that this is why “they’re stateless 
according to them. Cause they don’t know Haiti and they’ll never go to Haiti. They’ll never go to 
Haiti. The only place they know is The Bahamas.” 
Gustavius Smith, writing for The Haitian Times, explains how “lack of citizenship 
certainty provides an inability to plan for a prosperous future and is one of the primary reasons 
that Generation Y Haitian-Bahamians mentally check out of the Bahamas at an early age” (Smith 
2012, n. pag.). Citing a “lack of identity” and feeling as if they would not “ha[ve] a future in the 
Bahamas,” yet “ha[ving] no history or roots in Haiti,” Smith describes how some Bahamian-born 
persons of Haitian descent seek to live in the United States. Thus they not only “mentally check 
out,” but some of them also attempt to “physically check out” of The Bahamas and leave for the 
U.S. and elsewhere.47 Dumercy, describing how frustrating the citizenship application process 
was for her, admits that she “was actually at the point where I was ready to give up. That’s how 
bad it was. Just move and leave the country.” 
Their limbo-like status weighs heavily on their sense of worth and many of the 
Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent question where they belong. “They don’t make us feel 
like we belong here [in The Bahamas],” says Dumercy. “So it’s a sense of belonging…You 
shouldn’t be stateless in the place [where] you were born and where you feel like you’re not 
included or not wanted.” Like some of the youth in the Smith article, Dumercy describes how the 
sense of rejection is so strong that some persons, born in the country of Haitian descent, feel the 
need to embark on dangerous sea journeys to try and find a more welcoming community. “And 
it’s so sad you know, where you feel you have to leave your country to get better treatment.” 
                                                        
46 Personal interview, Marsh Harbour, Abaco, November 13, 2012. 
47 The Bahamas has an issue with human trafficking and smuggling (Government of the United States 2013, 84-5; 
Rolle 2013; Brown 2014; Maycock 2014). Many Haitians arrive in The Bahamas – and many of their descendants 
attempt to leave The Bahamas – via smugglers. Some of the latter are rumored to be Bahamian. 
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Reflecting on the death of a friend who had embarked on such a journey, Dumercy asks, “If the 
Bahamas is so great, why [do] you think they’d rather die than stay here? If people would rather 
risk their lives and die that means something is wrong, drastically wrong.” Lack of citizenship, 
compounded by societal rejection, thus drives some of these individuals to the extreme. 
The participants in Civolani Hischnjakow’s study also evidence uncertainty as to where 
they belong. Although more youth of Haitian descent born and raised in the DR feel Dominican, 
in comparison to the “Bahamianness” felt by those born in The Bahamas, the former also 
become “confused about what their nationality is and where they belong” (2011, 24). The 
participants in her study readily admit that it affects them to the point where “your personality 
changes. If you’re not from here or there, where are you from?” (ibid.). Ramona Petión declares, 
“We don’t know where we belong. It’s like when you have an animal and you let it loose without 
its brand…We’re not even in that position. We’re not even branded animals because, without 
those documents, nobody recognizes us” (ibid., 25).  
[D]e la Rosa adds that without any Dominican documentation it is as if “I were a 
stranger, but in my own country or in my own nation…it’s like I am physically here, but when it 
comes to the laws it’s as if I don’t exist” (Civolani Hischnjakow 2011, 26). Tejeda explains that 
although these individuals “feel like Dominicans” and “want to be Dominicans and integrate in 
the nation,” denationalization is very hard upon them. “They’re Dominicans in the whole sense 
of the word and it’s very difficult for a child when in an instant they say, ‘No, you’re not 
Dominican anymore.’ It’s very, very hard from a human rights perspective to accept this 
situation.” As a result, these Dominican-born individuals of Haitian descent feel “anguish, 
anxiety and insecurity,” humiliation, confusion and frustration (Civolani Hischnjakow 2011, 36. 
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34 and 27) – sentiments shared with their Bahamian-born counterparts to the north.  
Conclusion 
Paul Jones and Michał KrzyŜanowski posit that “belonging has to be based, to some extent, on 
elective attachments” (2011, 46) and that it is “a process whereby an individual in some way 
feels some sense of association with a group, and as such represents a way to explain the 
relationship between a personalized identity and a collective one” (ibid., 44). Both Dumercy and 
de la Rosa’s aforementioned comments are revealing in that they feel they are either compelled 
to leave their country (in the case of Dumercy) or made to feel like a stranger in their country (in 
the case of de la Rosa). They feel that they ought to belong to the country of their birth. The 
evidence presented above, however, demonstrates that belonging is more than elective 
attachment on the part of the Bahamian- or Dominican-born individual of Haitian descent.  
The chapter illustrates that noncitizen insiders of Haitian descent exist in limbo in 
Caribbean States such as The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. They do not fully belong to 
the countries of their birth, as they are legally and socially excluded; but they also do not belong 
to Haiti – whether from their personal point of view or in practice, as they lack proof of Haitian 
citizenship. When these individuals are removed from their liminal position, it is to be displaced 
within the classification of Haitian national, even though most have never been and never will go 
to Haiti. Belonging, therefore, has little to do with what one wishes to be in terms of nationality. 
Moreover, lack of citizenship from the countries of their birth – and a lack of effective 
citizenship, or proof of such citizenship, from Haiti – hampers their ability to enjoy the rights, 
freedoms and protections that supposedly adhere to personhood in the contemporary era. Thus a 
postnational world of blurred boundaries, flexible citizenships and deterritorialized rights has yet 
to be realized for them. If it exists, then they too are barred from its membership. The next and 
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final chapter discusses how statelessness can be addressed such that the stateless are removed 
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Chapter 6 – A Right to Belong 
 
“But the unsteadiness, softness and pliability of things may also trigger ambition and resolve: one 
can make things better than they are, and need not settle for what there is since no verdict of 
nature is final, no resistance of reality is unbreakable” (Bauman 2009, 2). 
 
Postnational assertions of the severance of human rights from citizenship and the weakening of 
citizenship in the State do not apply everywhere and do not hold for those who are citizens 
nowhere. As I illustrate in this dissertation, States still jealously guard their sovereign right to 
determine who belongs, often in arbitrary and discriminatory ways, and citizenship continues to 
be necessary to access rights, freedoms and protections. The boundaries of membership – 
especially against the ethnic or racialized “Other” – are hardening and belonging is becoming 
ever more precarious. Personhood has yet to serve as a key to the gates of the city, much less as a 
means of membership or rights attainment in the contemporary era. As in Arendt’s time, formal 
belonging to the State continues to be a fundamental aspect of the “human condition” (Arendt 
[1948] 2004, 631). 
 Citizenship is also a legal institution and the paradox, as I show in the dissertation, is that 
the law does not always operate in practice as it should so that people’s human right to a 
nationality can be fulfilled. Both the Bahamian and Dominican governments, for example, wash 
their hands of the statelessness problem they have helped generate by declaring that individuals 
born of Haitian descent on their soil fall under the operation of Article 11 of the Haitian 
Constitution. As I note earlier, this Article asserts that any person born of a Haitian mother or 
father who has never renounced Haitian citizenship is also a Haitian at birth. The reality is, 
however, that “[a]ll law is ‘situational law’” (Schmitt [1922] 1985, 13) and, as I show in chapters 
3 and 4, many such persons are not covered under Haitian nationality law in practice.  
Moreover, whether through a reinterpretation of legal doctrine (the “in-transit” clause in 
the case of the DR), the retroactive application of law (Ley 285-04 of the DR), the incorporation 
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of gender discriminatory provisions (the Bahamian Constitution) or the poor application of the 
law (Haiti is unable to satisfactorily provide proof of Haitian citizenship to its alleged nationals 
born overseas), the law often serves as the cover under which exclusionary State practices of 
citizenship denial and deprivation occur. Therefore a purely legal approach to statelessness and 
the fulfillment of the human right to a nationality will not suffice. As Serena Parekh explains, 
“Arendt’s insight is that the crisis of the 20th century has taught us the fallacy and naiveté of 
believing that human rights can be defended by legal means alone; human rights need something 
in addition to merely legal or formal structure” (2008, 50). I contend that the fulfillment of a 
human right to a nationality, and the resolution of statelessness in particular, need an additional 
framework beyond the legal sphere. This framework is global distributive justice (GDJ).  
Global distributive justice is concerned with the fair distribution of goods, or “‘who has 
what’,” so that people are able “to live decent lives” (Nardin 2006, 456). While most GDJ 
accounts are socioeconomic in nature,1 focusing upon the provision of food and foreign aid, the 
eradication of poverty, and the reduction of inequalities in wealth between rich and poor 
countries, I argue, contra the postnationalists, that citizenship is one of the key goods that people 
need in order to begin “to live decent lives.” For as Michael Walzer observes, “[t]he primary 
good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” (1983, 31). 
Although I make the case elsewhere why the non-fulfillment of the human right to a nationality 
is a matter of global distributive justice (Belton 2012), in this last chapter I would like to expand 
on what just membership for the stateless would entail, taking into account data gleaned from my 




                                                        
1 See, for example, Armstrong (2011), Beitz (1979), Pogge (1994 and 2002) and Moellendorf (1996). 
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Just Membership 
Just membership refers to the establishment of fair conditions under which people become 
members of a polity. In an earlier work I contend that  
[f]uture theorizing on global justice and membership…must acknowledge that 
just membership questions necessitate not simply looking at who is let in and 
what naturalization procedures should be extended to them, but also entails 
examining who has always been on the inside, and to whom we need to justify 
their continued exclusion from citizenship (2011b, 69). 
 
I then argue that just membership for the stateless should include a non-domination framework, a 
prohibition on permanent alienage, and a theoretical gaze away from the borders toward those 
noncitizens who have not migrated from elsewhere. In this dissertation I have purposefully 
examined “noncitizen insiders” – or individuals who have not migrated from elsewhere, but who 
are excluded from citizenship in the State nonetheless. In this final chapter I argue that just 
membership for the stateless entails the right to citizenship of a particular place from the 
moment a person is born, irrespective of the circumstances of their birth. This “place” is the 
country of their birth, if they so choose.  
This is a markedly distinct position to that of the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees. UNHCR’s position regarding citizenship acquisition for the stateless is “that 
individuals should have some state to turn to protect them against mistreatment by other states” 
(Spiro 2011, 733; italics added).2 As the UNHCR official in the Dominican Republic asserts, “to 
get to the point of UNHCR’s perspective on these nationality issues in the Dominican 
Republic…our main concern is that people have, that everyone has a link with a State. It doesn’t 
really matter what the State is – Haiti, the Dominican Republic, where ever.”3 Such a position, I 
                                                        
2 The exception in this regard is statelessness that arises in the context of State succession (Massey 2010). People 
who “who have the option to claim the nationality of more than one State to be able to freely decide which of these 
nationalities would be retained in situations of State succession” (UN 2009, 13). 
3 Personal interview, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, July 5, 2012. 
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argue, ignores the agency of stateless people while limiting their ability to be self-determining 
persons. It is overly Statist in orientation.  
Belonging to a State is about more than having protection from other States. For the 
majority of the stateless, it is about being able to make their lives in the country where they were 
born. It is about the ability to cement a foundation upon which future choices can be made and 
knowing that you have “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 376). In order for such a place to exist, just membership for the 
stateless must therefore entail the aforementioned right to citizenship from their State of birth at 
birth, recognition of a right to self-determination, non-discriminatory treatment, judicial review 
of State membership decisions and provision of documentation.  
Recognition of a right to self-determination is perhaps the most important when it comes 
to establishing fair conditions by which noncitizen insiders become members of a polity. Self-
determination is the right of peoples to decide how, and under what authority, they will govern 
themselves. It is a principle that came to the fore during decolonization (UN 1960), but it is an 
important collective right of indigenous peoples as well. 4 Both the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (UN 1966b) declare in their first articles that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination” and the Charter of the United Nations (UN 1945, Article 1) also recognizes this 
principle. It is important to emphasize that this is a right of “peoples” and not individuals, 
however. As I explain in chapter 1, no right to belong to a particular State exists. Thus while 
                                                        
4 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007b) asserts in Article 9 that “[i]ndigenous peoples 
and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and 
customs of the community or nation concerned.” Article 33 similarly declares that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the 
right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not 
impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.” See also the 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (2014). 
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Article 15 of the UDHR (UN 1948) proclaims that each person has the right to a nationality, 
international law does not delineate any particular duty bearer for the fulfillment of this right. 
Moreover, even though this same Article declares that each person has the right to change his or 
her nationality, this is not actually a right that is enforceable against any particular State. Even if 
a person wants to become a formal member of a State, he or she must undergo a State’s 
naturalization processes. It is “peoples,” embodied in the State, that have the right to self-
determination. 5  
As I describe in this dissertation, however, statelessness is the realm of the “betwixt and 
between” and “the essence of liminality is to be found in its release from normal constraints, 
making possible the deconstruction of the ‘uninteresting’ constructions of common sense” 
(Turner 1985, 160). The right of peoples, and not individuals, to self-determination is one of 
these “constructions of common sense” that permeates the way in which we look at the world. 
But what if we were “release[d] from normal constraints” and envisioned the fulfillment of the 
human right to a nationality from a less Statist and more individualistic perspective? What if we 
allowed the noncitizen insider to emerge from liminality and “return to society in a new identity 
with new responsibilities and powers” on his or her own terms (Beech 2011, 287)?  
A right of self-determination within a just membership framework addresses two distinct 
stateless groups when it comes to the fulfillment of a human right to a nationality. The first are 
those who are born on a State’s territory and the second are those who have come from 
elsewhere, but who have made their life on a given territory. As regards the first group, which 
consists of the majority of stateless persons, all those born on a State’s territory and who have no 
nationality in practice must be given the citizenship of their State of birth at the time they are 
                                                        
5 As Jacobson asserts, “[m]aking distinctions between citizen and alien is a crucial part of this process [of peoples’ 
self-determination]” (1996, 5). 
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born. Their ability to be self-determining agents in the nationality arena comes into play when 
they reach maturity. At this time they can choose whether they wish to retain the citizenship of 
their State of birth or, if they want and are able to do so, choose a different nationality and 
present proof of said nationality. Thus in the case of The Bahamas, for example, children born of 
noncitizens on its territory should be provided Bahamian citizenship at birth. At the age of 
maturity, instead of choosing to apply for Bahamian citizenship, they can choose to remain 
Bahamian – pending the fulfillment of certain qualifications6 – or acquire another nationality. 
As pertains to the second group, Peter Spiro (2011) envisions the rise of a norm wherein 
people access citizenship via residence in the future and Vicki Jackson argues that “[p]erhaps 
international human rights law needs to move in the direction of recognizing ‘rights’ to become 
citizens of countries in which one lives after some extended but reasonable period of time and 
subject to reasonable conditions” (2009, 448). Thus for those noncitizen insiders who are unable 
to prove birth on a State’s territory, or who have migrated from elsewhere, William Barbieri’s 
suggestion that “[a]lready established residents…not only have a right to political membership, 
but should be granted full…membership status unless they make a point of refusing it” (1998, 
143) may prove useful for this second group.  
Over sixty years ago the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established in the Nottebohm 
case7 that “the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor” in 
determining the actual nationality of an individual, but that “there are other factors such as the 
centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him 
                                                        
6 Qualifications could include length of residence, language ability, and other similar criteria.  
7 In this case, the ICJ ruled that Friedrich Nottebohm, a German by birth, but a recently naturalized citizen of 
Liechtenstein who had resided many years in Guatemala, was not in fact a Liechtensteiner because he had no 
genuine or effective link to that State and had only procured Liechtenstein citizenship to become a national of a 
“neutral” State during World War II (UN 1955, 26). The Court therefore judged that Liechtenstein had no standing 
to bring a claim on behalf of Nottebohm or to offer him diplomatic protection because Nottebohm lacked a genuine 
and effective link with Liechtenstein.  
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for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.” (United Nations 1955, 22; italics added) 
that must also be considered when determining where a person has a “genuine and effective” link 
to a State for nationality purposes.  
Although the ICJ was addressing the issue of dual nationality in this case, as opposed to 
those who have no nationality whatsoever, Mirna Adjami and Julia Harrington contend that “the 
principle of a ‘genuine, effective link’ is slowly emerging as a principle to guide State practice in 
granting citizenship” generally (2008, 106). They further posit that “[a] genuine and effective 
link suggests that citizenship should correlate with where individuals need citizenship in order to 
exercise the qualities of citizens and enjoy the state protection provided by citizenship” (ibid.). 
Arguably, in the cases I analyze in this dissertation, the Bahamian- and Dominican-born persons 
of Haitian descent need citizenship in the countries of their birth, which also happen to be their 
place of residence, employment and family ties. As Jn-Simon, discussing the option of obtaining 
a Haitian passport, asks,  
What use is that to you in The Bahamas? What could you do with it? Regardless 
of the fact that it proves you have an identity, you still have to consider that I have 
to go look for a job. I have to go apply to school. With that Haitian passport I 
would be charged non-Bahamian fees. With that Haitian passport I have to go and 
apply for a work permit in order to work in The Bahamas, which I have been here 
all of my life, and that’s just silly. 
 
Outside of need, however, an important element of individual self-determination as I present it 
here is its affective nature. Just membership for the stateless must include a process for 
citizenship acquisition (or retention) that fully takes into account where it is these noncitizen 
insiders want to belong. It must move beyond Statist practices of membership exclusion. 
As Goris remarks,   
[a]t some point in some cases, it should become immaterial whether another State 
will claim them as a citizen or not. Because if they have no effective ties to that 
country, if they do not want to be nationals of that country, there is the argument 
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that they should, particularly children, [be given citizenship] if they have no 
reasonable expectation of returning to [another] country, their parents have been 
living in [the] country [of the child’s birth]. You know, their grandparents were 
originally from country A, but the parents have been living in country Y for 30 
years. Does it matter that this other – their ‘country of origin’ however many 
generations back – could give them citizenship if that’s not where they’re going to 
make their life?  
 
As I discuss in chapter 5, many Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent think that it is strange 
that they have to go to the Haitian Embassy and renounce a nationality they either never knew 
they had or felt like did not belong to them. Similarly, those who have been denationalized or 
denied citizenship in the DR nonetheless feel Dominican. Not only do these Bahamian- and 
Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent often consider their birth place to be home, but 
numerous interviewees – and even President Martelly8 – acknowledge that these individuals 
“have no effective links to Haiti as a country. Haiti is not their country of origin.”9 As Dumercy 
emphatically asserts, “You’re not of there.”  
Yet the States of their birth continue to cast them into liminality or, when not making 
them liminals, force them to be Haitian. As Bahar Rumelili explains, “social structures of 
international politics respond to liminality mainly by attempting to ‘domesticate’ it, either by 
constructing new social categories, or by repositioning the liminal in one of the existing 
categories” (2012, 498). When The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic place Bahamian- and 
Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent into the existing category of Haitian national 
(typically without proof that they have said nationality in practice), they are, in effect, 
“domesticat[ing]” the liminality within their borders. They are regulating the “exceptions” within 
(Schmitt [1922] 1985).  
                                                        
8 See pp. 98-99 and 180. 
9 Personal interview with Indira Goris, New York City, February 22, 2012. 
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As I make clear in this dissertation, stateless people are made. They do not exist outside 
of State practices of inclusion and exclusion. “[S]tatelessness is not an aberrant or accidental 
phenomenon occurring despite the best efforts of states to prevent it, but a ‘normalized’ systemic 
condition produced by an international order predicated upon the power to exclude as the essence 
of statist politics” (Hayden 2008, 250). Thus, as in Arendt’s time, the stateless are often labeled 
and/or treated as “illegal” residents or made to fall outside the framework by which States 
categorize populations, thereby becoming “an outlaw by definition” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 360). 
It is thus unjust, in the majority of cases, to predicate their human right to a nationality, and the 
subsequent rights that attach to citizenship, on their “lawful” presence within a State.10 Children, 
especially, should not be penalized for the irregular migratory status of their parents and unable 
to enjoy their human right to a nationality as a result.11 
 Just as these persons should not be penalized for any “unlawful” status that they were 
made to hold through exclusionary State membership practices, they should not be treated in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory manner in the citizenship acquisition process because they are the 
racial or ethnic “Other.” As I demonstrate in the dissertation, discrimination often occurs under 
the cover of what appears to be neutral nationality law. In the case of The Bahamas, for example, 
the denial of citizenship to persons born of noncitizens on its soil applies to all noncitizens, not 
just Haitian nationals. In the case of the Dominican Republic, the 2010 nationality amendment to 
the Dominican Constitution applies to all persons who are present on Dominican soil without 
authorization, regardless of ethnicity or race. Yet the reality is, in both cases, individuals of 
                                                        
10 Barbieri does not predicate the right to citizenship in his just membership account to those who are “lawfully” or 
“rightfully” residing within a State either. He says, “One’s claim to belonging increases with residence, irrespective 
of the circumstances of admission” (1998, 157). 
11 This is prohibited in international law (see Article 2 of the CRC [UN 1989]), but as Sentence TC/0168/13 makes 
clear, the “irregular” migratory status of the parents and the grandparents can affect the right to Dominican 
citizenship of persons of Haitian descent. 
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Haitian descent are the ones who are most significantly affected by these laws and the obscure 
and politicized processes that surround their implementation.  
Whereas both the Bahamian and Dominican governments deny that they are 
discriminating against persons of Haitian descent when it comes to the fulfillment of their human 
right to a nationality, the evidence I present in chapters 3 and 4 suggests otherwise. In both cases, 
we may be dealing with what Gerard Delanty et al. call the “new racism.”  
The ‘new’ racism differs from the older kinds in that it is not expressed in overtly 
racist terms or in the terms of neo-fascist discourse…Instead, the repertoires of 
justification that are typically employed use social characteristics (for example, 
protecting jobs, concern about welfare benefits) or cultural incompatibilities or 
differences (migrants lack ‘cultural competences’, 12  ‘they do not want to 
integrate’, they are not ‘tolerant’)…the new racism has been termed ‘xeno-
racism’, a mixture of racism and xenophobia. While being racist in substance, it is 
xenophobic in form: its outward defensive mode of expression disguises a 
stronger opposition to migrants and the continuation of racism in a new guise and 
widened to exclude different groups of people (2011, 2). 
 
Being both black and “foreign” – they do not fit what it means to be a “true true” Bahamian or 
meet the Iberian cultural standards of Dominican nationality identity13 – individuals of Haitian 
descent in The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic fit the objects of the “new racism” and 
face a double constraint. As Dumercy explains, “I say, well you born, you born black. That’s an 
X against you here. And then you’re born, you’re a Haitian. That’s two X against you.” 
Granting citizenship in an equitable manner thus entails the establishment of transparent 
rules and procedures for citizenship acquisition (or retention). The relevant citizenship-granting 
body must provide regular status updates at predetermined intervals so that individuals are not 
left in limbo. This is what Benhabib calls “the right to know” (2004, 139). Discussing “the right 
to naturalization” (ibid., 50) of all persons who have already been admitted into the polity, 
                                                        
12 Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent are not considered “true true Bahamians” (see chapter 3, pp. 152-153) 
and Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent do not meet Dominican “Iberian” cultural standards (see chapter 4, 
p. 121). 
13 See chapters 4 and 5. 
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Benhabib argues that such persons have “the right to know” how to go about the naturalization 
process (ibid., 139). In the Bahamian and Dominican cases, where poor communication, requests 
for extraneous documentation, and non-transparent rules and procedures for citizenship claims 
are serious impediments to the fulfillment of many Haitian-descended persons’ human right to a 
nationality, “the right to know” all of the documents, deadlines and procedures for claiming 
citizenship is vital to belonging.  
Additionally, it is important that those States that do not allow dual nationality, such as 
The Bahamas, greatly reduce the period between the renunciation of one’s “original” nationality 
and the acquisition of another nationality. As I explain in chapter 3, people may become de jure 
stateless during this time. They have to renounce their “original” nationality as part of the 
Bahamian citizenship application process and do not become Bahamian citizens until the official 
swearing-in ceremony, which can take several months to occur. Leaving someone stateless for 
months, in a condition of “infinite danger” (Walzer 1983, 32), is far too long. Just membership 
for the stateless thus entails the immediate provision of citizenship to those whose application 
has been approved. Each person should be able to go to a justice of the peace or an immigration 
officer with the citizenship approval letter and immediately be sworn-in and registered as a 
Bahamian citizen. If said person would like to wait for the next official group swearing-in 
ceremony, he or she may choose to do so; but the option for an individual, rapid swearing-in 
must also exist.  
 Another means of avoiding discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the processing of 
citizenship claims is to ensure that judicial review exists. Although international law does not 
recognize nationality “as a prohibited ground for differentiation” among people when it comes to 
the provision of human rights (Lillich 1984, 41; Tiburcio 2001, 56), some scholars contend that 
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“the recognition of the human rights aspects of nationality implies procedural fairness and 
independent review” (Hailbronner 2003, 79). Since States, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, 
can engage in discriminatory membership practices under the cover of seemingly neutral laws or 
procedures, it is imperative that just membership for the stateless entails the right to judicial 
review of their citizenship application (e.g. The Bahamas) or citizenship status investigation (e.g. 
the Dominican Republic). 
As I note in chapter 3, the Bahamian Constitution provides broad leeway for the Minister 
in charge of naturalization and immigration to make membership decisions without heeding the 
advice of any other body. In that chapter I also point out that the Cabinet, which in practice 
makes the majority of citizenship decisions, does so in an overtly politicized and non-transparent 
environment. Individuals consequently have no recourse to contest any rejection of their 
citizenship application. As the Bahamas Constitutional Commission asserts,  
such preclusive provisions can be misused by the executive for political or other 
reasons to deny registration to persons who are entitled to be registered as 
citizens. The Commission is therefore firmly of the opinion that the Minister’s 
decision should be subject to review for breach for natural justice…the 
Commission is of the opinion that the current system under which the grant or 
refusal of citizenship is a purely executive power exercised directly by the 
political directorate, specifically the Cabinet, is inherently unfair and arbitrary 
(Government of The Bahamas 2013a, 99-100).  
 
Likewise, and as I explain in the Dominican case in chapter 4, the Junta Central Electoral is the 
body that grants citizenship and investigates “irregular” citizenship cases, yet is composed of 
some officials who arbitrarily deny or deprive people of their citizenship identity documents. As 
Gamboa states, the JCE is “judge and jury” of its own actions. Because of the suspect nature in 
which matters dealing with citizenship acquisition and denial are handled in The Bahamas and 
the DR, both countries’ governments need to establish independent judicial bodies that can 
 203
transparently and fairly review citizenship claims if they are to effectively address the problem of 
statelessness within their borders.14  
 Finally, since “the global era is increasingly legalistic, [and] invisibility to the law is a 
profound assignation indeed” (Dauvergne 2008, 174), just membership for the stateless must 
include the provision of citizenship documents, whether in the form of a birth certificate or a 
passport. It is not enough, as I show in the dissertation, to be covered in theory under the 
operation of a State’s law. An individual must have proof of it. Personhood does not yet suffice 
for membership and the enjoyment of the rights, freedoms and protections that are associated 
with formal belonging in the State.  
In a world of heightened human mobility, where so many rights, freedoms and 
protections continue to attach to citizenship, and where exclusionary State membership 
practices displace people into liminality or force them to take on a nationality with which 
they do not identify, the fulfillment of a human right to a nationality from a just 
membership perspective is crucially important. A just membership perspective not only 
removes these individuals from the “tyranny” of the citizens (Walzer 1983, 62), but it 
allows them to be self-determining agents. This is what is “at stake when belonging to the 
community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no 
longer a matter of choice” (Arendt [1948] 2004, 376). 
 While I have focused upon the noncitizen insider and the fulfillment of his or her human 
right to a nationality in this dissertation, the effects of citizenship denial and deprivation have 
important consequences beyond the individual level. As I describe in chapter 2, statelessness can 
                                                        
14 The Bahamian Constitutional Commission likewise recommends that “[s]erious consideration should be given to 
modifying the system to provide for the use of an independent, statutory board invested with powers to consider and 
recommend the grant of citizenship or asylum requests according to criteria consistently and, as far as practicable, 
objectively applied” (Government of The Bahamas 2013a, 100). 
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affect democratic consolidation and community stability. Some interviewees, for example, fear 
that the legal, political and social exclusion of Bahamian- and Dominican-born persons of 
Haitian descent will escalate into a large-scale social problem in the countries of their birth. “We 
will have pockets of the population that are going to then enter into crisis,” says Leonardo. 
“They’re going to enter into a crisis and search for their own identity. Because, look, they feel 
Dominican, but they are rejected. So, ‘What is our identity?’ They are going to start a process of 
differentiation.” Rodríguez agrees, “It’s a time bomb. We’re creating a bomb. There’s thousands 
of kids being raised in bateyes without access to education, without access to basic rights…So 
we’re creating a social bomb that’s going to explode.”  
These fears are echoed in the Bahamian case. Bahamian lawyer Dexter Reno Johnson 
proclaims that the situation “is a keg of dynamite, a source of potential social unrest of mammoth 
proportions;” “a critical problem that makes most other problems pale into insignificance since 
unless properly handled, this one could threaten the peaceful existence of the Bahamas, as we 
know it at any time, and for the foreseeable future” (Johnson 2008, 71 and 72).15 An interviewee 
adds that the Bahamian government’s exclusionary citizenship laws are “creating more liabilities 
than assets”16 for the country, while a second, discussing the problems associated with denying 
citizenship to children born of noncitizens until the age of 18, declares that “[w]hat you do in fact 
do is frustrate and alienate that person for 18 years. How does that serve the public good?”17 
Finally, The Bahamas Constitutional Commission, which made recommendations to alter the 
Bahamian Constitution in diverse areas, including nationality, emphatically asserts that it: 
cannot overstate the enormous psychological, socio-economic and other ill-effects 
that result from leaving large groups of persons in limbo in relation to their 
aspirations for Bahamian citizenship. Not only are the affected individuals badly 
                                                        
15 See also Marshall (1979, 207) and Sears (1994, 15). 
16 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, July 29, 2009. 
17 Personal interview, Nassau, Bahamas, August 6, 2009. 
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damaged and marginalized, the entire society is put at risk and its future 
compromised by having within its borders a substantial body of persons who, 
although having no knowledge or experience of any other society, are made to 
feel that they are intruders without any claim, moral or legal, for inclusion. Such 
feelings of alienation and rejection are bound to translate into anti-social behavior 
among many members of what is, in effect, a very large underclass in our society 
(Government of The Bahamas 2013a, 96-7; italics added). 
 
This particular “underclass” of which the Bahamian Constitutional Commission speaks 
exists globally. As I explain earlier in the dissertation, the non-fulfillment of a human 
right to a nationality has generated millions of stateless people worldwide. They are not 
captured within any legal framework by which people become formal members of some 
State. Often, the very laws by which they could become citizens are misused, misapplied 
or misinterpreted to exclude them from formal belonging.  
An overly legalistic approach to resolving the problem of statelessness and the 
non-fulfillment of a nationality, therefore, may not be the best approach. Thus, as I 
contend in this concluding chapter, we ought to consider alternative frameworks, such as 
that of global justice, from which to address statelessness and the fulfillment of a human 
right to a nationality. We must also, as I argue in the dissertation, examine how 
nationality laws are put into practice to understand how they affect people’s lives. When 
we do so, we discover that the world is not yet one of blurred boundaries, flexible 
memberships and denationalized rights for those who are noncitizens everywhere. 
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